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While much empirical literature studies agency conflict and firm performance 
within the corporate form of legal organization, this dissertation studies agency conflict 
and firm performance across two organizational forms, corporations and trusts.   Trust 
law imposes higher fiduciary responsibilities on managers than corporate law, which is 
likely to limit opportunistic behavior by trust managers.  At the same time, they can also 
constrain managerial flexibility in decision making.  To analyze the effect of this trade-
off, this dissertation exploits variation generated by a change in British regulations in 
1997 that removed a requirement that mutual funds organize as trusts, allowing them to 
organize as either trusts or corporations.  This regulatory shock offers a natural laboratory 
to study of the effect of organizational form on firms’ performance. 
Three chapters explore different aspects of this issue.  Chapter II examines 
whether funds behave differently when organized as trusts versus corporations.  The 
results demonstrate that trust law is more effective than corporate law in curtailing 
opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their 
observationally equivalent corporate counterparts.  Trusts also incur lower risk than 
corporations.  While the business flexibility of corporate funds leads to greater agency 




Given these results, a natural question is whether organizational competition can 
impact the performance of the financial services industry as a whole.  Chapter III 
analyzes this issue for the British fund industry.  Increased competition led to an increase 
in risk taking and risk-adjusted performance within the industry, though it also resulted in 
higher direct costs for consumers.  
Chapter IV critiques efforts by U.S. lawmakers to mitigate agency conflict 
inherent in mutual fund operations.  The U.S. follows a corporate model, requiring that 
all funds have boards of directors and grant voting rights to investors.  Chapter IV 
outlines shortcomings of the corporate model and contrasts the alternative trust model 
pursued by other countries, notably the U.K.  This dissertation shows that agency costs, 
risk taking behavior, and managerial performance are impacted by the different fiduciary 
duties inherent in trusts and corporations, making different organizational forms 








 Chapter II  
 





This chapter studies the effect of organizational form on managerial behavior and firm 
performance.  It does so by exploiting variation generated by a change in British 
regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a 
corporation.  Trust law imposes stricter fiduciary responsibilities on managers than 
corporate law does.  I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing opportunistic 
behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their observationally 
equivalent corporate counterparts.  Trust managers also choose portfolios with lower risk.  
However, evidence suggests that trust managers underperform their corporate 
counterparts, even after differences in risk are accommodated.  These results show that 
the business flexibility granted to the corporate funds leads to greater agency costs and 
greater risk-taking behavior, but also to superior risk-adjusted performance.  An investor 
who invests $100,000 in a mutual fund organized as a trust, instead of an equivalent 
corporate fund, would save about $100 per year in management expenses, but would 
forgo about $1,300 per year in gross risk-adjusted performance.  The results have 
implications for corporate governance design, suggesting that enhancing investor 
protection through heightened fiduciary duties can mitigate agency costs and managerial 
risk-taking behavior, but at the cost of lower risk-adjusted performance.       
    
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Are insiders more likely to misbehave in a corporation as opposed to a trust?  
Does the way a business is legally organized influence management‟s performance or 
risk tolerance?  A large literature in corporate finance and law studies the effectiveness of 
various forms of investor protection on managerial behavior and firm performance (see, 
e.g., Tirole 2006).  While the overwhelming majority of literature focuses on the 
corporate form of business organization, this chapter studies agency conflict and firm 
performance across corporations and trusts within the British mutual fund industry.  Trust 
law imposes higher fiduciary responsibilities on firm managers than corporate law does.  
While strict fiduciary responsibilities can limit opportunistic behavior, they can also 
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constrain managerial flexibility in business decision making.  This trade-off between 
agency conflict and flexibility in decision making presents an interesting setting in which 
to analyze the effect of organizational form on managerial behavior and firm 
performance.      
To analyze the effect of organizational form, this chapter exploits a variation 
generated by a change in British regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to 
organize as either a trust or a corporation.  The parallel existence of alternative types of 
organizational forms within one industry provides the key design feature of this study.  
The existence of the two types of funds offers a unique laboratory for the study of the 
effect of organizational form on agency and firm performance.  
This chapter examines governance at a more fundamental level than does the 
existing literature.  While there is a large empirical literature on firm governance, most of 
that literature focuses on the corporation and, hence, takes organizational form as given.  
One strand of that literature examines the impact on firm performance and firm value of 
the many concessions corporations can make to investors, such as covenants, control 
rights, board composition, takeover defenses, and other governance mechanisms within 
the corporation (e.g., Boone et al. 2007; Chidambaran et al. 2006; Core et al. 2006; 
Gompers et al. 2003; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Yermack 1996; Morck et al. 1988; and 
Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  However, these arrangements do not occur in an institutional 
vacuum, but rather within an environment of laws and regulations.  These laws and 
regulations may vary across organizational forms.  For instance, the fiduciary 
responsibilities imposed upon decision makers in corporations are not the same as those 
imposed upon decision makers in trusts.  A second strand of literature attempts to study 
the impact of different governance environments by examining differences in corporate 
governance structures across countries (e.g., Djankov et al. 2008 and LaPorta et al. 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000).  While current empirical research focuses on exploiting variation in 
governance environments across countries (but within the corporate form), this study 
exploits variation across organizational forms.  This approach offers sharper variation at a 
fundamental level of governance, and can help shed light on whether governance matters 
at all.   
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The traditional (Miller-Modigliani) view of corporate finance assigns 
organizational form no role.  It is irrelevant in a frictionless environment.  But in a world 
with agency conflict, fiduciary duties are important and organizational form might have 
implications.  In business organizations, a crucial task is to minimize the agency costs 
that arise from separation of ownership and control.  In the corporation, ownership is 
vested in the shareholders and control is exercised by management.  Similarly, in the 
trust, ownership is vested in the beneficiaries and control is exercised by the trustee.  In 
the absence of complete information about managerial activities, owners/beneficiaries 
cannot design and enforce a contract specifying the managerial actions to be taken in 
each state of the world.  Fiduciary duties provide a set of standards which the law applies 
to restrain insiders from exercising their discretionary power in contingencies not 
specifically foreseeable and over which the parties could not contract.  Corporate law 
resolves agency conflict by imposing on corporate officers and directors a duty of loyalty 
in pursuit of the corporation‟s objectives and a duty of care in performance.  Trust law, 
likewise, resolves the conflict between beneficiaries and trustees by imposing on the 
trustee a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.   
While similar, the fiduciary duties supplied by trust law and corporate law are not 
the same.  The duty of loyalty and the duty of care under trust law are stricter than those 
under corporate law.
1
  For instance, under both corporate law and trust law, the duty of 
care requires that decision makers discharge their duties with such care and skill as a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise.  However, the courts, understanding that 
excessive liability can deter economically desirable business activity, apply the duty of 
care in a way that defers to officers and directors of corporations.  That deference is 
embodied in the business judgment rule, which presumes that, in making business 
decisions, corporate officers and directors complied with the duty of care.  The business 
judgment rule places on a plaintiff challenging a business decision within a corporation 
the burden of rebutting the presumption, as the rule recognizes that reasonable decisions 
                                                 
1
 Note that trust fiduciary duties are default rules which the parties can vary by mutual consent (though 
some (e.g., Leslie 2005) object to the characterization of trust‟s fiduciary rules as true default rules, and 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff (2007) demonstrate empirically that changes in trust fiduciary laws impact the 
behavior of trustees of non-commercial trusts).  Also note that, while U.S. business trust statutes could have 
invoked different fiduciary duties, most such statutes instead incorporate the strict fiduciary standards of 
the common law of trusts. 
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can sometimes result in unfavorable outcomes.
2
  In contrast, trust law applies no business 
judgment rule in reviewing managerial actions, even when trusts are used in a 
commercial context.  In effect, the burden is placed upon trust management to show that 
their business decisions were prudent despite the unfavorable outcome.
 3
  The end result 
is that it is easier to hold decision makers personally accountable for their business 
decisions in trusts than in corporations.  The other fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, 
requires that decision makers act without any conflict of interest.  However, corporate 
law interprets the duty loosely, so as to permit conflict of interest transactions so long as 
they are “fair” to the corporation.  In contrast, trust law prohibits all such transactions, 
even if they would benefit the trust.  In short, due to the different fiduciary standards, 
decision makers are exposed to greater personal liability in trusts than in corporations.  
Tight fiduciary duties might impact a lot within a business organization.  They might 
lower agency conflict and reduce opportunistic behavior by insiders, but by leaving less 
flexibility for management, they might also impact performance and risk taking.   
This chapter examines mutual funds in the United Kingdom, where funds can 
organize in either corporate or trust form.  The chapter identifies, empirically, clear costs 
and benefits associated with these competing organizational forms.  I find that trusts are 
more effective than corporations in curtailing opportunistic behavior by fund managers.  
                                                 
2
 The English courts have not in terms developed a business judgment rule in the way that U.S. state courts 
have done, but “the same function is performed, perhaps more effectively, by formulating the directors‟ 
duties subjectively” (Davies 1992, 85n6).  The classic statement is that directors “exercise their discretion 
bona fide in what they may consider - not what a court may consider - in the interests of the company” (Re 
Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 (CA) at 306, cited in Davies 1992, 85). In other words, while there is 
no express business judgment rule, English courts are reluctant to second guess corporate decisions and 
have refrained from holding directors liable for mere errors of judgment. 
 
3
 While the corporate duty of care, along with the business judgment rule, require deference to ordinary 
business decisions absent gross negligence or conflict of interest, the trust duty of care is set at the more 
restrictive “reasonable person” standard.  The general principle followed by English courts since 1883 is 
stated: “As a general rule, a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes, in managing trust affairs, all 
those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his 
own” (Speight v. Gaunt [1883] 9 App. Cas. 1 at 19 cited in Mowbray, Tucker and Simpson 2000, 842).  
The standard requires trustees to take “objectively reasonable care in the context of the particular 
trusteeship, including due professional care where appropriate” (Getzler 2002, 42).  This standard has been 
reflected in the Trust Act 2000, which supplies a high objective standard, measuring trustee conduct against 
the conduct to be expected of a reasonable person with the trustee‟s knowledge, skills and characteristics 
(Getzler 2002, 42).  Further, the Trust Act imposes an even higher standard of care on trustees who are 
professionals or who hold themselves out as having special skill (Trust Act 2000 Sec. 1(1)).  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is some authority for deferential review of trustee decision making 
(see Restatement (Third) of Trusts 87).  
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Managers of trusts charge significantly lower fees than their corporate counterparts, even 
after controlling for potential differences in managerial ability and job complexity.  I 
confirm that these results are driven by differences in organizational form and not by self-
selection.  I employ both matched samples analysis and sample selection models to reach 
this conclusion.  One technique addresses selection on observables and the other selection 
on unobservables.  Both techniques support the conclusion that the difference in fees is a 
treatment effect of organizational form, not a selection bias.  The results indicate that 
trust law‟s strict fiduciary duties are a superior mechanism for mitigating opportunistic 
behavior and agency conflict within business organizations.  While strict fiduciary 
responsibilities limit opportunistic behavior, they might also constrain managerial 
flexibility in business decision making.  I find that trusts exhibit greater risk aversion than 
corporations.  Evidence also suggests that trusts generate lower returns than corporations, 
even after adjusting for the difference in risk.  In an equilibrium context, the trust‟s 
underperformance would more than offset its agency cost savings.  A hypothetical 
investor with $100,000 to invest would save, on average, about $100 per year in 
management fees by investing in a trust instead of an equivalent corporation.  But on 
average, that investor would earn about $1,300 per year less in gross risk-adjusted 
returns.  On a net basis, the investor is worse off having invested in a trust instead of an 
equivalent corporation.  The results show that the business flexibility granted to the 
corporate funds leads to greater risk-taking behavior and agency costs, but also 
sufficiently superior risk-adjusted performance to more than compensate for those costs.  
The results have implications for corporate governance design, suggesting that enhancing 
investor protection through heightened fiduciary duties can mitigate agency costs and 
reduce managerial risk-taking behavior, but at the cost of lower risk-adjusted 
performance.     
One caveat is that, due to data limitations, there is insufficient power to determine 
the statistical significance of the risk-adjusted performance results with confidence.  In 
spite of that limitation of the time series, the evidence does indicate that the difference in 
performance is quite sizeable in economic terms. 
The next section of the chapter describes the change in the British mutual fund 
industry that generated a unique laboratory for the study of the effect of organizational 
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form.  Section III describes the data.  Section IV presents the results with respect to fund 
expenses.  Section V presents the results with respect to fund performance.  Section VI 
addresses endogeneity concerns.  Section VII assesses the overall results and concludes. 
 
II. The British Mutual Fund Industry 
 
The mutual fund industry is a useful setting for analyzing the extent to which 
organizational form impacts managerial behavior and firm performance.  With mutual 
funds, it is easy to measure and compare performance, as net asset values are computed 
daily.  Moreover, so long as they satisfy income distribution requirements, mutual funds 
receive flow-through tax treatment, regardless of organizational form.  Thus, there are no 
differential tax effects.  Furthermore, by focusing on one industry, we minimize the 
concern that results are driven by differences in operating characteristics of firms rather 
than by differences in governance.  Finally, the fees charged to fund investors are 
computed regularly and on a standardized basis, and can be used to measure agency 
costs.  The mutual fund literature interprets management fees as a measure of agency 
conflict between fund managers and investors (e.g., Del Guercio, Dann and Partch 2003; 
Tufano and Sevick 1997; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).  Investors want to maximize their 
expected returns, net of fees, while fund managers want to maximize their own profits.  
Studies find that management fees are not positively related to performance (e.g., Tufano 
and Sevick 1997; Carhart 1997; Gruber 1996); hence, higher fees benefit fund managers 
while reducing net returns for fund investors.  Since incentives differ and managerial 
actions are not fully observable by investors, the levying of management fees on fund 
investors is a classic example of an agency conflict.  In sum, mutual funds provide 
outcomes that are directly observable and measurable, and that reflect the agency conflict 
between investors and managers.   
This study focuses on mutual funds in the United Kingdom.  Prior to 1997, British 
open-end mutual funds were organized exclusively as trusts, not corporations.  These 
British mutual funds are called “unit trusts.”  Unit trusts are created under British trust 
law and have been in existence for over a century.  Mutual funds in the U.K. evolved as 
unit trusts under trust law, as opposed to corporations under English company law, in 
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order to avoid certain restrictions of English company law, which does not apply to 
trusts.
4
  In a unit trust, the fund manager establishes the trust by entering into a trust 
agreement with a trustee.  Investors purchase beneficial interests in the trust pursuant to a 
contract between the investors and the manager.  The trustee takes ownership of the 
investment pool on behalf of investors, and the manager manages it. The contract 
pursuant to which the investors purchased their beneficial interests incorporates the terms 
of the trust agreement, which is binding upon and enforceable by the investors.  The 
rights and remedies of the investors are thus governed by trust (and contract) law.  A 
major change to the British mutual fund market occurred in 1997.  In 1997, British 
regulators permitted a new kind of open-end mutual fund, the Open-Ended Investment 
Company (OEIC).  OEICs are corporations organized under The Open-Ended Investment 
Companies (Investment Companies with Variable Capital) Regulations 1996, which 
came into effect on January 6, 1997.  As corporations, OEICs are independent legal 
entities with a board of directors, managed by a manager appointed by the fund‟s board.  
Investors invest in an OEIC by purchasing shares in the fund.    
The governance apparatus of OEICs, in practice, does not differ much from that 
of unit trusts.    While OEICs have a board of directors and the trusts do not, that 
difference is not substantive.  OEIC directors are not required to be independent.  
Moreover, no minimum number of directors is specified for OEIC boards.  The only 
requirement is that the fund‟s manager must serve as a director.  In practice, therefore, 
most OEIC boards consist solely of the fund‟s manager.  In other words, the board of an 
OEIC is not an active monitor comprised of independent directors, as the board is in the 
U.S. fund industry.  They exist merely on paper.  Furthermore, in a British fund 
organized in trust form, the trustee performs essentially a custodial role, unlike the active 
boards of trustees in U.S. trusts.  The custodial role is performed in an OEIC by the 
                                                 
4
 English company law prevented companies from repurchasing their own shares.  Thus, under English 
company law, mutual fund investors would not be able to liquidate their investments by demanding that the 
fund repurchase their shares; they would only be able to liquidate by selling the shares in a secondary 
market.  However, since trusts are not subject to company law, nothing prohibited unit trusts from 
repurchasing investors‟ interests.  This flexibility accounts for the development of open-end mutual funds 
as unit trusts rather than as corporations (Sin, 1997, 42-43).  That open-end funds organize as trusts 





  Both the trustee and the depository must be independent entities and are 
responsible for the safe keeping of investor assets.  Neither the trustee nor the depository 
performs active monitoring functions.  
The primary reason for the U.K.‟s adoption of the OEIC was marketability.  The 
OEICs were to be marketable in the European Union, unlike the unit trusts.
6
  In the 
1980s, the European Union set forth a framework for promoting cross-border flow of 
mutual funds among its members. Known as the UCITS Directive,
7
 this framework 
imposed minimum standards regulating open-end mutual funds within the European 
Union. The UCITS Directive set forth minimum standards with respect to fund 
organizational form, diversification, authorization, permissible activities, and disclosure, 
allowing mutual funds organized under the laws of one member nation to comply with 
only the marketing, advertising, and tax laws of another nation in which they do business. 
In other words, the Directive allowed mutual funds to operate under a “passport” system, 
where they could be offered for sale throughout Europe once they were authorized in one 
member state, and so long as they met the minimum standards set forth in the Directive.  
The Directive adopted the corporation as the required organizational form.  Thus, unlike 
unit trusts, which did not meet the requirements of the Directive in terms of 
organizational form, OEICs could be sold throughout Europe.  Moreover, the law of 
trusts, which governs unit trusts, grew out of English common law and is peculiar to that 
heritage. While trusts are common to those parts of the world with a strong British 
heritage, they are a foreign concept in European continental countries, where the 
Napoleonic and Roman legal heritage dominates. Thus, European investors were not 
likely to be familiar with the technical legal structure of unit trusts.  OEICs, therefore, 
                                                 
5
  Investment Management Association, Review of the Governance Arrangements of United Kingdom 
Authorized Collective Investment Schemes 21-22 (2005).   
 
6
 Besides cross-border marketability, a second difference is that, unlike unit trusts, OEICs can organize in 
umbrella form, with multiple sub-funds.  U.K. Securities and Investments Board, Open Ended Investment 
Companies Consultative Paper 93, 7-8 (1995).   
 
7
 Formally, Council Directive 85/611/EEC of December 20, 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS Directive). Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, 4 (EC). 
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were anticipated to be more marketable outside the United Kingdom.
8
  Note, however, 
that OEICs did not displace unit trusts within the U.K.  Rather, since 1997, investment 
advisors have been allowed to organize and market both forms of mutual funds (the 
OEIC and the unit trust) in the U.K.  Thus, the change in law has produced a useful set of 
data for assessing the impact of different organizational forms.   
In the U.K., regulatory authority over unit trusts is delegated to the Financial 
Services Authority (the FSA) and regulatory authority over OEICs is delegated to the 
Treasury.
9
  However, both authorities have adopted a common set of rules and guidance 
(the FSA‟s “Sourcebook”) related to the operation of funds and the activities of their 
managers.
10
  Thus, the regulatory regime governing unit trusts and OEICs is essentially 
the same, with a notable exception.  With respect to governance, unit trusts are subject to 
trust law while OEICs are subject to corporate law.   
First, the regulations are clear that unit trusts are governed by trust law.  The 
Sourcebook defines a unit trust as “a collective investment scheme under which the 
property is held in trust for the participants by the trustee” (1.1.6).  In addition, the 
Sourcebook states that, with respect to unit trusts, “both the manager and the trustee have 
fiduciary duties under the general law relating to trusts” (7.7.1).  The Sourcebook 
reiterates that: 
The duties of the manager and the trustee imposed upon them by 
the rules in this sourcebook and by the trust deed are in addition to, 
and not in derogation from, the duties which are otherwise 
                                                 
8
 OEICs, however, were unsuccessful in penetrating European markets during the initial time period (1997-
2001) analyzed in this chapter.  OEIC sponsors lacked the infrastructure (i.e., distribution channels, or sales 
forces) on the continent.  In addition, the Directive initially only permitted cross-border sales of funds that 
invest in “transferrable” securities.  This restriction excluded many types of OEICs from the passport 
system, including real estate funds, commodities funds, and funds of funds.   For these reasons, analyzing 
data from the 1997-2001 time period is convenient, as both types of funds were essentially selling only 
within the U.K. 
 
9
 See, respectively, Sections 247(1) and 262(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, ch. 8. 
 
10
 The Sourcebook (1.1.8) states that “together, this material forms a major part of the product regulation 
regime for ICVCs [Investment Companies with Variable Capital, also known as Open-Ended Investment 
Companies] and AUTs [Authorized Unit Trusts], complementing material in the ICVC regulations [The 
Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001, replacing The Open-Ended Investment Companies 
Regulations 1996, both issued by the Treasury] and Chapter III of Part XVII of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (for authorized unit trust schemes).” U.K. Financial Services Authority, Collective 
Investment Scheme Sourcebook (2001). 
 
 12 
imposed upon them by law.  The manager and the trustee are 
required to fulfill those other duties by this rule. (7.10.1(1), (2))   
In contrast, OEICs are governed by corporate law.  The regulations are clear that the 
“provisions of the Companies Act will apply to [OEICs] as if they are incorporated 
bodies.”
11
  The Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations, which are issued by the 
Treasury and govern OEICs exclusively, state that OEIC directors are subject to fiduciary 
duties that are “enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a 
company by its directors.”
12
  The Regulations further state that the court may relieve any 
officer of an OEIC from liability if he or she “acted honestly and reasonably”
13
, a lower 
standard than the “objectively prudent” standard applied to trustees under trust law.   
In sum, while much of the regulatory apparatus applicable to unit trusts and 
OEICs is the same, the fiduciary laws differ, depending upon the fund‟s organizational 
form.  That is, the main palpable difference between unit trusts and OEICs is the 
difference in fiduciary laws.  Neither trusts nor OEICs are overseen by an active monitor 
and both are taxed similarly, making the difference in fiduciary laws the prime 
difference.  In other words, the British mutual fund market contains two parallel 
organizations essentially identical in almost every respect except for the fiduciary laws 
that are applied to the fund managers.  This difference in fiduciary standards is a 
fundamental distinction between trusts and corporations.  And it is a distinction with 
teeth.  Although public corporations in the U.K. face few lawsuits alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty (Armour et al., 2009), it takes only one suit to get the attention of officers 
and directors.  Moreover, trusts have a long history of such suits (Sin, 1997), including in 
the fund context.  In one instance, for example, Baring Asset Management (BAM) was 
required to account for losses in connection with its management of a fund that was 
organized as a trust.  The fund managed by BAM lost $32 million over the 2000-2001 
period, considerably underperforming its benchmark over that time.  The court stated that 
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the facts constitute “a breach of duty” and “a credible case against BAM for damages for 
professional negligence.”
14
  In the mutual fund context, the fiduciary laws are litigated 
and enforced in the courts.   
While the empirical finance literature has not focused on the competition between 
the corporation and alternative organizational forms, the law literature has given it recent 
attention, from a theoretical perspective (Sitkoff 2005, 2004 and 2003; Schwarcz 2003a 
and 2003b; Hansmann and Mattei 1998; Langbein 2007, 2005 and 1997; Leslie 2005).  
The literature notes that, on the one hand, the stricter fiduciary duties of trust law might 
lead to overdeterrence of trust management, while on the other hand, those same strict 
fiduciary duties might leave less discretion for trust management and, hence, lower the 
potential for agency conflict.  The literature is unable to reach a conclusion about 
whether, on a net basis, trust law maximizes investor welfare relative to the corporation.  
For example, Schwarcz (2003b) states that “there are not … clear answers to the 
fundamental question of whether trusts are a better form of business organization than 
corporations.”  As a result, the scholarship contains explicit calls for empirical work on 
the subject.  For instance, Sitkoff (2005), in outlining a research agenda for future study 
of the trust, states that “a third line of suggested inquiry is empirical…. Data should 
facilitate basic comparative study of the statutory business trust and other forms of 
business association.”  This chapter seeks to fill that crucial gap in the literature by 
undertaking such a comparative treatment of the commercial trust and the corporation 
from an empirical perspective.   
This study‟s hypothesis is that the different fiduciary obligations applicable to 
mutual funds organized as trusts (unit trusts) and as corporations (OEICs) matter with 
respect to agency and performance.  This contrasts with empirical studies in the finance 
literature on the British mutual fund market, which ignore the difference between these 
two types of funds.  For instance, studies examine abnormal returns and persistence in 
British mutual funds (Otten and Bams 2002; Quigley and Sinquefield 2000; Rhodes 
2000; Allen and Tan 1999; Blake and Timmerman 1998; and Lunde, Blake and 
Timmerman 1998), management fees and performance of British and European funds 
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(Otten and Schweitzer 2001), tournaments in the British fund industry (Jans and Otten 
2005), and ethical mutual funds in the U.K. (Bauer, Koedijk and Otten 2005).  But these 
studies all neglect the fact that, since 1997, some mutual funds are organized as 
corporations and others as trusts, and are thus subject to different fiduciary standards.  
While most studies do not acknowledge that two forms of open-end funds exist in the 
U.K., those that do acknowledge the two forms proceed to treat them as the same.  For 
instance, Keswani and Stolin (2008), in examining whether the “smart money effect” 
exists in the U.K., acknowledge that OEICs entered the market in the 1990s, but they 
assume that “differences between unit trusts and OEICs are unimportant and [they] refer 
to both types of funds as mutual funds.”  In contrast to those studies, this chapter analyzes 
the impact of the difference in organizational form.  The only other study to examine 
structural differences between OEICs and unit trusts is Warburton (2008).  That paper 
finds that mutual fund organizational form has a statistically significant impact on 
management fees and loads.  The empirical analysis in that paper, however, was 
conducted on a limited data set, consisting of a cross-section and allowing for limited 
control variables.  This chapter exploits a richer set of data, allowing for such factors as 
time-varying effects and family-level characteristics in the regression models.  The 
different model specifications yield different results (discussed in Section IV).   
Although mutual funds are organized in a variety of forms around the world, 
studies have not focused on such differences.  The few comparative studies that exist 
explore differences in mutual funds at the industry or national levels only; none highlight 
differences in mutual fund organizational form.  One comparative study, by Khorana, 
Servaes and Tufano (2005), examines 56 countries in an attempt to identify those factors 
that determine the size of national mutual fund industries.  The authors find that strong 
legal and regulatory factors, such as disclosure laws, positively impact the size of mutual 
fund industries.  The study, however, does not consider differences in mutual fund 
organizational form as one of those factors.  Similarly, Klapper, Sulla and Vittas (2004) 
examine growth patterns of mutual fund industries around the world and the determinants 
of mutual fund development.  Analyzing data on 40 countries, the authors find that 
mutual funds are more advanced in countries with better developed capital markets and 
market-based financial systems.  They do not, however, consider differences in mutual 
 15 
fund organizational form.  Along the same lines, Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2006) 
study factors that determine national differences in fund fee levels.  Taking a cross-
sectional approach, they examine differences at the fund, complex and national level.  
While their study is comparative, and includes fund-level data, their analysis does not 
account explicitly for differences in fund organizational form.  In fact, none of the above 
studies discuss the fact that open-end funds around the world are organized in corporate 
and non-corporate forms.  Unlike those studies, this chapter focuses on heterogeneity in 
organizational form. 
While there has been much empirical research on mutual fund governance in the 
U.S., that research takes organizational form as fixed.  The reason is not surprising.  
While U.S. law (the Investment Company Act of 1940) does not expressly require that 
mutual funds be organized as corporations, it does impose the corporate paraphernalia of 
boards of directors and shareholder voting rights on all mutual funds, whether organized 
as a corporation or in some other form, such as a business trust, a limited partnership, or 
simply a pool of investment funds.  It also imposes the same fiduciary standards upon 
directors regardless of the fund‟s formal organizational form (Jones 1988, 434-39).  
Hence, studies on U.S. mutual funds, taking the corporate paradigm as a given, have 
examined how board structure and board composition, but not fiduciary standards, impact 
fund fees and expenses.  For instance, Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that expenses are 
lower in funds governed by smaller boards, and by boards containing a greater percentage 
of independent directors.  Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) find that expenses are 
lower in funds with more independent directors and in funds with more independent 
directors serving since fund inception.  In addition to fees and expenses, studies have 
examined how board structure and composition impact the likelihood that a board will act 
in the interests of mutual fund investors generally.  For example, Del Guercio, Dann and 
Partch find that fund boards are more likely to act in investors‟ interests the greater the 
proportion of independent directors on the board.  They also find that fund boards are 
more likely to act in investors‟ interests when all directors are elected annually.  In a 
similar manner, Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) examine how board structure and 
composition impact the likelihood of acting in the interests of investors in the specific 
context of mutual fund mergers.  They find that boards of underperforming funds are 
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more likely to approve mergers the greater the proportion of independent directors on the 
board and the lower the compensation of directors.  Other studies have approached 
mutual fund structure from a different angle.  For instance, Kong and Tang (2006) 
analyze factors that determine board structures.  Ferris and Yan (2007) study the 
ownership structure (public or private) of the fund‟s management company.  Ferris and 
Yan find that, after controlling for board governance variables and other fund 
characteristics, funds managed by publicly-traded management companies suffer from 
greater agency costs than those managed by private companies.  While Ferris and Yan 
find evidence that agency costs vary across two categories of funds, their focus is on the 
ownership structure of the management company, not the organizational form of the 
fund. 
That is, despite this volume of work analyzing U.S. mutual funds, no studies 
examine the more antecedent and fundamental question of whether investors are better 
served by mutual funds organized in corporate versus non-corporate form.  This chapter‟s 
approach, therefore, is to look not at one aspect of corporate governance, but rather at the 
foundation upon which governance is based, organizational form.  Specifically, this study 
explores whether British mutual funds organized in corporate form (the OEICs) charge 
different expenses than British mutual funds organized in trust form (the unit trusts), or 
generate different risk-taking behavior and performance.     
 
III.  Data 
 
There is no survivorship bias-free electronic database of British mutual funds that 
is widely available.  Consequently, I collected and manually input fund-level data from 
consecutive print editions of the Unit Trust and OEICs Yearbook, which is published 
annually by the Financial Times. 
 
The Yearbooks contain data on management fees, 
front-end loads, fund and family size, date of inception, fund style, fund family, and 
whether the fund is organized as a corporation (OEIC) or a trust (unit trust), for all funds 
in the United Kingdom.  Data is obtained on an annual basis for the years 1996 through 
2001, inclusive.
15
  Returns data is obtained on a monthly basis from Datastream and 
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manually linked to funds in the data set.  For funds which change organizational form, 
observations in the year of conversion are dropped.  Funds did not report their 
organizational form in year 2000.  For that year, I classify a fund as an OEIC if it 
reported itself as an OEIC in both (i) year 2001 and (ii) year 1999 (or 1998 if the fund or 
its organizational status was missing in year 1999).  I use the same approach to classify 
funds as unit trusts in year 2000.   
Table 2-1 reports the age, size and number of funds organized as corporations and 
unit trusts, by year.  Overall, corporate funds are younger than unit trusts.  Although the 
median corporate fund is initially older than the median unit trust (because most 
corporations were initially formed by converting unit trusts), the median age of corporate 
funds drops over time, as more such funds are created de novo (or anew).  In terms of 
total net assets, the median corporate fund is initially smaller than the median unit trust, 
but quickly equals or surpasses the median unit trust.  The number of corporate funds 
increases over time.  While only 45 exist in 1997, almost 600 exist in 2001.  Corporate 
funds steadily gain market share each year, constituting approximately 40% of the market 
by 2001 (the last year of the data set).  Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrate graphically the 
consistent market share gains of corporations (by number of funds in the case of Figure 
2-1, and by assets under management in the case of Figure 2-2).  Although corporate 
funds gain market share steadily, do they behave differently from trusts?   
 
IV.  Expenses 
 
This section presents empirical results with respect to fund expenses.  In order to 
compare the two organizational forms, measures of organizational effectiveness are 
required.  A common measure is mutual fund expenses.  Since it is generally argued that 
lower expenses reflect better governance (e.g., Del Guercio, Dann and Partch 2003), 
lower expenses should also reflect a superior organizational form.  Thus, this section 
examines the relationship between expenses and organizational form in the British 
mutual fund industry.  The hypothesis is that, due to the different fiduciary obligations, 
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unit trusts and corporations will charge significantly different expenses.  This section 
analyzes two types of expenses, annual management fees and front-end loads.
16
   
Summary statistics for annual management fees appear in Panel A of Table 2-2.  
The average management fee for unit trusts is 1.21%, while the average management fee 
for corporate funds is 1.27%.  The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Thus, the trust form, on average, charges lower annual management fees than the 
corporate form.   
Summary statistics for front-end loads appear in Panel B of Table 2-2.  The 
average front-end load for unit trusts is 4.25%, while the average front-end load for 
corporate funds is 4.01%.  The difference is significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the trust 
form appears to be associated with higher front-end loads.  Funds charge front-end loads 
primarily to cover the cost of distributing the fund.
17
  The difference in front-end loads 
may indicate that corporate funds are sold and distributed through different channels than 
unit trusts.  With lower front-end loads on average, the typical corporate fund is likely 
relying more on direct sales and other no-load channels, while the typical unit trust is 
likely relying more on brokers and other intermediaries.  Recent research shows that 
differences in distribution channels have ramifications for investors as well as funds and 
their managers (see Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto 2006; Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks 
2006; and Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2006).  In addition, it is important to also 
consider loads net of any waivers.  Funds in the U.K. often waive some or all of the front-
end load for investors.  Analyzing loads net of waivers is important because it captures 
what investors actually pay.  Summary statistics for net loads appear in Panel C of Table 
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2-2.  The average net load for unit trusts is 1.86%, while the average net load for 
corporate funds is 1.95%.  The difference is significant at the 10% level.  Thus, the 
average trust charges significantly lower net loads.  Overall, on average, unit trusts 
charge lower management fees and lower net loads than corporate funds.
18,19
   
To understand if and how organizational form is responsible for the differences in 
management fees and front-end loads, I regress fees and loads, in turn, on a corporate 
dummy variable, with control variables.  The hypothesis is that a fund‟s choice of 
organizational form will have a statistically significant impact on its management fees 
and/or front-end loads.  To test the impact of organizational form on fund expenses, I 
estimate the following: 
yi,t = α + β1Ii,t + β2Xi,t-1 + δj + γf + εi,t.      (1) 
        
Here, i indexes fund, t indexes time (year), j indexes investment style, f indexes fund 
family, and α is a constant term.  Ii,t is the variable of interest and takes a value of one if a 
fund is a corporation and zero if it is a unit trust.  Xi,t-1 represents a set of control 
variables.  δj represents fund investment style (such as International Equity or Domestic 
Money Market) and captures the different operating costs associated with different 
investment styles.
20
  γf  represents family affiliation, and εi,t is the error term.  The 
dependent variable, yi,t, is fund expenses, represented by annual management fees (in 
percent) in the first set of regressions, and front-end loads (in percent) in the second.  
Fund expenses should reflect the ability of the fund‟s managers (the value they add) as 
well as the difficulty of their job (the skill required of them).  We can control for each 
such factor using available data.  Prior performance captures managerial ability, and fund 
investment style captures job complexity.  Hence, control variables include the prior 12-
month total return of the fund and the fund‟s style.  Control variables also include other 
                                                 
18




 The two types of funds have equal ability to change their fees and loads.  The procedure for changing 
fees and loads is the same for both types of funds; management companies can change fees or loads at any 
time, but must give investors at least 90 days notice prior to the effectiveness of any change. 
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it holds, by the Investment Management Association, the industry association for the U.K. investment 
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factors that, according to the literature, tend to affect fund expenses: fund size (in log 
form),
21
 family size (in log form), fund age (in log form), an index fund dummy, and the 
front-end load (in the management fee regressions) or the management fee (in the load 
regression) charged by the fund.  All control variables are lagged by one year, to lessen 
potential endogeneity.  I report results using multiple regression specifications.  One is an 
OLS regression with robust standard errors that treats each observation as independent.  
Second, I employ clustered regressions where each fund is treated as a cluster.  Clustering 
by fund adjusts standard errors to control for potential lack of independence in fee 
decisions made by a fund.  Third, I control for family affiliation by including family 
dummies.  This specification is appropriate if there are factors common to funds within a 
family, but heterogenous across families, that influence the fees funds charge (for 
instance, management company reputation and skill).
22
  
Results using management fees as the dependent variable appear in Table 2-3.  
According to Table 2-3, the corporate dummy has a statistically significant impact on 
management fees.  The coefficient on the corporate dummy takes a positive value, 
indicating that the corporate form has a positive (i.e., upward) impact on management 
fees.  The magnitude of the increase in fees is approximately 7 to 12 basis points per year 
(or 0.07% to 0.12% per annum).  The upward impact of the corporate form on 
management fees is consistent with the different fiduciary duties applicable to the two 
organizational forms.  Managers of corporate funds are subject to looser fiduciary 
obligations than managers of unit trusts.  With looser fiduciary obligations should come 
greater agency costs and, presumably, greater fund fees.  This is, in fact, what we 
observe.  Exposure to stricter fiduciary liability induces trust managers to behave more 
conservatively in setting management fees.  If one believes that organizational law should 
minimize agency costs, the trust is a superior organizational form from an investor‟s 
perspective relative to the corporation.   
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The economic significance of organizational form is surprising.  Its impact is 
about one-quarter (in absolute value) that of the variable with the largest impact on fees, 
the index fund dummy.  The economic significance of passive versus active management 
on fees and performance is well-documented in the academic literature and popular 
media (index funds do not require the same degree of managerial effort or expense as 
actively managed funds).  It is surprising that a variable so innocuous as choice of 
organizational form (in fact, so seemingly innocuous that the literature has overlooked it) 
has an impact of about a quarter the impact of a variable known to be so important, active 
versus passive management.  Looking at it another way, the impact of organizational 
form amounts to nearly 10% of the average management fee.  In dollar terms, an investor 
with $100,000 would pay $1,270 on average in annual management fees when investing 
in a corporation, but would save about $100 per year by investing in an equivalent trust 
instead of a corporation.  Or, look at it from a fund manager‟s perspective.  Holding 
everything else constant, a manager of a trust of average size (£37 million) receives an 
extra £37,000 per year simply by organizing it as a corporation instead of a trust.  
Regarding the other variables, note that fund size is either not significant (specifications 
(1) and (2)) or significant and positive (specification (3)), indicating that any economies 
of scale at the fund level are not being shared with investors.  Family size is significant 
and negative in specifications (1) and (2), however, indicating that economies of scale at 
the family level are shared with investors.  Fund age is significant in specification (3), 
with older funds associated with higher fees.  The fact that age and size are significant 
only in the presence of family controls indicates that variation in age and size within a 
family matters.  It may be that management companies use their older and larger funds to 
subsidize their younger and smaller funds (see Tufano and Sevick 1997; Del Guercio, 
Dann and Partch 2003).  Finally, in accordance with the literature (e.g., Tufano and 
Sevick), prior fund performance does not impact fees significantly.      
Note that the upward impact of the corporate form on fees is inconsistent with the 
finding of Warburton (2008).  That paper finds that the corporate form has a significant 
but negative impact on management fees and loads.  That paper, however, was confined 




  When I supplement the Warburton (2008) data set to allow 
for a model specification more similar to the specification used in this chapter, namely by 
controlling for family affiliation, family size, and loads, the sign on the corporate dummy 
becomes positive while remaining significant.  In other words, when I apply the model 
used in this chapter to the supplemented Warburton (2008) data, I obtain consistent 
results. 
Results with respect to front-end loads appear in Table 2-4 (columns (1), (2), and 
(3)).  Unlike the case with management fees, the coefficient on the corporate dummy is 
negative and significant, indicating that the corporate form has a negative (i.e., 
downward) impact on front-end loads.  The negative impact of the corporate form on 
loads is surprising given that corporate funds, in theory, can be distributed to an 
international clientele while unit trusts cannot.  Front-end loads are charged in large part 
to cover distribution costs.  Funds distributed internationally might be expected to have 
greater distribution costs and hence greater loads.  However, the corporation‟s downward 
impact on loads is consistent with anecdotal evidence that fund sponsors did not penetrate 
the continent in these initial years.     
The corporate form‟s relative advantage with respect to loads disappears, 
however, when loads are netted against waivers.  As Table 2-4 shows, the corporate 
dummy has an upward and significant impact on net loads in (4) and (5).  Everything else 
equal, corporate managers charge greater net loads than trust managers.  Net loads are a 
more accurate measure than the stated loads of what investors pay in upfront fees.  By 
incorporating waivers into the analysis, we see that unit trusts provide greater discounts 
on stated loads than corporate funds provide.   
Since loads are primarily intended to cover distribution costs, management fees 
are a cleaner measure of agency costs and, consequently, I have regressed loads and fees 
separately.  Some studies attempt to combine loads and fees by amortizing loads over an 
assumed holding period for a hypothetical investor, and adding that amount to the annual 
fees (yielding a “total expense”).  I have performed such an analysis by assuming a seven 
year holding period and employing net loads.  Regression results (not reported) are 
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substantially similar to those in Table 2-3.  That is, the corporate form has an upward 
impact on total expenses, significant at the 1% level in specifications (1) and (2). 
In summary, the management fee regressions generate a statistically significant 
result: the corporate form has a positive (i.e., upward) impact on management fees.  The 
result is economically significant, with an impact of approximately 7 to 12 basis points 
per year in magnitude.  The corporate form also has an upward impact on net loads.  
Further, the corporate form has an upward impact on total expenses (combining 
management fees with net loads).  In other words, the trust is an organization where 
management works for you at a lower cost than in a corporation, even after controlling 
for differences in ability, job complexity, and other characteristics.  All else equal, 
corporate managers charge you more for doing essentially the same job.
24
  If fund fees 
are interpreted as a signal of the quality of the governance arrangement, then the trust is a 
superior form from an investor‟s perspective relative to the corporation. 
If trusts are truly superior, shareholders of corporate funds should force the 
corporation to switch to a trust, and corporate funds should disappear over time.  
However, no funds in the data set have switched from a corporation to a trust (though 59 
funds have switched from a trust to a corporation).  Given the trust‟s superiority with 
respect to management fees, how does one explain the absence of corporation-to-trust 
conversions?  Mutual fund shareholders, in practice, may lack the incentives to force the 
corporation to convert.  Shareholder voting is not an effective governance mechanism in 
mutual funds due to collective action problems (mutual fund shares are dispersed widely) 
as well as the diversification and liquidity mutual funds offer.  Of course, if governance 
mechanisms are ineffective, assets could simply flow out of corporate funds and into 
trusts.  However, Figure 2-2 shows industry assets shifting in favor of corporations, not 
trusts.  Despite the upward impact of the corporate form on management fees, the 
industry is shifting toward, not away from, corporate funds over time.  Why do industry 
assets not shift towards trusts? One explanation is that disincentives deter the switch 
between funds.  Such disincentives include loads, redemption fees and adverse tax 
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consequences.  It is not costless to switch between funds. Another explanation for the 
industry‟s failure to shift towards trusts may be investors‟ lack of awareness of the 
relative advantages of trusts
25
 and the responsiveness of fund flows to advertising by 
management companies (e.g., Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks 2006; Jain and Wu 2002).  
Since management companies benefit from looser corporate fiduciary duties, 
management companies have reason to favor corporate funds.  A third explanation for the 
failure of assets to shift toward the cheaper form is that the two types of funds might 
perform differently.  While trusts may be cheaper than corporations, perhaps they also 
underperform. 
 
V.  Performance 
 
 
The cost of investing in a fund is not the only consideration for investors.  
Investors ultimately care about fund performance.
26
  Thus, this section will examine the 
relationship between performance and organizational form.  Trust law‟s strict, bright-line 
rules may encourage trust managers to incur sub-optimal levels of risk (i.e., trust law may 
over-deter managers), hurting investor welfare in the commercial context.  In other 
words, while trust law may be superior to corporate law in controlling value-destroying 
agency conflict, it may do so by curtailing risk-taking behavior as well (which may or 
may not be value destroying).  That is, superior governance might be achieved at the 
expense of excessive risk aversion.  This section, therefore, tests the “overdeterrence 
hypothesis” that the stricter fiduciary duties of trust law lead trusts to behave differently 
from corporations.   
First, I examine how funds perform relative to their peers.  That is, I measure fund 
performance relative to the mean return of the fund‟s investment style category.  This 
style-adjusted return is computed by subtracting from each fund‟s return the mean return 
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of the relevant style category.  Style-adjusted returns are computed for each fund on a 
monthly basis and assume the reinvestment of dividends.  Summary statistics appear in 
Table 2-5 by organizational form.  Means are computed on a time-series basis for each 
organizational form, by averaging the style-adjusted returns in each month on an equal-
weight basis, and then by averaging across months (Panel A).  The average one-month 
return (style-adjusted) is 0.02% for corporate funds and 0.01% for unit trusts.  This is the 
case regardless of whether the fund returns are computed before fees or after fees.  The 
average style-adjusted return for corporations is not significantly different from that of 
unit trusts.  In addition to the time-series approach, I have also taken a cross-sectional 
approach to computing style-adjusted returns, by computing an average style-adjusted 
return for each fund over the period, and then by computing the equal-weight average 
style-adjusted return for each type of organizational form (Panel B).  The cross-sectional 
approach yields results similar to those generated by the time-series approach.    
Since performance might be driven by factors other than organizational form, I 
regress monthly style-adjusted returns on a corporate dummy variable with control 
variables.  Similar to equation (1), the model is: 
yi,t = α + β1Ii,t + β2Xi,t-1 + λk + εi,t.      (2) 
 
     
Here, the dependent variable, yi,t, is fund returns, defined as the one-month adjusted 
return for fund i in month t.  Ii,t is the variable of interest, Xi,t-1 is a set of control 
variables, and λk represents time (month) effects.  Control variables include fund size (in 
log form), family size (in log form), fund age (in log form), an index fund dummy, the 
fund‟s front-end load and management fee, and the fund‟s prior performance.  Prior 
performance is lagged by one month; all other controls are as of the last day of the 
preceding year.  I measure prior performance using, alternatively, 1-month returns and 
12-month returns.  The 12-month returns have greater economic content than the 1-month 
returns, but they potentially introduce greater bias.  Consequently, I report one 
specification with the 1-month returns, one with the 12-month returns, and one without 
returns.  
 According to Table 2-6, the corporate dummy has a statistically significant impact 
on returns.  Holding everything else constant, the corporate form improves performance 
by 12 to 14 basis points per month relative to the trust form (or by 1.45% to 1.69% per 
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year).  This evidence supports the “overdeterrence hypothesis” that the stricter fiduciary 
duties of trust law lead to more conservative trust management and lower performance.  
In other words, although the corporate form is associated with higher management fees (7 
to 12 basis points per year), the corporate form offers investors significantly superior 
fund performance on a gross basis (145 to 169 basis points per year) to compensate for 
charging those higher fees.  This result implies that corporate funds are generating 
superior returns, on a net basis, relative to unit trusts.  Investors in corporate funds are 
paying higher fees for that choice of organizational form but, since the corporate form 
positively impacts gross style-adjusted returns by a greater amount, they receive greater 
net returns.
27
   
The statistically significant control variables include fund size (negative 
coefficient), fund age (positive coefficient), and prior performance (positive coefficient 
on both one-month and one-year lagged returns, indicating momentum in fund returns).  
The management fee variable is not statistically significant, indicating that higher fees do 
not translate into significantly higher style-adjusted performance.   
Style-adjusted returns alone, however, do not reveal much information about the 
value managers add.  Corporate funds may be generating higher returns either because of 
superior security-selection skill or because they are simply incurring more risk than the 
trusts.  There is evidence that corporate funds incur greater risk than the trusts.  Corporate 
funds exhibit a greater dispersion of style-adjusted returns than unit trusts, evidenced by 
the difference in the standard deviation of returns in Table 2-5.  The higher style-adjusted 
returns of corporate funds, therefore, may simply reflect a premium for higher risk.  In 
other words, while style-adjusted returns control for differences in risk across investment 
styles, they do not control for such differences within investment styles.  Thus, in 
addition to style-adjusted returns, I also examine risk-adjusted abnormal returns (or 
alphas).   
First, I compute a single-factor alpha, the intercept in a regression of fund returns 
(in excess of the risk-free rate) on the return on a market proxy (in excess of the risk-free 
rate).  The alpha in a single-factor model gives the over- or under-performance of funds 
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relative to the market proxy.  Alphas are calculated separately for each type of 
organization, on a time-series basis, using the following single-index model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + εi,t      (3) 
 
where Ri,t is the average (equal-weight) one-month return of funds of type i in month t, 
Rf,t is the return on British treasury bills in month t, RALL,t is the one-month return on the 
market index in month t, and αi is the risk-adjusted excess return of type i.  The analysis 
is restricted to U.K. domestic equity funds.  Risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) and 
factor loadings appear in Panel A of Table 2-7 for each type of organization.  Neither 
type of organization generates an alpha significantly different from zero.  The result is 
consistent with the mutual fund literature, which generally finds that fund managers lack 
security-selection skill.  Moreover, each organizational form generates alphas that are not 
significantly different from the alphas generated by the other.  That is, neither form 
outperforms the other to a significant degree, either statistically or economically.  In 
addition to the time-series approach, I also take a cross-sectional approach to computing 
average alphas, by computing an alpha for each fund, and then by computing the equal-
weight average alpha for each type of organizational form (Panel B of Table 2-7).  The 
cross-sectional approach shows a divergence in the performance of corporations and 
trusts.   Corporations generate alphas of 16 basis points per month, while trusts generate 
alphas of -12 basis points per month.  Corporate managers are able to create positive 
value while trust managers destroy value.  Moreover, the difference in performance 
between corporations and trusts is economically substantial, amounting to over 28 basis 
points per month or approximately 3.36% per year.  That is, corporations generate 
economically meaningful gains relative to trusts.  After management fees are deducted, 
corporations continue to create value, while trusts continue to destroy value.   
Corporations generate net (after fee) alphas of 6 basis points, while trusts generate net 
alphas of -22 basis points.  This difference in after-fee performance between trusts and 
corporations is, again, over 28 basis points per month or approximately 3.36% per year.  
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In sum, whether alphas are measured before or after fees, corporations outperform trusts 
by over 3.36% annually.
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The above single-factor model assumes a fund‟s investment behavior can be 
approximated using a single market index.  Because of the variety of mutual fund 
investment styles, it is preferable to use a multi-factor model to account for such diversity 
of investment strategies.  Hence, I also compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns from a 
multi-factor model (Carhart 1997).  In addition to a market proxy, the model includes 
factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum.  Formally, alphas are calculated from 
the following model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + miMOMt + εi,t        (4) 
 
where SBMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of 
small cap stocks and a portfolio of large cap stocks; HMLt is the difference in one-month 
returns in month t between a portfolio containing “value” stocks (with a high book-to-
market ratio) and one containing “growth” stocks (with a low book-to-market ratio); and 
MOMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of past 
winners and a portfolio of past losers.  The other variables, Rf,t, RALL,t, and αi, are as 
defined previously.  As before, I compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) on both 
a time-series and a cross-sectional basis.  To compute the size factor (SMBt), I rank all 
stocks in the United Kingdom based on market capitalization as of the last day of 
December each year, with the bottom 30% assigned to the small cap portfolio and the top 
30% assigned to the large cap portfolio.  The difference in returns between the small cap 
portfolio and the large cap portfolio over the subsequent months provides the size factor 
returns.  Similarly, to compute the momentum factor (MOMt), I rank all stocks in the 
United Kingdom based on their prior 12-month return as of the last day of December 
each year, with the bottom 30% assigned to a portfolio of contrarian stocks and the top 
30% assigned to a portfolio of momentum stocks.  The difference in returns between the 
contrarian portfolio and the momentum portfolio over the subsequent months provides 
the momentum factor returns.  All portfolios are value-weighted.  SBM and MOM are 
                                                 
28
 Unlike the cross-sectional approach, the time-series approach does not produce an economically 
meaningful difference in alphas because, most likely, differences in performance are washed out in 
averaging the monthly returns.   
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computed using all British equities contained in Datastream.  HML is taken from the 
international returns data library compiled by Kenneth French. 
 Four-factor alphas are computed separately for each organizational form.  Four-
factor alphas and factor loadings appear in Table 2-7.  Using the cross-sectional method, 
corporations generate statistically significant positive alphas (before fees) while trusts do 
not.  In other words, corporate managers are able to create significant positive value 
while trust managers are not.  Moreover, the difference in performance between 
corporations and trusts is economically significant, amounting to over 11 basis points per 
month or approximately 1.32% per year.  That is, corporations generate economically 
meaningful gains relative to trusts.  After management fees are deducted, corporations 
continue to create value, but trusts destroy value.   Corporations generate net (after fee) 
alphas of 5 basis points, while trusts generate net alphas of -6 basis points.  This 
difference in after-fee performance between trusts and corporations is, again, over 11 
basis points per month or approximately 1.32% per year.  In sum, whether alphas are 
measured before or after fees, corporations outperform trusts by over 1.32% annually.
29
   
 We can also look at the percent of funds of each type that generate statistically 
significant positive (or negative) alphas.  Using the cross-sectional results from the four-
factor model, we see that 7.6% of corporate funds generate significant positive alphas 
while 7.3% of unit trusts do so (last column of Table 2-7, Panel B).  In other words, the 
probability of an investor selecting a corporate fund that generates a statistically 
significant positive alpha is a little better than the probability of an investor selecting a 
unit trust that does so.  There is only a 3.1% chance that an investor will select a 
corporate fund that generates significant negative alphas, but a 4.7% chance that an 
investor will select a trust that does so.  These results provide additional evidence that, on 
an individual fund basis, corporations outperform trusts after accounting for risk.  That is, 
when selecting an individual fund, an investor has a greater probability of receiving 
positive risk-adjusted returns when he or she invests in a corporation as opposed to a 
trust, and a lower probability of receiving negative risk-adjusted returns.   
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meaningful difference in alphas because, most likely, differences in performance are washed out in 
averaging the monthly returns.   
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 In sum, the evidence suggests that corporations outperform trusts on a risk-
adjusted basis.  One caveat, however, is required.  The tests do not have sufficient power 
to conclusively establish the statistical significance of the results.  The data set is limited 
to only 48 months of returns.  A firm conclusion would require a longer time series of 
returns.  But while we cannot say conclusively that corporations outperform trusts on a 
risk-adjusted basis, the evidence does suggest that result.  Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that this difference in risk-adjusted performance is quite large economically, 
amounting to approximately 1.32% per year. 
 Although I do not observe the actual portfolio holdings of the funds, I can infer 
their holdings by examining the factor loadings reported in Table 2-7.  The cross-
sectional results reveal substantial differences in the holdings of trusts versus 
corporations.
30
  First, for both types of funds, the loading on the market factor is close to 
one.  Since the data is limited to a subset of domestic equity funds, both types of funds 
are basically doing what they are supposed to, investing in domestic stocks.  But the 
corporations have significantly higher loadings than the trusts on the market factor.  
Corporations, hence, are taking on significantly greater market risk than the trusts.  
Second, with respect to size, both corporations and trusts exhibit a tilt towards small cap 
stocks.  However, corporations show a significantly greater tilt towards small cap stocks 
than trusts do.  Third, both types of funds favor growth stocks over value stocks.  
However, corporations show a significantly greater tilt towards growth stocks than the 
trusts do.  That is, corporations take on more market risk, and greater exposure to small 
cap and growth stocks, than trusts do.
31
  In other words, the factor loadings indicate that 
corporations take on more systematic risk than the trusts.  In addition to their higher 
systematic risk, corporate funds also exhibit higher idiosyncratic (non-systematic) risk 
than trusts.  That is, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of monthly 
fund returns is 2.0839 for corporate funds and 1.8905 for unit trusts (using a single-factor 
model) and 1.7751 for corporate funds and 1.5728 for unit trusts (using a four-factor 
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 Corporations, however, appear to follow a contrarian strategy, in contrast to the trusts‟ momentum 
strategy.   
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model).  In other words, corporations choose portfolios with greater risk than those that 
trusts choose.  The difference in fiduciary standards translates into a difference in 
willingness to incur risk.   
 In sum, the evidence suggests that corporations incur greater risk than trusts, but 
they also outperform trusts even after adjusting for the difference in risk.  This evidence 
supports the hypothesis that trust law induces excessive risk aversion.  Trust law‟s strict 
fiduciary duties induce fund managers to choose portfolios with lower risk than those of 
corporate managers and, after we adjust for this difference in risk, trust managers under-
perform corporate managers.  Hence, the evidence suggests that trust law‟s strict 
fiduciary duties are value destroying in the commercial context.   
Finally, Figure 2-3 suggests a reason why corporations can outperform trusts: they 
are more nimble. Since the data set encompasses the stock market bubble period (1998-
1999) as well as the crash and immediate aftermath (2000-2001), we can examine 
whether one organizational form performed better than the other in one of these market 
environments.   
Figure 2-3 shows each form‟s relative monthly performance over 1998-2001.  The 





) each month over the time period.  During the bubble years (1998-1999), neither 




oscillates rapidly between 
positive and negative.  In this period, neither form is able to outperform the other for 
more than two consecutive months.  During the crash, however, a pattern emerges.  
Corporate funds put together a string of months in which they outperform trusts, 
beginning in the spring of 2000 (as the stock market bubble began to burst).  Corporate 
funds were more nimble in navigating the market crash.  In other words, it appears that 
the greater flexibility of the corporate form enables corporate funds to react more quickly 
to abrupt market movements and to more nimbly navigate within fast-changing market 
environments.   
 
VI.  Endogeneity Concerns 
 
This chapter has assumed that organizational form is exogenous or, in other 
words, that organizational form causes the difference in the outcome variables (fund 
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expenses and performance).  However, organizational form might be endogenously 
determined.  That is, some unobserved factor may be influencing, for instance, both 
management fees and choice of organizational form, making it mistakenly appear as if 
there is a direct causal connection between fees and organizational form.  If so, it would 
be deceptive to say that the corporate form is causing higher management fees.  Or, 
causation may run in the opposite direction, with management fees influencing the choice 
of organizational form.  In other words, it may be that expensive funds are attracted to the 
corporate form.  The underlying problem is that a fund is not assigned its organizational 
form randomly; rather, its organizational form is chosen by the fund (or by its 
management company on the fund‟s behalf).  If expensive funds are self-selecting into 
the corporate form, this selection bias may be driving the results instead of the treatment 
effect of organizational form.  If this is the case, the least squares estimate of the impact 
of the corporate form overstates its true effect.  The literature has used matched samples 
approaches, sample selection model approaches, and fixed effects approaches to address 
these endogeneity concerns.  In this section, I examine each method, as each has its own 
assumptions and tradeoffs.   
 
(i) Matched Samples Approach 
 
I first use matching methods to balance the sample along observable dimensions 
that might influence the outcome variables.  The idea behind matching is that, for any 
fund, we observe an outcome (e.g., the management fee it charges) when it is either (i) a 
corporation (exposed to the “treatment”) or (ii) a trust (not exposed to the “treatment”).  
That is, for any fund, we observe only one of the two possible outcomes.  To estimate the 
impact of organizational form on that fund, we would like to know the outcome (the fee it 
charges) both when it is a corporation and when it is a trust.  Although we only observe 
the fund when it is organized as one or the other, we can impute the missing outcome by 
finding other funds in the data whose covariates are similar to those of the particular 
fund, but which are organized in the other form (not exposed to the “treatment”).  The 
general approach is to find corporation-trust pairs where the funds are identical along 
observable dimensions except for organizational form.  Matching thus approximates 
random assignment; when you match, any difference between the two groups may be 
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deemed to be random.  Under that condition, matching isolates the impact of 
organizational form on the outcome variable (management fees).  The advantage of the 
matched samples approach is that it removes potential bias from model misspecification.  
And it does so under less restrictive assumptions than other approaches, which require, 
for instance, the specification of exclusion criteria (i.e., instrumental variables) and 
assumptions about the distribution of the error terms. 
I match each corporate fund with the ten closest trusts.  Since matching with 
instruments (that is, variables that affect selection but not outcomes) does not help 
address selection bias and may worsen support problems, I match using only variables 
correlated with both the selection variable and the outcome variable.  That means, for 
management fees, I match on the basis of fund age, family size, loads, passive versus 
active management and investment style.   I do not match using fund size, as it is 
correlated with organizational form but not with fees, or using prior performance, as it is 
correlated with fees but not with organizational form.  Using the nearest neighbor 
matching method following Abadie et. al. (2001), I find that the average treatment effect 
of the corporate form on fees is 0.071%, and that the effect is significant at the 1% level 
(Table 2-8).  This 7.1 basis point effect is roughly similar to the 7 to 12 basis point effect 
found in the OLS regressions in Table 2-3.  Thus, the matched samples analysis confirms 
the significant and upward impact of the corporate form on fund fees.    
Matched samples analysis requires trading off similarity of matched units with 
sample size.  This, in effect, involves trading off bias and efficiency.  I have required that 
each corporate fund be matched with ten trusts.  In the present setting, where we have 
many more trusts than corporations, requiring ten matches for each corporate fund seems 
reasonable to maximize efficiency without introducing significant bias concerns.  
However, to lower the bias potential, I also require that each corporate fund match with 
only four trusts (to ensure a more precise match on observable dimensions).  Despite the 
resulting drop in efficiency, I get similar results.  The coefficient increases slightly to 
0.072% and, although the standard error increases slightly, the effect remains significant 
at the 1% level.  Thus, the results are robust to a change in the number of matches.  In 
summary, after establishing the equivalence of corporations and trusts along observable 
dimensions, I find that the corporations charge significantly greater fees.    
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(ii) Sample Selection Model Approach 
 
Matching handles selection on observables.  But what if unobservable factors 
drive both the outcomes (e.g., management fees) and the choice of organizational form?  
One response is to first endogenously model the choice of organizational form as the first 
step of a two-step procedure using a bivariate normal selection (Heckman) model.  The 
first step of the two-step procedure is to estimate a probit model of selection.  Since funds 
choose how to organanize, we model that choice explicitly.  Estimates from this probit 
model are then used to construct consistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio.  In the 
second stage, the outcome equation is estimated by ordinary least squares, and includes 
the original independent variables from the main regression augmented by the 
constructed value of the inverse Mills ratio, which controls for omitted variable bias due 
to self-selection.   
Specifying a proper “exclusion restriction” is crucial.  The exclusion restriction is 
the specification of a variable that “belongs” in the selection equation but not in the 
outcome equation.  In other words, it is an instrument.  The model is formally identified 
without an exclusion restriction (the identification comes from the non-linearity of the 
inverse Mills ratio), but this often produces substantial colinearity between the predicted 
inverse Mills ratio term and the remaining covariates in the outcome equation. This 
colinearity will lead to large standard errors.  A proper exclusion restriction requires us to 
identify a variable associated with organizational form but not the outcome (i.e., 
management fees).  An ideal instrument is whether the fund receives flows from foreign 
investors.  Since corporate funds can be marketed abroad and trusts cannot, such a 
variable is associated with organizational form but likely does not have a direct impact 
management fees.  However, data on foreign flows is not available.  Instead, I use fund 
size to proxy for foreign flows.  Funds choose the corporate form in order to have access 
to foreign markets and a greater pool of investors.  In other words, they choose the 
corporate form because they want to grow in size.  Size, therefore, should be a good 
substitute for foreign flows.  In the data, size in fact is highly correlated with the 
corporate form, but uncorrelated with fees.  Hence, specifying size as the exclusion 
restriction should give us confidence that the identification structure will work.      
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Estimates from the selection and outcome equations are reported in Table 2-9.  
First note the significant positive impact of size in the probit regression (column (1)), 
confirming the theory that size predicts corporate form.  In the ordinary least squares 
regression (column (2)), the coefficient on the corporate dummy is positive and 
significant at the 1% level despite the inclusion of λ (the inverse Mills ratio).  That is, 
after controlling for potential selection bias, the corporate form has an upward impact on 
fees, and its magnitude (16 basis points) is even larger than in the main results (7 to 12 
basis points).  Moreover, the coefficient on λ is not significant, indicating no substantial 
selection effect.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no selection bias in the 
outcome equation.  In other words, it appears likely that our main results are not driven 
by selection bias.
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  In all, the sample selection model indicates that the corporate form‟s 
impact on fees is being driven by the treatment effect, not the selection effect.   
 
(iii) Fund Fixed Effects Approach 
 
The idea behind a fixed effects specification is to use the repeated observations on 
funds in the panel to control for those unobserved and unchanging characteristics related 
to both outcomes and causing variables.  In other words, it exploits repeated observations 
on funds to control for unobserved fund characteristics that are time-invariant.  The fund 
fixed effects approach, however, is a simple and extreme approach to addressing 
endogeneity.  Fixed effects estimators estimate the effects of only the time-varying 
regressors.  That is, the fixed effects approach ignores cross-sectional variation in 
organizational form, exploiting only its time-series variation.  However, our regressor of 
interest, the corporate dummy, does not have much time-series variation.  Only 59 funds 
have been conclusively identified as having changed organizational form, and I lack 
complete data on all of those 59 funds.  Thus, the fixed effects approach has fewer than 
59 funds to work with.  With insufficient time variation in organizational form, it would 
be difficult to distinguish the impact of organizational form from the impact of the time-
invariant unobservables.  If the corporate dummy is, in effect, not time-varying, its effect 
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 Note that when no exclusion restriction is specified, the significance of the corporate dummy disappears.  
However, it appears that this result is driven by the large standard errors that are generated by removing the 
exclusion restriction.  Of course, it is unnecessary to endure the inefficiency and restrictive assumptions of 
this specification, as we have a compelling exclusion restriction (size) to help with identification.   
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cannot be conclusively determined using fixed effects.  The data set is simply not rich 
enough for a fund fixed effects model to isolate the impact of organizational form.  The 
other two approaches employed in the section, which handle endogeneity through 




The impact of the corporate form on fees is most likely due to organizational form 
and not selection bias.  Multiple regression methodologies for handling endogeneity 
concerns point to this conclusion.  Using matched samples, I find that the corporate form 
has a significant upward impact on fees, similar in magnitude to the impact in my main 
results.  This result is robust to changes in the number of matches.  In addition, using a 
sample selection model, I reach the same conclusion.  The corporate form has a 
significant upward impact on fees, again similar in magnitude to the impact in my main 
results.  The sample selection model also sheds light on why funds choose the corporate 
form.  The stage I probit model, and correlations in the data, indicate that funds become 
corporations in order to grow in size (likely by reaching a foreign clientele).  After 
controlling for that motivation for choosing the corporate form, as well as other potential 
motivations, I find that organizational form has a significant impact.  In conclusion, my 
earlier results appear to be driven not by endogeneity but by the effect of organizational 
form. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter identifies, empirically, clear costs and benefits associated with 
competing organizational forms.  The chapter does so by exploiting a change in British 
regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a 
corporation.  Trust law imposes stricter fiduciary responsibilities on managers than 
corporate law does.  I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing opportunistic 
behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their corporate 
counterparts, even after accounting for potential differences in managerial ability and job 
complexity.  I confirm that these results are driven by differences in organizational form 
and not by self-selection.  The results suggest that trust law‟s strict fiduciary duties are a 
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superior mechanism for mitigating agency conflict within business organizations.  While 
strict fiduciary responsibilities limit opportunistic behavior, they also constrain 
managerial flexibility in business decision making.  I find that trust managers exhibit 
greater risk aversion than their corporate counterparts.  Evidence suggests that, even after 
this difference in risk taking is accommodated, the trusts underperform the corporations.  
The results indicate that the business flexibility granted to the corporate funds leads to 
greater risk-taking behavior and greater agency costs, but also to superior risk-adjusted 
performance.  Overall, this chapter finds that fiduciary rules which curtail managerial 
discretion are effective in reducing agency costs and risk taking within the firm, but at the 
cost of sacrificing risk-adjusted performance.   
The results have implications for investors.  In equilibrium, investors should 
prefer to invest via the corporate structure.  All else equal, on average, the trust form 
saves investors about 10 basis points (or 0.10%) per year in agency costs, but costs 
investors about 132 basis points (or 1.32%) per year in performance.  In other words, 
while trust law‟s strict fiduciary duties are a superior mechanism for mitigating agency 
conflict, the economic significance of the agency cost savings are overwhelmed by the 
economic significance of the negative performance impact.  To see this more clearly, 
consider a hypothetical investor with $100,000 to invest.  The investor can choose one of 
two investments, identical in every respect, except one is structured as a trust and the 
other as a corporation.  That investor would save about $100 per year in fees, on average, 
by investing in the trust instead of the corporation.  However, that investment would earn 
the investor about $1,300 per year less, on average, in gross returns.  On a net basis, the 
investor is worse off, by $1,200, having invested in the trust.  In other words, the trust‟s 
underperformance more than offsets its cost savings.  Trust law mitigates agency conflict, 
but it does so by “overdeterring” trust management.    
The results also have implications for corporate governance design.  The results 
suggest that strengthening fiduciary responsibilities by moving corporate law closer to 
trust law can lessen the potential for expropriation, fraud, and opportunistic behavior by 
corporate managers.  Heightened fiduciary duties can also reduce managerial risk-taking 
behavior.  While these concepts are intuitive, this chapter has been able to demonstrate 
them empirically and to quantify their effects.  Moreover, this chapter suggests that such 
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results are achieved at the cost of lower risk-adjusted performance.  While trust law may 
be superior at controlling value-destroying agency conflict, it does so by curtailing 
desirable risk-taking behavior to an extent that is value-destroying in the commercial 
context.      
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Figure 2-1 
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Age, Size and Number of Funds  
 
Age, size and number of funds in the data set.  Mutual funds are grouped according to organizational form 
(corporation versus unit trust) and by year.  Median figures are provided for size and age. 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Overall 
(A)  Age (years) 
Corporations    n.a. 10.13  8.13  5.00   5.42  6.89   6.17 
Unit Trusts   9.09   8.59  9.17  8.84 10.29  9.02   9.09 
 
(B)  Size (£ millions) 
Corporations    n.a. 22.10 54.50 45.20 70.30 51.50 53.30 
Unit Trusts  29.10 32.30 34.00 47.30 60.60 51.80 37.40 
 
(C) Number 
Corporations         n.a.       45    174    364    259    579    701 
Unit Trusts  1,592 1,317 1,427 1,377    709    925 2,419 
Unclassified        0    231        0        0    531        0     748  









Summary Statistics on Expenses  
 
Summary statistics for mutual funds in the data set, on an equal-weight basis.  Mutual funds are grouped 
according to organizational form (corporation versus unit trust).  Panel A presents summary statistics on 
annual management fees (in percent).  Panel B presents summary statistics on front-end loads (in percent).   
Panel C presents summary statistics on front-end loads netted against waivers (in percent).   
 
     Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(A) Management Fees 
Corporations    1,403 1.27 1.30 0.33 0.00 3.00 
Unit Trusts    7,277 1.21 1.25 0.40 0.00 8.75 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust)     0.06
*** 
 
(B) Front-End Loads 
Corporations  1,406 4.01 4.50 1.60 0.00   9.00 
Unit Trusts 7,323 4.25 5.00 1.90 0.00 10.00 
Difference (Corporation-Unit Trust) -0.24
*** 
 
(C) Front-End Loads Net of Waivers 
Corporations    1,164  1.95  2.00 1.74 0.00   6.00  
Unit Trusts   6,192  1.86  1.25 1.70 0.00 10.00 















Regression Results for Management Fees 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of annual management fees (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 
1 for a corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  All observations are annual.  All 
independent variables (except the corporate dummy) are lagged by one year.  Observations in the year in 
which a fund changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  
Columns (2) and (3) adjust standard errors for clustering by fund. 
 
Dependent Variable: Management Fees 
    (1)    (2) (3)  
Corporate Dummy   0.067   0.067   0.117  







Size (log)   0.002   0.002  0.012  
   (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
* 
 
Age (log)   0.012   0.012  0.026  







Family Size (log)  -0.022  -0.022 -0.003  





Load     0.043   0.043  0.069  







Index Fund Dummy  -0.357  -0.357 -0.406  







12-Month Return   0.000   0.000 -0.000  





Constant   1.064   1.064  0.735  







Style Controls    Yes  Yes  Yes     
Family Controls    No  No  Yes     
Fund Clusters    No  Yes  Yes    
Observations  3,142 3,142 3,142  
Adjusted R
2











Regression Results for Loads 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of front-end loads (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 1 for a 
corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Loads are before waivers in columns 
(1) through (3), and after waivers in columns (4) through (6).  All observations are annual.  All independent 
variables (except the corporate dummy) are lagged by one year.  Observations in the year in which a fund 
changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  Columns (2), 
(3), (5) and (6) adjust standard errors for clustering by fund. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Front-End Loads (Before Waivers) Front-End Loads (After Waivers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Dummy -0.339 -0.339 -0.661  0.253  0.253 -0.057 











Size (log) -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015 -0.045  













































































Style Controls   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Family Controls   No No Yes No No Yes    
Fund Clusters   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,143 3,143 3,143  2,549  2,549  2,549 
Adjusted R
2









 Table 2-5 
 
Summary Statistics on Style-Adjusted Returns  
 
Summary statistics on one-month style-adjusted returns (in percent) on an equal-weight basis for all funds 
in the data set.  Returns are computed monthly on a gross (before management fee) basis, assume re-
investment of dividends and are adjusted by subtracting the mean return of the applicable style.  In Panel A, 
style-adjusted returns are computed on a time-series basis (by computing on each month an average style-
adjusted return for each type of organizational form, and then computing the average style-adjusted return 
over the period for each type of organizational form).  In Panel B, style-adjusted returns are computed on a 
cross-sectional basis (by computing the average style-adjusted return for each fund over the period, and 
then computing the average style-adjusted return for each type of organizational form).   
 
     - - - - Mean - - - - 
  Before After  - - - - - - - - - Before Fees - - - - - - - - - - - 
  Obs.   Fees Fees Median Std. Dev.  Min.   Max. 
(A) Time-Series 
Corporations      58   0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.53 -1.32   1.97 
Unit Trusts      58   0.01 0.01  0.01 0.10 -0.34   0.30 




Corporations      123  -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.49 -1.35   1.81 
Unit Trusts      969   0.02  0.02  0.01 0.48 -6.03   2.96 












Regression Results for Style-Adjusted Returns 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of one-month style-adjusted returns (in percent) on a corporate dummy 
(equal to 1 for a corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Returns are computed 
monthly on a gross (pre-expense) basis, assume reinvestment of dividends, and are adjusted by subtracting 
the mean return of the applicable style.  Regressions correct for time effects.  The independent return 
variables are lagged by one month.  All other control variables are as of the end of the prior year.   
Observations in the year in which a fund changes organizational form are dropped.  Robust standard errors 
based on fund clusters are shown in parenthesis. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Style-Adjusted Returns 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Corporate Dummy   0.142   0.132   0.123 







Size (log)  -0.035  -0.033  -0.033 







Age (log)   0.054   0.050   0.054 







Family Size (log)   0.000  -0.000   0.001 





Management Fee   0.048   0.042   0.019 





Front-End Load  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005 





Index Fund Dummy  -0.030  -0.031  -0.020 
   (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.045) 
One-Month Return     0.071   
     (0.025)
*** 
  
One-Year Return       0.015   
       (0.002)
*** 
  
Constant   0.053   0.056   0.027 
   (0.245)
 
 (0.229)  (0.223) 
Time Controls    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Observations  39,626  39,612  39,312 
Adjusted R
2









Risk-Adjusted Returns and Factor Loadings 
One-month risk-adjusted returns and factor loadings (in percent), computed on an equal-weight basis.  
Risk-adjusted returns (alphas) are computed on both a gross (before management fee) and a net (after 
management fee) basis.  The data set consists of 48 months of data and is restricted to U.K. domestic equity 
funds.  In Panel A, risk-adjusted returns are computed on a time-series basis (by computing on each month 
an average one-month return for each type of organizational form, and then computing a risk-adjusted 
return over the period for each type of organizational form).  In Panel B, risk-adjusted returns are computed 
on a cross-sectional basis (by computing the risk-adjusted return for each fund, and then computing an 
average risk-adjusted return for each type of organizational form).  Standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.  The last column gives percent of funds with significant positive/negative risk-adjusted returns.      
 - - Return (Alpha) - - - - - - - - - Factor Loadings (Before Fees)- - - - - - - - Percent 
 Before Fee After Fee Market Size Value Momentum pos/neg 
(A) Time-Series 
Single-Factor Model 
Corporations  0.0994 -0.0125 0.9927   
 (0.3041) (0.3021) (0.0724)
*** 
Unit Trusts  0.1127  0.0111 0.9809
      
 
 (0.2759) (0.2755) (0.0657)
*** 
Difference  -0.0133 -0.0236 0.0118        
(Corp-Trust) (0.0742) (0.0739) (0.0177) 
Four-Factor Model 
Corporations  0.0605 -0.0511 1.0524  0.1299 -0.0413 -0.0030    





Unit Trusts  0.0804 -0.0211 1.0367  0.1228 -0.0450  0.0002    





Difference  -0.0199 -0.0300 0.0157  0.0071   0.0037 -0.0032
 
   
(Corp-Trust)
 
(0.0768) (0.0765) (0.0189) (0.0100)  (0.0162) (0.0068) 
(B) Cross-Sectional 
Single-Factor Model 
Corporations  0.1605  0.0567 1.1194   6.6/ 2.2 
 (0.0980) (0.0982) (0.0353)
*** 
Unit Trusts -0.1238 -0.2231 1.0323
       
6.8/ 5.0 
 (0.2324) (0.2314) (0.0517)
*** 
Difference   0.2843  0.2798 0.0871       -0.2/-2.8 
(Corp-Trust) (0.3606) (0.3602) (0.0823) 
 Four-Factor Model 












Unit Trusts  0.0443 -0.0596 0.9876  0.0963 -0.0455  0.0099   7.3/ 4.7 









Difference   0.1139  0.1137 0.1165  0.0455   -0.0191 -0.0256
 



















Matched Sample Analysis: 
Management Fees 
 
Treatment (corporation) and control (unit trust) groups are based on fund age, family size, loads, passive 
versus active management and investment style.   The mean difference between the management fees of 
these two groups is presented.  Control groups are formed using 1 to 10 matching (first row) or 1 to 4 
matching (second row).  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
 
      (1)       (2) 
  1 to 10         1 to 4  
 Matching   Matching 
 
Treatment - Control   0.071      0.072  

















Sample Selection Model: 
Management Fees 
 
Heckman regressions of annual management fees (in percent) on a corporate dummy (equal to 1 for a 
corporation and 0 for a unit trust), with control variables as shown.  Stage I probit results appear in column 
(1).  Stage II ordinary least squares results appear in column (2).   Robust standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.   
      (1)    (2)  
Dependent Variable: Corporate Management  
 Dummy   Fees  
Exclusion Restriction:    Size   
Corporate Dummy        0.161     





Lambda       -0.030  
       (0.029)  
Size (log)    0.149     
    (0.056)
***
    
Age (log)   -0.028   0.030  





Family Size (log)    0.910  -0.000  





Load     -0.263   0.070  





Index Fund Dummy   -0.822  -0.401  





12-Month Return    0.001  -0.000  





Constant   -19.548   0.807  





Style Controls     Yes  Yes    
Family Controls     Yes  Yes   
Rho       -0.119  
Sigma          0.254  
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This chapter analyzes the effects of competition in the financial services industry by 
exploiting a change in British mutual fund regulations in the 1990s.  In 1997, British 
regulators removed a requirement that mutual funds organize as trusts, freeing them to 
organize as either trusts or corporations (trust law subjects fund managers to stricter 
fiduciary responsibilities than corporate law does).  Exploiting this regulatory shock, I 
trace non-trivial linkages among organizational form, industry competition, risk taking, 
and performance.  After the removal of this entry barrier, the industry experienced an 
increase in competition.  Increased competition led to a significant increase in the risk-
taking behavior of funds.  Results suggest that increased competition generated an 
improvement in risk-adjusted performance.  However, competition did not produce 
tangible cost savings for consumers, though it did mitigate certain harmful investor 
behaviors, such as chasing past performance.  These results indicate that deregulation of 
the financial services industry facilitates risk-seeking behavior within the industry and 
improves its performance (even after adjusting for the increased risk taking), though it 
does not lower the direct costs of financial services for consumers. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
It is widely assumed that deregulation of the U.S. financial services industry 
generated excessive risk taking, which ultimately increased systemic fragility, 
culminating in the current financial crisis.  Today’s events underscore the importance of 
determining empirically the consequences of financial deregulation on the behavior of 
financial services firms.  This chapter analyzes deregulation’s effects on the financial 
services industry by studying a change in British regulations in the 1990s that opened the 
mutual fund industry in the U.K. to organizational competition.  This study finds that the 




While studies have analyzed the deregulation of the U.S. banking system that has 
taken place since the late 1970s, the limited and gradual nature of that deregulation 
makes its effect on the U.S. financial services industry difficult to identify.  U.S. states 
deregulated their banking systems individually and in piecemeal fashion.  Federal 
regulations were repealed gradually.  This slow and fragmented deregulation of the U.S. 
banking sector makes it difficult to determine whether and how the industry 
systematically changed following deregulation.   
This chapter, in contrast, analyzes the effect of an abrupt regulatory change that 
applied at once to an entire financial sector, the British mutual fund industry.   Prior to 
1997, British regulations required that all mutual funds be legally organized as trusts.  In 
1997, this regulatory restriction was loosened, and funds were permitted to organize as 
either trusts or corporations.  The main difference between the two types of funds is that 
trust law subjects fund managers to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than corporate law 
does.  The regulatory change thus permitted entrants (corporations) into the sector with 
lower fiduciary standards than those of incumbents (trusts).  The primary motivation of 
this chapter, therefore, is to determine whether the elimination of that entry barrier 
impacted the behavior of mutual funds within the British fund industry and/or their 
customers.   
The British experience is a useful one to study, as it provides an example of a 
regulatory shock that applied abruptly to an entire financial sector, not gradually or in 
piecemeal fashion.  Moreover, mutual funds are clear and transparent organizations that 
generate abundant data on firm performance, risk taking and costs to consumers.  Finally, 
mutual funds are important savings and investment vehicles for individual investors, 
rivaling the importance of depository institutions.  Hence, regulatory changes in the 
mutual fund industry have direct and significant ramifications for consumers. 
  The results indicate that, after the restriction on organizational form was lifted in 
1997, organizational competition ensued, and funds became more willing to incur risk.  
Following the deregulation, the industry experienced an overall increase in competition.  
Increased competition within the industry led to a significant increase in the risk-taking 
behavior of funds.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that competition also generated an 
improvement in risk-adjusted performance.  That is, this chapter traces a non-trivial link 
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among organizational form, the degree of industry competition, and the risk taking 
behavior and performance of the industry.  Finally, I do not find evidence that 
competition resulted in tangible cost savings for consumers, as the cost to consumers of 
investment services significantly increased with the onset of organizational competition.   
However, competition appears to have mitigated certain harmful investor behaviors, such 
as chasing past performance and neglecting fund expenses.  These results indicate that 
deregulation facilitates risk-seeking within the financial services industry and improves 
its performance (even after adjusting for the increased risk taking), though it does not 
lower the direct costs of financial services for consumers.   
One caveat is that this analysis examines only the direct effect of competition on 
the consumer.  Deregulation of the mutual fund industry and the resulting increase in 
competition can have certain indirect benefits for consumers.  For example, deregulation 
may result in a greater number of funds entering the market, which in turn may increase 
the price efficiency of the financial markets.   Or, deregulation may attract more assets 
under management by the industry and, hence, increase the liquidity of the stock market, 
generating greater price efficiency.  The data analyzed in this chapter is not rich enough 
to quantify any such indirect effects.  However, the analysis does reveal that no direct, 
tangible cost savings from deregulation were passed on to consumers.  A second caveat is 
that, due to data limitations, we do not have sufficient power to determine the statistical 
significance of the performance results.  In spite of that limitation of the time series, the 
evidence does suggest that the difference in performance is rather sizeable in economic 
terms.   
The next section of the chapter reviews the related literature and sets forth the 
hypotheses to be tested.  Section III describes why the British mutual fund industry is a 
unique laboratory for the study of the effects of competition on the financial services 
industry, and describes the data to be analyzed.  Section IV establishes the link between 
the regulatory change in the U.K. and the subsequent increase in competition in the 







II. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
 
There is a wide literature in industrial economics exploring the relationship 
between industry structure and firm behavior.  The industrial economics literature has 
observed that, following deregulation, the reallocation of market share among 
heterogeneous firms or plants is a substantial factor in the success and structure of an 
industry.  By increasing competitive pressure, deregulation forces inefficient firms to 
improve performance, shut down, or merge (Winston, 1998).  The literature concludes 
that reallocation of market share toward better, more efficient firms produces productivity 
gains within an industry or economy (Haltiwanger, 1997; Forster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan, 1998).  Despite this literature’s extensive exploration of the relationship between 
industrial structure and firm behavior, the role of firm organizational form in this 
relationship remains largely unexplored.  In contrast, this chapter examines how industry 
structure and firm behavior are impacted by the removal of restrictions on the way firms 
may formally organize themselves.   
The conclusions reached by the literature on the industrial organization of non-
financial firms echo those reached by the literature on the industrial organization of the 
banking industry.  The banking literature has examined how the industry and bank 
behavior are impacted by regulatory changes.  Much of this literature on the banking 
industry, however, focuses on the effects of deregulation beginning in the late 1970s in 
the U.S. (in particular, the removal of restrictions on interstate banking, intrastate 
branching, interest rates on time deposits, and business activities).  See, for instance, 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), Stiroh and Strahan (2003) and Stiroh (2000).  Despite the 
banking literature’s focus on how the banking industry and bank behavior are impacted 
by deregulation, little is known about how they are impacted by the removal of 
restrictions on bank organizational form.  One of the few studies to investigate the impact 
of bank organizational form on bank conduct and the banking industry is Mehran and 
Suher (2009).  That study examines the effect at the bank and industry level of S-
corporation versus C-corporation status of banks.   However, S-corporations and C-
corporations are both corporations, and hence the study does not fully capture differences 
across organizational forms (rather, it captures differences in tax treatment).   Other 
studies investigate bank organizational structure (i.e., the size or hierarchy of the bank) 
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instead of bank organizational form (i.e., how the firm is legally organized) (Berger, 
Miller, Peterson, Rajan, and Stein, 2005; Liberti, 2004; Liberti, 2005; Canales and 
Nanda, 2008; and Degryse, Laeven, and Ongena, 2009).   
This chapter also contributes to the corporate finance literature that relates 
managerial incentives to corporate decisions.  Empirical work has investigated the effect 
of managerial incentives on policies such as capital structure, risk management, and 
investments (see, for example, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 
2008; and Chava and Purnanandam, 2009).  While the current literature has focused on 
the role of managerial incentives, this chapter suggests that firm organizational form also 
plays an important role in managerial decisions.  Since managers want to avoid personal 
liability, this chapter extends the current literature on managerial incentives to encompass 
organizational form and fiduciary responsibilities.    
The mutual fund literature also has overlooked the impact of organizational form 
on the fund industry and fund behavior.  Empirical studies of mutual funds have mostly 
focused on the ability of mutual funds to beat the market (e.g., Brown and Goetzmann, 
1995,1997; Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996; Ferson and 
Schadt, 1996; Wermers, 2000), the relationship between fund performance and fund 
flows from investors (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Zheng, 1999), the relationship 
between fund manager compensation and risk taking (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; 
Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996), and the relationship between fees and performance 
(e.g., Ippolito, 1989).  Only recently have funds been studied as an industry.  Studies 
have examined the determinants of mutual fund starts (Khorana and Servaes, 1999, 
2007), exits (Zhao, 2005), and mergers (Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge, 2007).  Massa 
(2003) analyzes the relationship between performance and the degree of product 
differentiation in the mutual fund industry.  However, the link between industry structure 
and fund organizational form remains largely unexplored.  The literature assumes that, 
with respect to legal form, funds are perfect substitutes regardless of how they are 
organized.  
An exception is Warburton (2009).  Warburton (2009) examines cross-sectional 
variation in British mutual funds during the period of organizational competition (1997-
2001), to identify whether funds behave differently when organized as trusts versus 
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corporations.  That study finds that funds organized as corporations, as opposed to trusts, 
charge significantly greater management fees and incur significantly greater risk, while 
generating similar risk-adjusted performance.  But Warburton (2009) essentially exploits 
only cross-sectional variation in organizational form, unlike this study which exploits 
time variation within the industry.  This chapter examines a longer time series, including 
the period before organizational competition (1994-1996), in order to assess the impact of 
increased competition on the fund industry.  That is, while Warburton  
(2009) explores the impact of organizational form on fund behavior and performance, 
this chapter examines the impact of deregulation on the industry, an important 
consideration for today’s policy makers focusing on financial sector stability.  As a 
consequence, this chapter is also able to capture how trusts respond to increased 
competition, by comparing how trusts behave in a less competitive environment to how 
they behave in a more competitive environment.  That issue is unaddressed by Warburton 
(2009).  
This chapter hypothesizes that many aspects of the financial services industry 
may be impacted by the increased competition that followed the lifting of restrictions on 
firm organizational form.  The study’s first hypothesis is that increased competition in the 
British mutual fund industry will significantly increase the degree of risk-taking within 
the industry.  The mutual fund literature has shown that fund managers sometimes have 
an incentive to manipulate their risk taking in order to get ahead in the “tournament” 
among fund managers for additional fund flows.  (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; and Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spielgel and Welch, 2007).  
Facing greater competition, fund managers may focus more on short-term gains.  And 
one way to achieve greater short-term gains is to make riskier bets.  Hence, the increased 
competition in the British fund industry may be expected to produce greater risk-seeking 
behavior.   
Second, the study also examines whether deregulation has an impact on 
performance.  That is, the study explores whether increased competition within the 
industry adds value for investors by comparing abnormal returns from the period before 
organizational deregulation to those from the period after. 
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The study’s third hypothesis is that organizational competition has a positive 
impact on the link between performance and market share.  The industrial organization 
and banking literatures have established that deregulation of an industry produces 
substantial reallocation of market share toward the better firms.  This study examines 
whether that result holds with respect to deregulation of organizational form in the British 
fund industry.  The study tests whether we see a strengthening of the link between 
performance and market share in the fund industry following the regulatory change that 
permitted organizational competition.  If so, we have evidence that organizational 
competition generates tangible, positive effects which were previously hindered by 
regulatory restrictions. 
The changing composition of the industry may impact not just managerial 
behavior but investor behavior as well.  Greater competition may alter investor 
sensitivities to fund performance and expenses, as greater competition may provide 
investors with greater choice and greater information.  The study will thus explore 
whether there was a change in the sensitivity of fund flows to prior fund performance and 
to fund expenses.   
The study’s final hypothesis is that permitting competition within the financial 
services industry impacts the direct costs consumers must bear.  The study compares the 
unexplained components of fund expenses in the years prior to deregulation of the British 
fund industry to the unexplained components in the following years.   
  
III.  The British Fund Industry and the Data 
 
This study focuses on mutual funds in the United Kingdom.  Prior to 1997, British 
open-end mutual funds were required to organize exclusively as trusts.  These British 
mutual funds are called “unit trusts.”  Unit trusts are created under British trust law and 
have been in existence for over a century.
1
  In 1997, British regulators, for the first time, 
                                                 
1
 Mutual funds in the U.K. evolved as unit trusts under trust law, as opposed to corporations under English 
company law, in order to avoid certain restrictions of English company law, which does not apply to trusts.  
English company law prevented companies from repurchasing their own shares.  Thus, under English 
company law, mutual fund investors would not be able to liquidate their investments by demanding that the 
fund repurchase their shares; they would only be able to liquidate by selling the shares in a secondary 
market.  However, since trusts are not subject to company law, nothing prohibited unit trusts from 
repurchasing investors’ interests.  This flexibility accounts for the development of open-end mutual funds 
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permitted open-end mutual funds to organize as corporations.
2
  Since 1997, open-end 
mutual funds have been allowed to freely choose how to organize: as either a trust or a 
corporation.   
British mutual funds are governed by the same set of regulations, regardless of 
how they are organized, with one notable exception.  With respect to governance, unit 
trusts are subject to trust law while corporate funds are subject to corporate law.  Trust 
law subjects fund managers to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than corporate law does.  




Corporate officers and directors owe their institutions fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.  Similarly, managers of trusts also owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  
While similar, the fiduciary duties under trust law are stricter than those under corporate 
law.  For instance, under both corporate law and trust law, the duty of care requires that 
officers and directors discharge their duties with such care and skill as a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise.  However, the courts, understanding that excessive 
liability can deter economically desirable business activity, apply the duty of care in a 
way that defers to officers and directors of corporations.  That is, corporate law 
recognizes that reasonable decisions can sometimes result in unfavorable outcomes.  That 
deference is embodied in the business judgment rule, which presumes that, in making 
                                                                                                                                                 
as trusts rather than as corporations (Sin, 1997).  That open-end funds organize as trusts subsequently 
became a requirement codified in the regulations. 
 
2
 The U.K. permitted funds to organize in corporate form to move their fund industry toward the more 
international corporate standard and to facilitate cross-border marketability. See Warburton (2009). 
 
3
 In the British fund industry, trusts and corporations are taxed, regulated and structured in a similar 
manner.  While the corporate funds have a board of directors and the trusts do not, that difference is not 
substantive.  Boards of corporate funds are required to have the fund’s manager as a member, but no 
minimum board size is specified and no independent directors are required to sit on the board.  Hence, 
these boards predominately consist of only one director, the fund’s manager.  In other words, the board of a 
corporate fund in the U.K. is not an active monitor comprised of independent directors, as the board is in 
the U.S. fund industry.  They exist merely on paper.   
   Furthermore, in a British fund organized in trust form, the trustee performs essentially a custodial role, 
unlike the active boards of trustees in U.S. trusts.  The trustee’s custodial role is performed in a corporate 
fund by the “depository.”  Both the trustee and the depository must be independent entities and are 
responsible for the safe keeping of investor assets.  Neither the trustee nor the depository performs active 
monitoring functions.  Because of these structural parallels, the primary palpable difference between trusts 




business decisions, corporate officers and directors complied with the duty of care.  The 
business judgment rule places on a plaintiff challenging a business decision in a 
corporation the burden of rebutting the presumption.   In contrast, trust law applies no 
business judgment rule in reviewing managerial actions within trusts.  In effect, the 
burden is placed upon trust management to show that their business decisions were 
prudent despite the unfavorable outcome.  The end result is that it is easier to hold 
decision makers personally accountable for their business decisions in trusts than in 
corporations.  The other fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, is also stricter under trust law 
than under corporate law.  The duty of loyalty requires that decision makers act without 
any conflict of interest.  However, corporate law interprets the duty loosely, so as to 
permit conflict of interest transactions so long as they are “fair” to the corporation.  In 
contrast, trust law prohibits all such transactions, even if they would benefit the trust.  In 
short, due to the different fiduciary standards, decision makers are exposed to greater 
personal liability in trusts than in corporations. Consequently, a requirement that funds 
organize in trust form functions as an entry barrier. 
This difference in fiduciary standards applicable to trusts and corporations in the 
British fund industry is not merely a hypothetical distinction.  It is a distinction with 
teeth.  The fiduciary laws are litigated and enforced in the courts.  In one instance, for 
example, Baring Asset Management (BAM) was required to account for losses in 
connection with its management of a fund that was organized as a trust.  The fund 
managed by BAM lost $32 million over the 2000-2001 period, considerably 
underperforming its benchmark over that time.  Citing BAM’s fiduciary responsibilities 
under trust law, the court stated that the facts constitute “a breach of duty” and “a 
credible case against BAM for damages for professional negligence.”
4
 As a result, the 
1997 regulatory change allowing funds to choose their organizational form has generated 
a rich set of data.  
There is no survivorship bias-free electronic database of British mutual funds that 
is widely available.  Consequently, I collect and manually input fund-level data from 
consecutive print editions of the Unit Trust and OEICs Yearbook, which is published 
                                                 
4
 Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assn. Trustees (Bermuda Ltd.) and others v. Baring Asset Management 
Ltd. [2004] EWHC 202, Q.B. 
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annually by the Financial Times. 
 
The Yearbooks contain data on fund characteristics, 
such as management fees, front-end loads, fund and family size, date of inception, fund 
style, fund family, and whether the fund is organized as a corporation or a trust, for all 
funds in the United Kingdom.  Data is obtained on an annual basis for the years 1994 
through 2001, inclusive.  Returns data is obtained on a monthly basis from Datastream 
and manually linked to funds in the data set.   
Table 3-1 provides statistics on the British fund industry.  The average fund has 
£75.5 million under management in the three year period before deregulation, and £126 
million in the three year period after.  The industry consists of £317 billion in assets 
under management in the three years before deregulation, and £565 billion in the three 
years after.  The total number of funds in the industry grows from 1,698 before 
deregulation to 2,453 after.  The number of trusts declines, however, from 1,698 before to 
1,574 after. 
 
IV.  Industry Competitiveness 
 
This section establishes the link between organizational deregulation in the U.K. 
and increased competition within the British fund industry.  This section shows that the 
regulatory change allowing greater flexibility in organizational form resulted in a more 
competitive industry.  Allowing greater choice in how firms organize resulted in more 
players within the industry, generating greater competition within the industry and more 
choices for consumers.   
Table 3-1 shows that, following organizational deregulation, the number of fund 
entrants increases.  In the three years prior to organizational deregulation, 282 new funds 
are formed, while in the three years following deregulation, 405 new funds are formed.   
By allowing fund sponsors to, in effect, choose the applicable fiduciary standard, British 
regulators appear to have lowered entry barriers within the fund industry.  Table 3-1 also 
shows that the number of exits increased following organizational deregulation.  While 
71 funds were dissolved in the three years before deregulation, 167 were dissolved in the 
three years following deregulation.   
Not surprisingly, the dissolved funds were poor performers, underperforming 
their benchmarks both before and after deregulation.  Panel (D)(2) shows that the average 
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style-adjusted return of funds dissolved before deregulation was -3.88% (in the year prior 
to their dissolution), while for funds dissolved after deregulation, it was -1.40%.  This 
change reflects an increase in the exit rate of the relatively “better” underperformers.  In 
other words, after organizational deregulation, fund dissolution becomes more sensitive 
to prior performance.  There is greater pressure on underperforming funds to dissolve 
after deregulation than before.  It appears that the restriction on organizational form 
shielded the market somewhat from competitive pressure.  The lifting of the regulatory 
restriction increased competitive pressure, bringing better governance to the industry.   
In addition, following deregulation, investors had a greater range of investment 
styles from which to choose.  Panel (E) of Table 3-1 shows the number of broad 
investment style categories, the number of styles within each category, and the number of 
funds within each category.  While a total of 27 different investment styles exist in the 
period before organizational deregulation, 46 investment styles exist in the period after.  
Moreover, following deregulation, the number of styles within each style category 
increases for most style categories. The number of styles in the Domestic Balanced 
category increases from 7 to 9, the number of styles in the Domestic Bond/Money Market 
category increases from 3 to 7, the number of styles in the Domestic Specialist category 
increases from 4 to 7, and the number of styles in the International Equity category 
increases from 7 to 17.  There is no change in the number of styles within the Domestic 
Equity, International Balanced or International Bond categories.  And in no instance does 
the number of funds within a category decrease following deregulation.   Thus, following 
deregulation, within any style category, investors have more styles from which to choose 
and more funds from which to choose.    
The link between organizational deregulation and increased competition can also 
be established by computing the Herfindahl index for the industry.  The Herfindahl index 
measures the degree of competition within an industry (the lower the index, the greater 
the competitiveness).  Table 3-2 shows the Herfindahl index for the entire British fund 
market, and for the entire U.S. fund market.  The index is computed for each market on 
both (i) an annual basis and (ii) a time period basis (by taking a weighted average of the 
annual index values in the three years before deregulation, and in the three years after 
deregulation).    The U.S. experiences no change in its average index from the three years 
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before deregulation to the three years after.  In contrast, the UK experiences a significant 
decline in its average index.  The UK experiences a 22% decline (significant at 5%) in its 
index from the period before deregulation to the period after.  This trend can also be seen 
in the below regression results: 
 
Hc,t  =  22.49  –  0.07 PostDummyc,t  +  10.52 BritishDummyc,t  –  6.91 (PostDummy * BritishDummy)c,t  
(1.26)
***





where H is the Herfindahl index for country c in year t, PostDummy is an indicator 
valuable indicating that year t occurs after deregulation, BritishDummy is an indicator 
variable for the U.K. as opposed to the U.S., and PostDummy * BritishDummy is an 
interaction term.   The significant negative coefficient on the interaction term shows that 
competition increased disproportionately more in the U.K. as compared to the U.S. after 
1997.  This trend can also be seen in Figure 3-1.  The Figure plots the Herfindahl index 
for each country over time.  The Figure shows that, before the regulatory change in 1997, 
the U.S. was more competitive than the U.K.  After the regulatory change, the U.K. 
converges towards the U.S. standard.  The common conclusion is that, following the 
regulatory change in 1997, competition increased disproportionately more in the U.K. 
than in the U.S..  The evidence thus shows that increased competition in the British 
market followed the loosening of the restriction on organizational form.  
 
 V.  Empirical Analysis 
 
This section examines empirically the impact of increased competition on the 
industry.  Specifically, this section looks at the impact of increased competition on risk 
taking, performance, market share, consumer behavior and consumer costs.  
 
(a) Managerial Risk Taking 
 
The subsection examines whether competition impacts risk-taking behavior 
within the financial services industry.  Specifically, as the industry becomes more 
competitive, might firms become more inclined to incur risk?  This subsection thus 
explores whether the removal of the entry barrier in the British fund industry had an 
impact on managerial risk-seeking behavior within the industry.   
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The results indicate that the liberalization generated an increase in risk taking 
within the industry.  Table 3-3 shows the standard deviation of monthly returns in the 
period before organizational competition and in the period after.  Panel A computes the 
standard deviation of returns on a time-series basis in each period, using an equal-weight 
average of all fund returns in each month.  Panel B computes the standard deviation of 
returns on a cross-sectional basis, by calculating a standard deviation for each fund in 
each period, and then averaging over all funds in the period on an equal-weight or value-
weight basis.  Four measures of fund returns are used: (i) raw returns, (ii) market-adjusted 
returns (wherein the total market return is subtracted from the fund’s raw return), (iii) 
style-adjusted (median) returns (wherein the median return of the applicable style is 
subtracted from the fund’s raw return), and (iv) style-adjusted (mean) returns (wherein 
the mean return of the applicable style is subtracted from the fund’s raw return).  Returns 
are computed before management fees, and the data set is restricted to U.K. domestic 
equity mutual funds.   The results reveal that the industry’s degree of risk taking increases 
across the board following deregulation.  That is, volatility increases following 
deregulation on both a time-series basis and a cross-sectional basis, and regardless of how 
returns are computed (raw, market-adjusted, or style-adjusted).  Similar results are 
obtained for the subset of the industry consisting of only trusts.  That is, the increased risk 
taking is not driven entirely by the entry of the corporations.  Rather, the trusts respond to 
the removal of the entry barrier by increasing their own risk-taking behavior.   
In addition to revealing an increase in risk taking, Table 3-3 also reveals the 
manner in which risk taking increases.  The last columns of the Table present measures of 
idiosyncratic risk.  Both single-factor and four-factor models indicate that the 
idiosyncratic component of monthly returns increases following organizational 
deregulation.   This is true under both the time-series and the cross-sectional approaches.
5
  
And idiosyncratic risk increases for both the entire industry and for the subset of trusts.  
The results indicate that funds respond to deregulation not simply by taking on more 
systemic risk, but also by taking on more idiosyncratic risk.  That is, the evidence 
                                                 
5
 An exception is the result from the single-factor model computed using the value-weighted cross-
sectional method.  That aberrant result, however, may be due to the fact that the value-weighting must be 
done with annual, not monthly, weights. 
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suggests that fund managers increasingly invest in high idiosyncratic-risk investments 
following deregulation.   
One explanation for the increase in idiosyncratic risk might be that, as more 
competitors enter the industry, funds increasingly try to compete along new or more 
narrowly-defined attributes in an effort to distinguish themselves from the rest.  For 
instance, funds may cater to narrower clienteles by adopting more exotic specializations.  
This interpretation is supported by the increasing number of investment styles subsequent 
to deregulation (Table 3-1).  In other words, as more funds enter the industry, funds 
respond by increasingly catering to the specific needs of a segment of investors and, by 
doing so, increase idiosyncratic volatility.  However, this is not a likely explanation of the 
results in Table 3-3, as that table is restricted to domestic equity funds.  That is, funds that 
follow the same style are exhibiting this risk-shifting behavior.  An alternative 
explanation is that increased competition has lead fund managers to actively increase 
idiosyncratic risk.  This behavior is consistent with the tournament literature, in which 
fund managers manipulate their risk taking in order to get ahead in the tournament with 
other fund managers for additional flows.   
In sum, increased competition in the British fund industry has produced greater 
risk-seeking behavior.  In part, this is a product of the nature of the new organizational 
form.  With looser fiduciary responsibilities, corporate funds should be expected to incur 
greater risk than the incumbent trusts.  But the results reveal that the trusts respond to the 
increased competition from the corporations by increasing their own risk-seeking 
behavior.  Matching the risks the corporations are incurring, the trusts exhibit herding 
behavior.  Thus, the greater risk-seeking is not merely an effect of organizational form, 




 Although fund managers take on more risk following deregulation, do they 
generate superior performance after adjusting for the increase in risk?  This subsection 
examines whether the loosening of the entry barrier has added value for investors by 
comparing risk-adjusted performance in the period before deregulation to that after 
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deregulation. Table 3-4 shows the risk-adjusted abnormal returns and factor loadings 
from a single-factor model and a four-factor model.    
The single-factor model is a regression of monthly fund returns (in excess of the 
risk-free rate) on the return on a market proxy (in excess of the risk-free rate).  The 
intercept (or alpha) in a single-factor model gives the over- or under-performance of 
funds relative to the market proxy.  In Panel A, a time-series approach is used to compute 
an alpha in each period using the following single-index model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + εi,t      (1) 
where Ri,t is the average (equal-weight) one-month return for all funds in the industry in 
month t, Rf,t is the return on British treasury bills in month t, RALL,t is the one-month 
return on the market in month t, and αi is the risk-adjusted excess return.  In Panel B, a 
cross-sectional approach is used to compute the single-factor alpha in each period by 
computing a single-factor alpha for each fund individually, and then computing the 
average alpha in each period on an equal weight basis.   
The four-factor model (following Carhart 1997) includes, in addition to the 
market return, factors for size, book-to-market, and momentum.  Formally, four-factor 
alphas are calculated from the following model: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βi(RALL,t – Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + miMOMt + εi,t        (2) 
where SBMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of 
small cap stocks and a portfolio of large cap stocks; HMLt is the difference in one-month 
returns in month t between a portfolio containing “value” stocks (with a high book-to-
market ratio) and one containing “growth” stocks (with a low book-to-market ratio); and 
MOMt is the difference in one-month returns in month t between a portfolio of past 
winners and a portfolio of past losers.  As with the single-factor model, monthly fund 
returns, Ri,t, are computed using both a time-series approach (Panel A) and a cross-
sectional approach (Panel B).  The variables RALL,t, Rf,t and αi are as defined previously.  
To compute the size factor (SBMt), I rank all stocks in the United Kingdom based on 
market capitalization as of the last day of December each year, with the bottom 30% 
assigned to the small cap portfolio and the top 30% assigned to the large cap portfolio.  
The difference in returns between the small cap portfolio and the large cap portfolio over 
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the subsequent months provides the size factor returns.  Similarly, to compute the 
momentum factor (MOMt), I rank all stocks in the United Kingdom based on their prior 
12-month return as of the last day of December each year, with the bottom 30% assigned 
to a portfolio of contrarian stocks and the top 30% assigned to a portfolio of momentum 
stocks.  The difference in returns between the contrarian portfolio and the momentum 
portfolio over the subsequent months provides the momentum factor returns.  All 
portfolios are value-weighted.  SBM and MOM are computed using all British equities 
contained in Datastream.  HML is taken from the international returns data library 
compiled by Kenneth French.  The analysis is restricted to U.K. domestic equity funds.   
 Risk-adjusted returns (alphas) and factor loadings in each period appear in Table 
3-4.  Prior to deregulation, the industry is generating four-factor alphas of about zero, 
before fees.  Following deregulation, the industry’s performance improves to about 10 
basis points per month, before fees.  On an after-fee basis, the industry generates 
abnormally low performance prior to deregulation, with a four-factor alpha of about -10 
basis points per month.  The industry is destroying value prior to deregulation.  The 
industry’s value-destruction, however, is eliminated after deregulation.  In other words, 
the entry barrier had a real bite on the industry’s net performance.  In all, we see that 
deregulation results in improved performance on both a before-fee and an after-fee basis.  
The effect is economically significant, equal to 8 to 10 basis points per month (in the 
cross-sectional and time-series approaches, respectively).  A similar pattern exists for the 
subset of the industry composed of trusts.  The trusts improve their performance by 6 to 
12 basis points per month.  That is, there is evidence that deregulation has generated 
economically meaningful gains for the industry as a whole and for the subset of trusts.   
 The last column of Panel A gives the percent of funds that generate significant 
positive or negative alphas in each period.  While only 4.8 percent of funds in the 
industry generate significant positive four-factor alphas before deregulation, after 
deregulation 6.6 percent of the industry and 7.3 percent of trusts generate positive alphas.  
Again, the evidence points to improved performance for both trusts and the overall 
industry following deregulation.  Moreover, 5.6 percent of funds destroy value before 
deregulation, while only 3.2 percent of the industry and 3.5 percent of trusts do so after 
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deregulation.  Thus, the evidence again points to improved performance following 
deregulation.  (The one-factor model produces similar results). 
 In sum, the evidence suggests that deregulation improves performance.  One 
caveat, however, is required.  The tests do not have sufficient power to persuasively 
establish the statistical significance of the results.  The data set is limited to only three 
years of monthly returns before deregulation and four years after.  A firm conclusion 
would require a longer time series of returns.  But while we cannot say conclusively that 
deregulation improves performance, the evidence does suggest that result.  Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that this difference in performance is quite large economically, 
amounting to approximately 0.72% to 1.44% per year. 
  The factor loadings in Table 3-4 indicate that funds take on more systematic risk 
following deregulation.  First, funds take on significantly greater market risk following 
deregulation.  Second, with respect to size, funds exhibit a tilt towards small cap stocks in 
both periods.  However, funds show a significantly greater tilt towards small cap stocks 
following deregulation.  Third, while funds show a significant value tilt before 
deregulation, they switch to a significant growth tilt following deregulation.  Finally, 
funds switch from a contrarian strategy before deregulation to a momentum strategy 
following deregulation.  That is, following organizational deregulation, funds become 
more risky than the market index, and take on greater exposure to small cap, growth, and 
momentum stocks.
6
  We also saw in Table 3-3 that, in addition to taking on greater 
systematic risk, funds also take on more idiosyncratic risk following deregulation.  That 
is, organizational competition introduces greater risk into the market, both idiosyncratic 
and systematic.  This result holds for both the entire industry and for the subset of trusts.   
 
(c)  Market Share 
 
This subsection analyzes whether organizational competition has had dynamic 
reallocation effects within the industry.  The industrial organization and banking 
literatures have established that deregulation of an industry produces efficiencies through 
                                                 
6
The time-series approach does not produce the significant difference in factor loadings seen in the cross-





a substantial reallocation of market share toward the better firms over time (e.g., Stiroh 
and Strahan 2003; Stiroh 2000; Winston 1998; Haltiwanger 1997; Forster, Haltiwanger, 
and Krizan 1998).  Does that result holds with respect to deregulation of organizational 
form?  We can test whether we see a strengthening of the link between performance and 
market share in the fund industry following the regulatory change that permitted 
organizational competition.  If we see such an effect, we have evidence that 
organizational competition generates positive effects which were previously hindered by 
regulatory restrictions. 
Market share is computed for each fund by dividing fund assets by industry 
assets.  Changes in market share are then computed from t-1 to t (∆MSt-1, t) and from t to 
t+1 (∆MSt, t+1).  To understand how organizational deregulation impacts the relationship 
between market share and performance, each change in market share variable is 
regressed, in turn, on Post 1997 (a time period dummy equal to 1 for an observation after 
1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), the one-year return from t-1 to 1, an 
interaction term, and control variables, as follows: 
∆MSt-1, t = α + β1 Post1997t + β2 Rt-1, t + β3 Post1997t Rt-1, t + β4Xt-1 + δj + εt   (3) 
∆MSt, t+1 = α + β1 Post1997t + β2 Rt-1, t + β3 Post1997t Rt-1, t + β4Xt-1 + δj + εt   (4) 
Here, t indexes time, j indexes investment style, and α is a constant term. Individual fund 
subscripts have been omitted.   Post1997t is the time period dummy.  Rt-1, t is the one-year 
return variable (expressed in decimal format).  Xt represents a set of control variables.  δj 
represents fund investment style, and εt is the error term.  The dependent variables are the 
change in market share from t-1 to t and from t to t+1.  The dependent variables (∆MSt-1, t 
and ∆MSt, t+1) are expressed in percent and then multiplied by 100 (to scale up the 
coefficient estimates).  Control variables include family size (in log form), fund age (in 
log form), management fees, front-end loads, and an index fund dummy.  All control 
variables are lagged by one year, to lessen potential endogeneity.   
Panel A of Table 3-5 indicates that performance over t-1 to t has no impact on the 
change in market share over that same period, ∆MSt-1, t (equation (3) above).  However, 
outliers might be responsible for the lack of statistical significance.  Panels B and C show 
results using robust regressions and median regressions.  Those approaches show a 
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significant positive relationship between performance and current market share (column 
1).   
Column 2 shows a strong relationship between performance and market share 
over the subsequent period, ∆MSt, t+1 (equation (4) above).  The coefficient on the one-
year performance variable is significant and positive, indicating that performance has a 
positive effect on the change in market share in the subsequent period.  In other words, a 
fund that performs well gains market share in the next year.  More importantly, however, 
the coefficient on the interaction term, Post1997t * Rt-1, t, is significant and negative.  That 
is, organizational deregulation has had a negative impact on the relationship between 
performance and subsequent market share.  Good prior performance does not yield as 
much of a market-share benefit in the post-1997 period as it did in the pre-1997 period.  
This result may be consistent with the idea of greater market competition post 1997.  
After deregulation, to gain market share, a fund must have something more than just good 
prior performance.  This result suggests that, after 1997, investors consider prior 
performance as well as some other signal.  That other signal has gained importance in the 
post-1997 period.    
Do winning and losing funds exhibit the same patterns?  That is, might the 
behavior of the poor-performing funds be diluting the behavior of the high-performing 
funds in the overall sample, or vice versa?  Thus, as a robustness check, I also estimate 
equations (3) and (4) for only funds that outperform the mean fund in their style, and then 
for only funds that underperform the mean fund in their style.  The advantage of this 
specification is that we can observe the behavior of the winners undiluted by the behavior 
of the losers, and vice versa.  Results appear in Table 3-5.1.  The results, however, reveal 
that both winners and losers follow the same pattern.  For both winners and losers, 
performance has a positive impact on subsequent market share (i.e., the coefficient on 
performance is significant and positive), but the relationship weakens after deregulation 
(i.e., the coefficient on the interaction term is significant and negative).   For both 
winning and losing funds, investors consider prior performance as well as some other 





(d) Consumer Behavior 
 
The changing composition of the industry may impact not only managerial 
behavior, but also consumer behavior.  This subsection thus explores whether consumers 
of financial services (fund investors) change their sensitivity to prior fund performance or 
to fund expenses.   
Studies of British and U.S. investors indicate that fund investors chase past 
performance (Keswani and Stolin 2008; Sirri and Tufano 1998; Chevalier and Ellison 
1997; Gruber 1996; and Ippolito 1992).  Or, from a managerial perspective, flows 
function as a proxy for reward, since managers are compensated on the basis of the 
percentage of assets under management.  How does deregulation impact the sensitivities 
of these relationships? 
The literature analyzes the behavior of fund investors by studying fund flows.  
The most simple measure of flows is the change in total net assets minus the appreciation 
in the fund assets or, equivalently, as follows: 
CFi,t = TNAi,t – (1 + Ri,t) TNAi,t-1
 
 
where TNAi,t is fund i’s total net assets at time t, and Ri,t is fund i’s return at time t.  This 
definition of flows is equivalent to defining it as the flow that is not due to dividends and 
capital gains.  In other words, it assumes all dividends and capital gains are reinvested, 
and measures flows into and out of the fund above that amount.  The measure is an 
absolute one, capturing the sterling amount of new flows.  The problem with the absolute 
measure, however, is that large funds tend to have larger absolute flows regardless of 
performance.  In addition to this absolute (i.e., pound sterling) measure, flows can also be 
defined on a relative (i.e., normalized) basis.  The relative measure divides flows by total 
net assets at the beginning of the period, or  
cfi,t = CFi,t / TNAi,t-1. 
The relative measure presents flows as a growth rate, giving greater weight to small funds 
than the absolute measure does.   
Studies tend to examine fund flows by regressing them on past performance 
measures and certain other control variables.  The literature regresses flows on prior fund 
performance (using risk-adjusted returns) as well as fund characteristics such as size and 
expenses (e.g., Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks 2006; Barber, Odean and Zheng 2005; Gruber 
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1996).  In Table 3-6, annual fund flows are regressed on Post 1997 (a time period dummy 
equal to 1 for an observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), as well as 
risk-adjusted returns (alphas from a four-factor model using a rolling 12 month window) 
annualized over the prior year.  Following Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005), a squared 
performance variable is also included to control for the non-linear relationship between 
flows and performance (Sirri and Tufano 1998; Chevalier and Ellison 1997).  In addition, 
the past performance measures are interacted with the time period dummy, Post 1997, to 
determine whether the impact of past performance on flows changes between time 
periods.  Management fees and front-end loads (in percent) are included to measure 
investor sensitivity to these fund expenses.  The regressions also control for other fund 
characteristics.  Fund age (in log form) is included as a control to address the possibility 
that flows are sensitive to the age of the fund.  Fund and family size (in log form) are 
included to ensure results are not driven by small funds or small families.  The final 
control is an index fund dummy.  The value of each such fund characteristic is its value 
as of the end of the year preceding the year of the flow.  Finally, management fees and 
front-end loads are interacted with Post 1997 to determine whether the sensitivity of 
flows to fund expenses changes between time periods.  The data set is restricted to 
domestic equity funds.  To ensure that highly unusual flows do not drive the results, 
flows are winsorized at the 1% level.  Flows are calculated over annual intervals.   
The significant positive coefficient on Alpha in Table 3-6 indicates that flows 
increase following good fund performance.  In other words, British investors, like their 
American counterparts, chase prior performance.  Or, equivalently, those managers that 
perform well are subsequently rewarded through greater inflows and ultimately greater 
fee revenue.  Also note the significant positive coefficient on the Alpha-squared term.  
That result suggests non-linearity in the relationship between flows and performance in 
the U.K.  In other words, the very best performing funds receive additional inflows.  This 
non-linearity is consistent with other studies of the U.K. market (Keswani and Stolin 
2008) as well as the U.S. market (Sirri and Tufano 1998; Chevalier and Ellison 1997; 
Gruber 1996; and Ippolito 1992), which find a convex relationship between performance 
and fund flows from American investors.   
75 
 
The results suggest, however, that deregulation in the U.K. has altered this 
relationship between flows and performance.  The coefficient on the interaction term, 
(Post 1997 * Alpha), is negative and similar in magnitude to the coefficient on Alpha 
(although it is not statistically significant).  In other words, while the coefficient on Alpha 
before 1997 was sizeable and positive, the coefficient in Alpha after 1997 is equal to 
about zero.  Similarly, the coefficient on (Post 1997 * Alpha-squared) is negative and 
similar in magnitude to the coefficient on Alpha-squared (although it is not statistically 
significant).  While sizeable and positive before 1997, the coefficient on Alpha-squared 
after 1997 is equal to about zero.  This is the case for both the industry as a whole 
(column 1) and for only the trusts (column 3).  Although the coefficients on the two 
interaction terms lack significance, that absence of power appears to be driven by a few 
outliers.  When I correct for those outliers by using a median regression (Panel B), the 
coefficients on the two interaction terms become statistically significant.  And as before, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms offset those on Alpha and Alpha-squared, 
yielding coefficients for Alpha and Alpha-squared of about zero in the post-1997 period.  
These results indicate that flows become insensitive to performance after 1997.  The 
convex relationship before 1997 becomes a flat relationship after 1997.  The lack of 
convexity between flows and performance after 1997 is surprising, as convexity in this 
relationship is routinely documented in the literature.  Competition in the UK market has 
eliminated investors’ penchant to chase prior performance.  This result suggests that 
deregulation benefits consumers, as studies show that chasing prior performance is not a 
long-term winning strategy. 
Note the insignificance of the coefficients on management fees and front-end 
loads.  This result suggests that British investors disregard expenses when selecting a 
fund.  The insensitivity of fund flows to expenses is consistent with Barber, Odean and 
Zheng (2005), who find no relationship between fund flows and operating expenses in the 
U.S.  However, deregulation has made investors sensitive to management fees.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term, (Post 1997 * Management Fee), is significant and 
negative in both the OLS and median regressions. That is, competition has made 
investors more sensitive to management fees.  Thus, we have another result suggesting 
that deregulation benefits consumers, as studies show that net returns are negatively 
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correlated with expenses (e.g., Carhart, 1997; and Wermers, 2000).  This result may not 
extend to the subset of trusts.  While the coefficient on the interaction term is negative, it 
is not statistically significant, even in the median regression.  A similar result is seen for 
loads charged by trusts.  The interaction term, (Post 1997 * Load), is significant and 
positive (in the median regression), offsetting the significant negative coefficient before 
deregulation.  Trust investors thus appear to become insensitive to loads after 
deregulation.   
   
(e) Consumer Costs 
 
The chapter’s final hypothesis is that competition impacts the cost of financial 
services for consumers.  This subsection looks at the direct expenses fund investors incur, 
by comparing the unexplained components of annual fund expenses in the years prior to 
organizational competition to the unexplained components in the years following.   
Summary statistics for annual management fees appear in Panel B of Table 3-7.  
The average management fee before deregulation is 1.21%, while the average 
management fee after deregulation is 1.22% for the industry and 1.21% for the subset of 
trusts.  Management fees for the industry are statistically greater following deregulation 
than they were before.  Summary statistics for front-end loads appear in Panel C.  The 
average front-end load before deregulation is 4.59%, while the average front-end load 
after deregulation is 4.16% for the industry and 4.15% for the trusts.  Front-end loads are 
statistically lower for both the industry and the trusts following deregulation than they 
were before.  However, it is important to consider loads net of any waivers, as British 
funds often waive some or all of the front-end load.  Analyzing loads net of waivers is 
important because it is a more accurate measure of what investors are actually paying 
than the fund’s stated load.  Summary statistics for net loads appear in Panel D.  The 
average net load before deregulation is 1.82%, while the average net load after 
deregulation is 2.00% for the industry and 1.91% for the trusts.  In other words, we find 
that deregulation resulted in significantly higher net loads, in contrast to significantly 
lower stated loads.  Some studies attempt to combine loads and fees into a “total 
expense.”  I compute total expenses for each fund by amortizing its net load over an 
assumed sever-year holding period, and adding that amount to the fund’s annual fee.  
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Summary statistics for total expenses appear in Panel A.  The average total expense 
before deregulation is 1.47%, while the average total expense after deregulation is 1.52% 
for the industry and 1.49% for the trusts.  Total expenses for the industry are statistically 
greater following deregulation than before deregulation.  Total expenses for the trusts are 
statistically unchanged.  Overall, on average, the fund industry charges significantly 
greater management fees, front-end loads (net of waivers) and total expenses following 
deregulation.  The trusts do not significantly change their management fees or total 
expenses following deregulation.  Although the trusts charge greater net loads after 
deregulation, the average net load for trusts is less than the average net load of the 
industry.
7
   
To understand if deregulation is responsible for the change in expenses, I regress 
total fund expenses on Post 1997 (a time period dummy equal to 1 for an observation 
after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), with control variables.  The hypothesis 
is that deregulation has had a statistically significant impact on the direct costs consumers 
must bear within the industry. I regress total fund expenses on Post 1997 with control 
variables as follows: 
yi,t = α + β1 Post1997i,t + β2Xi,t + δj + γf + εi,t      (5) 
        
Here, i indexes fund, t indexes time, j indexes investment style, f indexes fund family, 
and α is a constant term.  Post1997i,t is the variable of interest.  Xi,t represents a set of 
control variables.  δj represents fund investment style and captures the different operating 
costs associated with different investment styles and objectives.
8
  γf  represents family 
affiliation, and εi,t is the error term.  The dependent variable, yi,t, is total fund expenses (in 
percent).  Control variables include those factors that tend to affect fund expenses: fund 
size (in log form),
9
 family size (in log form), fund age (in log form), the total return of the 
fund over the prior 12 months, the total return of the fund over the prior 36 months minus 
the total return over the prior 12 months, and an index fund dummy.  All control variables 
are lagged by one year, to lessen potential endogeneity.  I report results using multiple 
                                                 
7
 The reported results were obtained by equal-weighting.  Similar results were obtained by value-weighting. 
 
8
 In the United Kingdom, each fund is assigned to an official style category by the Investment Management 
Association, the industry association for the U.K. investment management industry.   
 
9
 Due to the potential for reporting errors, fund size has been winsorized at the 1% level. 
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regression specifications.  One is an OLS regression with robust standard errors that 
treats each observation as independent.  Next, I employ clustered regressions where each 
family is treated as a cluster, and then each fund is treated as a cluster.  Clustering adjusts 
standard errors to control for potential lack of independence in fee decisions made within 
a family or a fund.  Finally, I control for family affiliation by including family dummies.  
This specification is appropriate if there are factors common to funds within a family, but 
heterogenous across families, that influence the fees funds charge (for instance, 
management company reputation and skill).  
Results appear in Table 3-8.  Panel A shows results for the entire industry.  The 
variable Post 1997 has a statistically significant impact on total fund expenses in each 
regression specification.  The coefficient on Post 1997 takes a positive value, indicating 
that organizational deregulation has a positive (i.e., upward) impact on fund expenses.  
The magnitude of the increase in expenses is approximately 4 to 5 basis points per year.  
Competition has thus resulted in an increase in the overall expenses consumers must bear.  
Regarding the other variables, the index fund dummy has a large and significant negative 
impact on expenses.  The magnitude and significance of passive versus active 
management on expenses is consistent with the academic literature and popular media 
(index funds do not require the same degree of managerial effort or expense as actively 
managed funds).  Note that fund size is not significant, indicating that any economies of 
scale at the fund level are not being shared with investors.  However, family size is 
significant and negative, indicating that economies of scale at the family level are shared 
with investors.  In contrast, fund age and prior fund performance do not have a significant 
impact on expenses.        
Panel B shows results for the subset of trusts.  The coefficient on Post 1997 is not 
significant (except it is weakly significant in column 1).  Competition thus has not had a 
significant impact on the total expenses charged by trusts.  The results from Panels A and 
B together reveal that the new entrants, the corporations, charged significantly greater 
expenses than the trusts were charging.  However, the trusts did not respond by 
increasing their overall expenses.  The trusts did not attempt to mimic their new 
competitors in this respect.   
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Results with respect to the individual components of total fund expenses appear in 
Table 3-9.
10
  Panel A shows results for the entire industry.  When management fees are 
used as the dependent variable (column 1), the coefficient on the time period dummy, 
Post 1997, is significant and positive.  Deregulation has thus had a positive (i.e., upward) 
impact on management fees, approximately 7 basis points per year in magnitude.  When 
front-end loads (before waivers) are used as the dependent variable (column 2), the 
coefficient on the time period dummy takes a significant negative value, indicating that 
deregulation has had a downward impact on front-end loads.  The significance of the 
downward impact, however, disappears when loads are netted against waivers (column 
3).  Panel B shows results for the subset of trusts.  Although the trusts did not change 
their total expenses, Panel B reveals that the trusts did increase their management fees.  
However, the increase was not as large as that of the overall market (5.5 bps versus 6.6 
bps, respectively).  On the one hand, trusts are facing increasing competition from new 
funds, which should restrain the trusts’ ability to increase fees.  On the other hand, those 
new competitors, the corporations, are subject to looser fiduciary responsibilities, 
allowing corporations to more confidently increase their fees.  Trusts, in turn, can feel 
more confident that their fees will appear reasonable, hence trusts respond by raising their 
fees, but not as high as the corporations’.  Note also that the trusts did not change their 
net loads, while the overall market experienced a 5 bps increase in net loads.   
Nevertheless, when we employ the most comprehensive measure of expenses 
(total expenses), which combines net loads with management fees, we see that 
competition has resulted in an increase in the expenses charged by the industry, but no 
change in the expenses charged by the trusts.  In sum, the unexplained component of total 
fund expenses indicates that organizational competition has failed to generate tangible 
benefits for consumers in terms of the direct costs they must bear.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
It is widely assumed that deregulation of the financial services industry in the 
U.S. led to an increase in risk taking within the industry.  This chapter supports that 
                                                 
10
 Table 3-9 employs fund clusters, but similar results are obtained when family clusters or family controls 
are employed instead. 
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assumption empirically, by analyzing a regulatory change in the British mutual fund 
industry that loosened restrictions on fund organizational forms.  Previously confined to 
the trust form, British funds after 1997 were free to organize as either trusts or 
corporations, and thus to subject themselves to their preferred set of fiduciary obligations 
to investors.  Once the fund industry was freed from organizational restrictions, 
competition intensified and risk taking significantly increased.  Both systemic and 
idiosyncratic risk increased.  The new entrants, the corporations, are responsible for part 
of the increase in risk taking, an intuitive result given their looser fiduciary 
responsibilities.  But the trusts responded to the competition from the corporations by 
increasing their own risk-seeking behavior.  Hence, greater risk seeking is not merely an 
effect of organizational form, but also an effect of greater market competition.  An 
analysis of organizational deregulation in the British fund industry thus confirms the 
intuitive link between deregulation and greater risk taking. 
Deregulation, however, appears to generate an improvement in risk-adjusted 
performance.  After adjusting for the greater risk taking, both the overall fund industry 
and the subset of trusts exhibit improved performance.  Competition was able to stop the 
value destruction the industry was producing on an after-fee basis.  Although power 
issues inhibit a determination of statistical significance, the economic magnitude of the 
improvement in performance is significant, amounting to about 0.72% to 1.44% per year.  
The evidence thus appears to support the notion that competition improves the 
performance of financial services firms.  
It is also widely assumed that deregulation of the financial services industry in the 
U.S. generated lower out-of-pocket costs for consumers.  British deregulation with 
respect to fund organizational form, however, appears to have generated the opposite 
effects.  Deregulation appears to have had a negative impact on the direct costs paid by 
consumers, reflected in an increase in the unexplained component of fund expenses 
following deregulation.  That is, the cost to consumers of investment services 
significantly increased following deregulation, after accounting for potential differences 
in performance, investment style, and other characteristics.  Trusts, however, did not 
change the total expenses they charge.  The industry’s increase in total expenses was 
driven by the new entrants, the corporations.  Nevertheless, the greater competition did 
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not induce the trusts to lower their expenses.  Since consumers experience no tangible 
reduction in direct costs, the evidence generated by the British fund industry contradicts 
with the widely held assumption that financial deregulation generates lower out-of-pocket 
costs for consumers. 
Deregulation, however, did benefit consumers in other respects.  Deregulation 
eliminated investors’ destructive habit of chasing prior performance, as competition 
eroded the sensitivity of flows to performance.  Competition also made investors more 
sensitive to the expenses they are charged.  These benefits from competition should be 
taken into account when assessing competition’s impact on the direct costs consumers 
bear. 
As policy makers today search for ways to foster the stability of the financial 
system, important insights can be gained from the study of regulatory shocks in the 
mutual fund industry.  This chapter traces non-trivial linkages among deregulation, 
industry competition, risk taking, and performance of the British mutual fund industry.  
By exploiting a change in British fund regulations in the 1990s that loosened restrictions 
on organizational form, this chapter finds that deregulation of the financial services 
industry facilitates risk-seeking behavior within the industry.  Preliminary evidence 
suggests that deregulation also improves performance (after adjusting for the increased 
risk taking).  While deregulation of the British fund industry did not generate direct cost 
savings for consumers, it did mitigate certain harmful investor behaviors typically seen in 
the mutual fund industry.  Because of differences in how mutual funds and banks are 
operated and regulated, the results may not extend clearly to depository institutions.  
However, the results should be of relevance to policy makers contemplating reform of the 






The Herfindahl Index (H) is shown for the US and UK mutual fund industries on an annual basis, using all 
US and UK mutual funds.  H is calculated annually by squaring the market share (in percent) of each fund 






Evolution of the British Fund Industry  
 
Panel A gives the size of the mean and median fund (in £ million), and the size of the total fund industry (in 
£ billion).  Panel B gives the number of funds.  Panel C gives the number of entrants (newly formed funds).  
Panel D gives the number and percentage of exiting funds (by dissolution and by acquisition) and the 
performance of the dissolved funds (one-year style-adjusted return, in percent) in the year before 
dissolution.  Panel E classifies funds according to their general category of investment style.  “Number of 
Funds” gives the number of funds following the applicable investment style category.  “Number of Styles” 
gives the number of specific styles that constitute the general investment style category.  Figures are given 
for all funds (All) and, from 1997 forward, for trusts only (Trusts). 
(A)  Size 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff 
Mean Fund  
All 67.6 75.3 81.3 93.3 107.0 136.0 137.0 132.0 75.5 126.0 50.5 
Trusts     94.4 103.0 135.0 144.0 129.0 75.5 123.0 47.5 
 
Median Fund         
All 24.8 27.7 29.1 31.8   34.8   46.3   52.4   51.6 27.3 43.6 16.3 
Trusts     32.0   34.0   47.3   60.6   51.6 27.3 43.2 15.9 
 
Industry Total  
All 77.3 110.0 129.0 148.0 169.0 236.0 161.0 183.0 317.0 565.0 248.0 
Trusts    124.0 145.0 185.0 85.2 106.0 317.0 415.0  98.0 
 
(B)  Number of Funds 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff 
All 1,208 1,478 1,592 1,593 1,601 1,741 1,499 1,504 1,698 2,453    755 
Trusts    1,317 1,427 1,377   707    925 1,698 1,574   -124 
 
 (C) Entrants (Newly Formed Funds) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff 
Number 
All 71 122 89 87 112 194 99 94 282 405    123 
Trusts    71 77 119 13 46 282 209    -73 
Percent 
All 6.25 10.10 6.02 5.47 7.03 12.12 5.69 6.27 16.61 16.51 -0.10 
Trusts    4.46 5.85 8.34 0.95 6.51 16.61 13.28 -3.33 
 
(D)(1) Exits: Dissolved Funds 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff 
Number    
All    25   27   19   33   30   22  115  52    71   167 96 
Trusts          33   30   22   99  36    71  151 80 
Percent    
All   2.07   2.24   1.29  2.07   1.88   1.37  6.61  3.47    4.18   6.81 2.63 




(D)(2) Exits: Performance of Dissolved Funds 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  94-96 98-00  
All   -1.92   -6.11  -5.30  -2.19   2.93    -3.80    -1.34  
    (1.48)  (1.33)
***  
(2.69)
*   
(2.08)  (6.65)   (1.07)
***  
  (2.03) 
 
(D)(3) Exits: Acquired Funds 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff 
Number 
All   39   26   66   66  145   na   na    na   131  n.a.   
Trusts 4 139 131 n.a.  
   
(E) Investment Styles 




Number of Funds 
All 244 220 241 230 225 382 318 318 347 616    269 
Trusts    190 204 307 160 193 347 480 133 
Number of Styles     
All 3    3    2    2    2 2 2 3 3 3 0 





Number of Funds 
All 138 288 316 340 337 284 255 257 409 622 213 
Trusts    283 302 233 125 174 409 501 92 
Number of Styles  
All    3    5    6    5    5 7 7 7 7 9 2 





Number of Funds 
All 103 118 126 137 146 202 179 198 177 398 221 
Trusts    111 129 162 97 123 177 287 110 
Number of Styles     
All 3    3    2    3     3 4 5 6 3 7 4 
Trusts             3     3 4 5 5 3 7 4 
                                                 
11
 All Companies, Equity Growth, Smaller Companies, General. 
12
 Balanced, Equity & Bond, Equity & Bond Income, Equity Income, Growth & Income, Convertibles, Active 
Managed, Balanced Managed, Cautious Managed, Managed Funds, Managed Income.  
13







    
Number of Funds 
All 69 125 138 113 110 23 54 70 152 183 31 
Trusts    101 108 16 28 44 152 148 -4 
Number of Styles     
All 3    4    4    3    3 3 4 3 4 7  3 





Number of Funds 
All 520 633 663 669 671 737 587 550 740 1,237 497 
Trusts    540 582 567 262 321 740 941 201 
Number of Styles  
All    7    7    7    7    7 14 11 12 7 17 10 





    
Number of Funds 
All 37  42  50  42  44  49  37  20   57   84 27 
Trusts       36  43  43  12  15   57   65 8 
Number of Styles     
All 2    2    2    2    2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
Trusts             2    2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
 
International Bond   
Number of Funds 
All 29  37  37  39  41  50  48  45  38   79 41 
Trusts     33  33  38  19  25  38   53 15 
Number of Styles 
All    1    1    1    1    1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Trusts                1    1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
 
Total Number of Styles 
All  22 25 24 23 23 33 32 34 27 46  19 
Trusts     23 23 33 30 32 27 44  17 
 
                                                 
14
 Commodity & Energy, Financial & Property, Fund of Funds, Futures & Options, Property, Securities Fund, 
Specialist, Tech & Telecom, UK Specialist.  
15
 Australasia, Europe, Europe ex. UK, Europe inc. UK, European Small Cos., European Specialist, Far East Specialist, 
Far East ex. Japan, Far East inc. Japan, Japan, Japanese Small Cos., Japanese Specialist, Latin America, No. America, 
No. America Small Cos., No. America Specialist, Global Emerging Markets, Global Growth, Global Specialist. 
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The Herfindahl Index (H) is shown for the US and UK mutual fund industries on an annual basis, using all 
US and UK mutual funds.  H is calculated annually by squaring the market share (in percent) of each fund 
in the applicable market, and then summing the resulting numbers for all funds in such market in such year.  
The weighted average H of the applicable industry over the relevant period (94-96 and 98-00) is computed 




        - - - - -Weighted Average - - - - - -  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 94-96 98-00 Diff Pct 
UK 33.68 33.35 32.00 28.74 26.58 21.84 29.89 25.77 32.92 25.60 -7.32 -22.24 
          (2.01)
** 
US 21.12 23.03 23.30 23.66 23.61 24.25 21.56 20.23 22.64 22.33 -0.31 -1.37 








Volatility of Returns 
 
Standard deviation of monthly returns (in percent) according to period (1994-1996 versus 1998-2001).   In 
Panel A, standard deviation of returns is computed on a time-series basis in each period, using an equal-
weight average of all fund returns in each month.  In Panel B, standard deviations of returns is computed on 
a cross-sectional basis, by calculating each fund’s standard deviation of returns in each period, and then 
averaging over all funds in the period.  Value-weight results are computed by weighting funds by their size 
as of the end of the prior year.  Four measures of fund returns are used: (i) raw returns, (ii) market-adjusted 
returns (wherein the total market return is subtracted from the fund’s raw return), (iii) style-adjusted 
(median) returns (wherein the median return of the applicable style is subtracted from the fund’s raw 
return), and (iv) style-adjusted (mean) returns (wherein the mean return of the applicable style is subtracted 
from the fund’s raw return).  The last two columns give idiosyncratic risk computed from a 4-factor and a 
1-factor model.  Returns are computed before management fees.  The data set is restricted to U.K. domestic 
equity mutual funds.  Figures are given for all funds (All) and for trusts only (Trusts).   
 
       Market - Style-Adjusted - Idiosyncratic Risk 
 Obs. Raw Adjusted Median Mean 4-Factor  1-Factor 
  
(A) Time-Series Approach 
BEFORE (1994-1996) 
All 36 2.913 1.061 0.159   . 0.8683 0.9798 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All 48 4.623 1.924 0.394   . 1.5968 1.9244  
Trusts 48 4.587 1.892 0.390   . 1.5709 1.8920  
 
(B) Cross-Sectional Approach  
Equal Weight 
BEFORE (1994-1996)  
All 279 3.021 1.680 1.253 1.271 0.3508 0.3874 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All 454 5.298 3.177 2.289 2.310 0.5692 0.5080 
Trusts 326 5.244 3.078 2.264 2.278 0.7430 0.7609 
 
Value Weight 
BEFORE (1994-1996)  
All 278 2.981 1.363 0.952 0.990 0.2642 0.3458 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All 426 4.977 2.561 1.699 1.787 0.3294 0.2973 









Risk-Adjusted Returns and Factor Loadings 
 
One-month risk-adjusted returns (alphas) and factor loadings (in percent) computed on an equal-weight 
basis from a single-factor model and a four-factor model.  A cross-section approach is used in Panel A by 
computing an alpha for each fund in each period, and then computing the average alpha in each period on 
an equal weight basis.  A time-series approach is used in Panel B by computing the average monthly return 
of funds in month t on an equal-weight basis, and then computing an alpha in each period.  Alphas are 
computed on both a gross (before management fee) basis and a net (after management fee) basis.  The data 
set is restricted to U.K. domestic equity funds.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  The “percent 
pos/neg” column gives the percent of funds with significant positive or negative risk-adjusted returns.   
Figures are given for all funds (All) and for trusts only (Trusts).   
 
 - - - Return - - -    
 Before After  - - - - - - - Factor Loadings (Before Fees)- - - - - - Percent 
 Fees Fees Market Size Value Momentum pos/neg 
 
(A) Cross-Sectional Approach 
Before (1994-1996) 
All  0.0492 -0.0525 0.9190    5.1/6.5 
 (0.0445) (0.0444) (0.0631)
*** 
After (1998-2001) 
All -0.0240 -0.1254 1.0288
      
 7.1/3.6 
 (0.1684) (0.1680) (0.0371)
*** 
 Difference  -0.0732 -0.0729 0.1098        2.0/-2.9
* 
 (0.2177) (0.2176) (0.0684) 
 
Trusts -0.0969 -0.1965 1.0417
      
 7.1/4.6 
 (0.2330) (0.2320) (0.0518)
*** 
 Difference  -0.1461 -0.1440 0.1227        2.0/-1.9
 
















All  0.0954 -0.0102 1.0238  0.1291 -0.0549  0.0072    6.6/3.2 








 Difference   0.0840  0.0802 0.1706  0.0960    -0.1368  0.0660
  











Trusts  0.0765 -0.0284 0.9959 0.0944  -0.0508 0.0101    7.3/3.5 








 Difference 0.0651 0.0620 0.1427 0.0613  0.1327 -0.0689    2.5/-2.1 

















(B) Time-Series Approach 
BEFORE (1994-1996) 
All  0.0462 -0.0558 0.8703   
 (0.1673) (0.1673) (0.0536)
*** 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All  0.1431  0.0392 0.9987
     
  
 (0.2838) (0.2832) (0.0681)
*** 
 Difference   0.0969  0.0950 0.1284       
 
 (0.3578) (0.3572) (0.1034) 
 
Trusts  0.1508  0.0492 0.9929
     
  
 (0.2790) (0.2786) (0.0670)
*** 
 Difference   0.1046  0.1050 0.1226       
 




All  0.0012 -0.1008 0.8820  0.0647  0.0876 -0.0532    






All  0.1079  0.0042 1.0543  0.1224 -0.0540 -0.0006    











 (0.0535)  (0.1443) (0.0607) 
 
Trusts  0.1158 0.0143 1.0475 0.1206  -0.0515 -0.0006 





 Difference 0.1146 0.1151 0.1655 0.0559  -0.1391 0.0526 
 (0.0758) (0.3180) (0.0910)
* 












The Link Between Market Share and Performance 
 
Regressions of change in fund market share (fund assets as a percent of industry assets, times 100) on a 
time period dummy, Post 1997 (equal to 1 for an observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 
1997), one-year net returns (in decimal format), an interaction term, and control variables as shown.  All 
observations are annual.  All control variables are lagged by one year.  Regressions are run separately for 
all funds and for trusts only.  Robust standard errors based on fund clusters are shown in parenthesis.  
 
Dependent Variable: Change in Fund Market Share (% * 100) 
  - - - - All Funds - - - -   - - - - Trusts Only - - - - 
        (1) (2)    (1)  (2) 
  ∆MSt-1, t  ∆MSt, t+1 ∆MSt-1, t  ∆MSt, t+1 
(A) Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Post 1997 * One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]  -0.050 -0.535 -0.113 -0.595 






Post 1997     0.145 -0.028  0.129 -0.036   
      (0.028)
***
  (0.030) (0.029)
*** 
(0.031)   
One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]      0.315  0.910  0.343  0.867 










Age (log)    -0.051 -0.038 -0.053 -0.036  










Family Size (log)    -0.011 -0.032 -0.021 -0.037  











Management Fee      0.063 -0.011  0.062 -0.016  









Load      -0.010  0.002  0.001  0.008  








Index Fund Dummy     0.088  0.053  0.153  0.107  









Constant      0.377  1.038  0.500  1.169  










Style Control      Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fund Clusters      Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   4,209  2,909  3,407 2,520 
Adjusted R
2
      0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
 
(B) Robust Regression 
 
Post 1997 * One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]   0.089 -0.092  0.090 -0.094 








Post 1997     0.046  0.004  0.040  0.004   
      (0.007)
***
  (0.008) (0.007)
*** 
(0.008)   
One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]      0.064  0.172  0.049  0.168 












Age (log)    -0.017 -0.012 -0.017 -0.013  










Family Size (log)    -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009  











Management Fee      0.019  0.005  0.011  0.001  









Load      -0.002  0.004 -0.000  0.003  








Index Fund Dummy     0.017 -0.007  0.013  0.000  







Constant      0.143  0.278  0.180  0.254  










Style Control      Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations   4,209  2,909  3,407 2,520 
 
(C) Quantile (Median) Regression 
 
Post 1997 * One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]   0.054 -0.051  0.054 -0.023 






Post 1997     0.040 -0.005  0.037 -0.012   
      (0.006)
***




   
One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]      0.061  0.155  0.055  0.139 










Age (log)    -0.014 -0.010 -0.013 -0.012  










Family Size (log)    -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008  











Management Fee      0.010 -0.006  0.007 -0.004  









Load      -0.002  0.001 -0.000  0.001  








Index Fund Dummy     0.011  0.003  0.010  0.010  







Constant      0.129  0.235  0.173  0.259  










Style Control      Yes Yes Yes Yes  
















The Link Between Market Share and Performance:  
Winners and Losers 
 
Regressions of change in fund market share (fund assets as a percent of industry assets, times 100) on a 
time period dummy, Post 1997 (equal to 1 for an observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 
1997), one-year net returns (in decimal format), an interaction term, and control variables as shown.  All 
observations are annual.  All control variables are lagged by one year.  Regressions are run separately for 
funds that outperform the mean fund in their style, and for funds that underperform the mean fund in their 
style.  Robust standard errors based on fund clusters are shown in parenthesis.  
 
Dependent Variable: Change in Fund Market Share (% * 100) 
  - - - - - Winners - - - - -  - - - - - Losers - - - - - 
        (1) (2)    (1)  (2) 
  ∆MSt-1, t  ∆MSt, t+1 ∆MSt-1, t  ∆MSt, t+1 
Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Post 1997 * One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]   0.549 -0.580 -0.348 -0.423 






Post 1997     0.046 -0.031  0.167 -0.039   
      (0.034)  (0.060) (0.037)
*** 
(0.036)   
One-Year Return [Rt-1, t]     -0.234  1.058  0.371  0.796 










Age (log)    -0.056 -0.046 -0.045 -0.034  










Family Size (log)     0.002 -0.029 -0.025 -0.033  











Management Fee      0.102  0.051  0.022 -0.077  









Load      -0.016  0.002 -0.004  0.002  








Index Fund Dummy     0.036  0.259  0.145 -0.117  









Constant      0.347  0.941  0.480  1.148  










Style Control      Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Fund Clusters      Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   2,009  1,437  2,195 1,469 
Adjusted R
2












Regression Results for Fund Flows 
Regressions of annual fund flows (in percent) on a time period dummy, Post 1997 (equal to 1 for an 
observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), prior performance (alpha and alpha-squared), 
interaction terms, and control variables as shown.  Flows have been winsorized at the 1% level.  Control 
variables are as of the end of the prior year.  Alpha is the average of the fund’s monthly alphas (from a 
four-factor model using a rolling 12 month window) over the prior year.  The data set is limited to U.K. 
domestic equity funds.  Regressions are run separately for all funds and for trusts only.  Robust standard 
errors based on fund clusters are shown in parenthesis.  
 Dependent Variable: Annual Fund Flows 
    - - - All Funds - - -    - - - Trusts Only - - - 
    (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
(A) Ordinary Least Squares 
Post 1997    -4.11  25.71   -4.27   12.17 
   (7.24) (19.16)   (7.34)  (23.39) 
Size (log)  -10.72 -10.76   -10.97  -11.00 
   (4.25)
** 
(4.22)





Age (log)    0.07  -0.26     1.65    1.13 
   (4.05) (3.96)   (4.61)   (4.50) 
Family Size (log)    3.51   3.31     2.81    2.68 
   (3.72) (3.69)   (4.27)   (4.26) 
Management Fee  -11.78 10.53    -9.78    8.17 
   (10.46) (10.55)   (11.55)  (11.29)
 
Front-End Load    1.11  -0.05     1.78   -0.60 
   (1.52) (1.49)   (1.82)  (2.33) 
Index Fund Dummy  -12.92 -14.05   -10.44  -10.95 
   (12.86) (13.75)   (17.77) (18.76)
 
Alpha    52.69  11.25    51.96    9.60 










   21.56  -1.03    21.62   -0.72 
   (12.66)
* 
(0.83)   (12.78)
* 
(0.79) 
Post 97 * Alpha  -42.15     -43.46 
   (29.26)     (29.38)
 
Post 97 * (Alpha)
2 
 -22.57     -22.29 
   (12.79)
*  
   (12.93)
* 
Post 97 * Management Fee   -27.50     -21.68 
     (14.77)
*   
  (16.88) 
Post 97 * Front-End Load      1.56       2.86 
     (1.70)      (2.75) 
Constant  161.34 143.92   166.93 160.53 








Style Controls     Yes  Yes      Yes     Yes 
Observations     771  771      640     640 
Adjusted R
2




(B) Robust Regression 
Post 1997    -4.12  10.23   -3.77   -9.65 
   (2.58) (7.44)   (2.49)  (8.32) 
Size (log)    0.23  -0.08     0.48    0.30 
   (0.60)
 
(0.59)





Age (log)   -4.75  -4.40    -4.90   -4.94 








Family Size (log)    0.21   0.34    -0.03    0.06 
   (0.57) (0.56)   (0.58)   (0.57) 
Management Fee   -4.41  2.40    -2.10   -0.62 
   (2.67)
*
 (4.95)   (2.73)   (5.13)
 
Front-End Load    0.36   0.66     0.54   -1.22 
   (0.50) (0.83)   (0.53)  (1.07) 
Index Fund Dummy   -0.83 -1.32     0.69    1.39 
   (4.78) (4.78)   (5.45)  (5.43)
 
Alpha    22.94  2.56    22.29    2.87 










   15.66   0.59    15.85    0.56 








Post 97 * Alpha  -21.14     -21.02 
   (6.66)
***
     (6.36)
*** 
Post 97 * (Alpha)
2 
 -15.00     -15.13 
   (9.12)
  
   (8.69)
* 
Post 97 * Management Fee   -8.24     -1.67 
     (5.40)
   
  (5.65) 
Post 97 * Front-End Load     -0.32       2.05 
     (0.91)      (1.18)
*
 
Constant   41.45 28.69   38.73  45.63 








Style Controls     Yes  Yes      Yes     Yes 
Observations     770  771      639     640 
 
(C) Quantile (Median) Regression 
Post 1997   -2.28  16.94   -2.72   -7.97 
   (2.15) (7.90)
**
   (2.02)  (8.15) 
Size (log)    0.04  -0.38    -0.00   -0.26 
   (0.54)
 
(0.63)





Age (log)   -5.43  -5.19    -5.91   -6.21 








Family Size (log)    0.41   0.52     0.19    0.09 
   (0.50) (0.59)   (0.49)   (0.58) 
Management Fee   -3.83  7.05    -2.38    3.07 




Front-End Load    0.38   1.01     0.59   -1.97 
   (0.44) (0.85)   (0.45)  (1.07)
* 
Index Fund Dummy   -2.27 -2.02     0.47   -0.34 
   (4.16) (5.00)   (4.66)  (5.41)
 
Alpha    18.65  3.02    14.74    3.82 










    5.70   0.44    4.04    0.27 
   (1.90)
*** 




Post 97 * Alpha  -15.97     -12.00 
   (5.41)
***
     (5.00)
** 
Post 97 * (Alpha)
2 
 -5.28     -3.52 
   (1.91)
***  
   (1.77)
** 
Post 97 * Management Fee   -12.42     -6.58 
     (5.75)
**   
  (5.62) 
Post 97 * Front-End Load     -0.64       2.87 
     (0.93)      (1.19)
**
 
Constant   44.77 30.37   52.08  67.20 








Style Controls     Yes  Yes      Yes     Yes 












Summary Statistics on Expenses  
 
Summary statistics for mutual funds in the data set, on an equal-weight basis.  Mutual funds are grouped 
according to period (1994-1996 versus 1998-2001).  Panel A presents summary statistics on total expense 
ratios, computed as front-end loads netted against waivers and amortized over a seven year holding period, 
plus annual management fees.  Panel B presents summary statistics on annual management fees (in 
percent).  Panel C presents summary statistics on front-end loads (in percent).   Panel D presents summary 
statistics on front-end loads netted against waivers (in percent).   Figures are given for all funds (All) and 
for trusts only (Trusts). 
 
     Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 
(A) Total Expense Ratios 
BEFORE (1994-1996)  
All 3,926 1.47 1.55 0.44 0.00   4.50 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All  5,070 1.52 1.57 0.50 0.00   9.07 
 Difference (After-Before)   0.05
***
 
Trusts  3,532 1.49 1.54 0.52 0.00   9.07 
 Difference (After-Before)   0.02 
 
(B) Management Fees 
BEFORE (1994-1996)     
All  4,215 1.21 1.25 0.37 0.00 4.50 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All  6,249 1.22 1.25 0.39 0.00 8.75 
 Difference (After-Before)     0.01
* 
Trusts  4,375 1.21 1.25 0.41 0.00 8.75 
 Difference (After-Before)     0.01
 
 
(C) Front-End Loads 
BEFORE (1994-1996)   
All  4,217 4.59 5.25 1.66 0.00   7.50 
AFTER (1998-2001) 
All  6,295 4.16 5.00 1.87 0.00 10.00 
 Difference (After-Before)   -0.43
*** 
Trusts  4,413 4.15 5.00 1.96 0.00 10.00 
 Difference (After-Before)   -0.44
*** 
 
(D) Front-End Loads Net of Waivers 
BEFORE (1994-1996)  
 All   3,929  1.82  2.00 1.35 0.00   7.50  
AFTER (1998-2001)  
All   5,124  2.00  1.25 1.89 0.00 10.00 
 Difference (After-Before)   0.18
*** 
Trusts   3,574  1.91  1.00 1.88 0.00 10.00 













Regression Results for Total Expense Ratio 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of total expense ratio (equal to front-end load (net of waivers) amortized 
over seven years plus annual management fee) (in percent) on a time period dummy, Post 1997 (equal to 1 
for an observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), with control variables as shown.  All 
observations are annual.  All independent variables (except for Post 1997) are lagged by one year.  
Regressions are run for all funds (Panel A) and for trusts only (Panel B).  Robust standard errors are shown 
in parenthesis.  Columns (2) and (3) adjust standard errors for clustering by family affiliation and by fund, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Expense Ratios 
    (1)    (2) (3) (4) 
(A) All Funds 
Post 1997   0.049   0.049   0.049  0.036   








   
Size (log)   0.006   0.006  0.006  0.005  
   (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
 
Age (log)   0.003   0.003   0.003  0.026  








Family Size (log)  -0.022  -0.022 -0.022 -0.025  









Index Fund Dummy  -0.844  -0.844 -0.844 -0.775  








One-Year Return  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 






Three-Year Return  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  0.000 






Constant   1.763   1.763  1.763 1.548  








Style Control    Yes  Yes  Yes Yes    
Family Controls    No  No  No Yes     
Family Clusters    No  Yes  No  No  
Fund Clusters    No  No  Yes No 
Observations  2,616 2,616 2,616  2,616 
Adjusted R
2
    0.22  0.22 0.22 0.50   
 
(B) Trusts Only 
Post 1997   0.031   0.031   0.031  0.029   
   (0.019)
*
  (0.030)  (0.019)  (0.021)   
Size (log)   0.014   0.014  0.014  0.012  
   (0.008)
*
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.008)
* 
Age (log)  -0.013  -0.013  -0.013  0.011  








Family Size (log)  -0.023  -0.023 -0.023 -0.016  






 (0.013)  
98 
 
Index Fund Dummy  -0.797  -0.797 -0.797 -0.722  








One-Year Return  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 






Three-Year Return  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  0.000 






Constant   1.747   1.747  1.747 1.344  








Style Control    Yes  Yes  Yes Yes    
Family Controls    No  No  No Yes     
Family Clusters    No  Yes  No  No  
Fund Clusters    No  No  Yes No 
Observations 2,223 2,223 2,223  2,223 
Adjusted R
2













Regression Results for Management Fees and Loads 
 
Ordinary least squares regressions of annual management fees, front-end loads (before waivers) and front-
end loads (after waivers) (each in percent) on a time period dummy, Post 1997 (equal to 1 for an 
observation after 1997 and 0 for an observation before 1997), with control variables as shown.  All 
observations are annual.  All independent variables (except for Post 1997) are lagged by one year.  
Regressions are run for all funds (Panel A) and for trusts only (Panel B).  Robust standard errors based on 
fund clusters are shown in parenthesis.   
 
Dependent Variable:  
 Management - - - - Front-End Loads - - - - 
 Fees (before waivers) (after waivers) 
    (1)    (2) (3)  
(A) All Funds 
Post 1997   0.066  -0.334   0.050     




  (0.074)     
Size (log)  -0.004  -0.016  0.025   
   (0.008) (0.034) (0.036)  
Age (log)  -0.014   0.186  0.153   







Family Size (log)  -0.013  -0.016 -0.120   






   
Load or Fee   0.036   0.678  0.259   






Index Fund Dummy  -0.479  -2.503 -1.329   






One-Year Return   0.000   0.001 -0.004  







Three-Year Return   0.000   0.001 -0.001  





Constant   1.373   3.009  3.092  






Style Control    Yes  Yes  Yes     
Fund Clusters    Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  3,158 3,156 2,615   
Adjusted R
2
    0.26  0.28 0.07 
 
(B) Trusts Only 
Post 1997   0.055  -0.291  -0.000     




  (0.076)     
Size (log)   0.001  -0.006  0.035   
   (0.009) (0.037) (0.038)  
Age (log)  -0.038   0.229  0.163   







Family Size (log)  -0.011  -0.014 -0.133   
100 
 






   
Load or Fee   0.037   0.638  0.193   






Index Fund Dummy  -0.459  -2.766 -1.326   






One-Year Return   0.000   0.001 -0.006  







Three-Year Return   0.000   0.002 -0.002  





Constant   1.421   2.464  3.371  






Style Control    Yes  Yes  Yes     
Fund Clusters    Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  2,675 2,672 2,222   
Adjusted R
2
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Since the inception of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment 
Company Act”), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has sought to 
enhance the independence and effectiveness of mutual fund boards of directors and to 
improve their ability to protect the interests of the funds and fund shareholders they 
serve.  Most recently, in 2004, after discovering that a number of mutual fund complexes 
had been engaging in late trading, inappropriate market timing activities, and misuse of 
nonpublic information about fund portfolios, the SEC proposed numerous changes 
pertaining to fund governance, including requirements that independent directors 
comprise at least 75% of each mutual fund‟s board, and that an independent director chair 
each fund‟s board.
1 
 These changes followed the SEC‟s adoption, in 2001, of rules that 
required independent directors to comprise at least a majority of each mutual fund‟s 
board (the previous requirement had been 40%), and that required independent directors 
to be selected and nominated only by other independent directors.
2
  In fact, the SEC has 
 
 1. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC Docket 
1384 (July 27, 2004) [hereinafter Release No. 26,520]. The rule has been challenged in the courts and is 
currently being reconsidered by the SEC. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136–37 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 893–94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the SEC 
failed to seek comment on the data used in estimating the cost and competitive impact of the rule and 
ordering the SEC to request further comment). Separately, in 2004, the SEC required fund shareholder 
reports to include a discussion of why the board chose the particular investment adviser and how the 
advisory fee was decided. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors 
of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8433, Exchange Act Release No. 49,909, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,486, 83 SEC Docket 261 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239–40, 
274). 
 2. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7932, 
Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 
16, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239-40, 270, 274). The SEC does not impose such requirements 
directly, but instead ties them to a fund‟s use of important exemptions from certain provisions of the 
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been reviewing, revising, and adopting rules and regulations pertaining to fund 




This continuing need to revisit fund governance issues raises the possibility that 
the SEC is not asking the correct questions.
4
  Instead of asking how to enhance the 
effectiveness of mutual fund boards, perhaps the SEC should consider whether mutual 
funds should have boards at all.  Similar consideration might also be given to the 
requirement that mutual fund investors be shareholders in the fund with full voting rights.  
That is, perhaps the SEC should question, more broadly, the assumption that mutual 
funds must be organized in accordance with a corporate model.  This reevaluation is 
particularly important as mutual funds increasingly compete with collective investment 
arrangements, such as hedge funds, that have freedom in their choice of organizational 
form.  If mutual funds in the United States are organized in corporate form simply to 
satisfy legal requirements, those requirements represent a deadweight cost to mutual 
funds and their investors.  This Chapter analyzes whether mutual fund investors in the 
United States could be better served by mutual funds organized according to an 
alternative, non-corporate governance structure. 
Part II of this chapter explores the corporate model required in the U.S. mutual 
fund industry.  Part III examines the contractual model that characterizes many mutual 
fund industries outside the United States.  Chapters II and III of this dissertation suggest 
 
Investment Company Act. Id. at 3734. 
 3. For instance, in the 1990s, the SEC‟s Division of Investment Management recommended raising the 
minimum percentage of independent directors of a fund‟s board from 40% to a majority, and modifying the 
list of issues that should require shareholder vote to better comport with market realities. The Division‟s 
objective was to “increase the effectiveness of boards of directors in monitoring conflicts of interest [and] 
provide shareholders with more meaningful voting opportunities[.]” DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, 
PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF-CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 253 (1992) 
[hereinafter 1992 SEC REPORT]. Before that, the SEC commenced a four-year legislative program in 1966 
to address what it perceived as excessive sales loads and management fees stemming from an apparent lack 
of price competition and economies of scale in the industry. The SEC‟s efforts resulted in the 1970 
amendments to the Investment Company Act, which strengthened independent director requirements and 
imposed a fiduciary duty with respect to management compensation. 
 4. When the SEC requested comments on its recent proposal to require at least 75% of the board of 
directors be independent, it asked the following: 
Is any change from the current requirement necessary? Should the requirement be higher? Should 
it be lower? Should it be phrased in terms other than a fraction or percentage, e.g., that all 
directors, or all directors but one, must be independent?  
See Release No. 26,520, supra note 1. But it did not ask the more fundamental and antecedent question of 




that a change in U.S. regulatory policy allowing the trust model to compete alongside the 
corporate model would likely have implications for fund investors.  Hence, Part IV of this 
chapter argues that organizational competition may benefit investors by offering them 
greater choice.  Investors could chose to invest in funds that subject themselves to stricter 
fiduciary obligations in place of boards and voting rights, or funds that subject 
themselves to weaker fiduciary obligations with boards and voting rights to supplement 
those obligations.  Different governance structures would appeal to different investor 
clienteles.  Part V concludes. 
 
II. Mutual Funds in the United States 
 
This Part details the corporate paradigm that governs mutual fund regulation in 
the United States, and a critique of that paradigm. 
 
A. Organization of Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds in the United States, or “investment companies” as they are referred 
to in the statutes, are organized pursuant to a corporate model.  In the United States, the 
mutual fund is an independent legal entity, owned by shareholders, with a board of 
directors.  It has full corporate powers, including the capacity to enter into contracts, to 
sue, and to be sued.  The mutual fund raises money by issuing shares and invests the 
pooled proceeds in securities.  The shares entitle their owners to a pro rata interest in the 
pooled assets. Investors in mutual funds are shareholders in the fund, with voting rights. 
Virtually all mutual funds are externally managed.  That is, they do not have their 
own employees, other than a few officers.  Instead, each fund contracts with an entity, the 
investment adviser, which manages the fund‟s investments for a fee, which is typically a 
percentage of assets under management.  The investment adviser, from a legal 
perspective, is an entity that is separate and distinct from the mutual fund.  The 
investment adviser, or its affiliate, is usually the entity that created the fund and promoted 
its sale to investors.
5
  Acting through its board, the mutual fund enters into contracts with 
 
 5. Often, the investment adviser, or an affiliate, organizes a variety of funds and distributes their 
shares through a common, wholly owned distributor. The group of such funds is often referred to as a 
mutual fund family or complex. The best known examples of fund families or complexes are Fidelity, 
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not only an investment adviser, but various other service providers as well, including an 
administrator, a distributor (or principal underwriter), a custodian, and a transfer agent.  
Each mutual fund, and its relationships with these outside service providers, is overseen 
by a board of directors (or trustees) elected by the fund‟s shareholders. 
While the law does not expressly require that mutual funds be organized as 
corporations, it does impose requirements that assume a typical corporate form: a board 
of directors (whose function is to oversee the operations of the mutual fund and review 
contracts with service providers, such as those with the investment adviser) and 
shareholder voting (to elect directors, accept or reject fee arrangement, and approve 
fundamental changes).  These requirements equally apply to investment companies that 
are not corporations but are organized in some other form, such as business trusts or 
limited partnerships.  That is, the Investment Company Act, which regulates mutual 
funds in the United States, imposes the corporate paraphernalia of boards of directors and 
shareholder voting on all mutual funds, whether they are organized as corporations, 
trusts, limited partnerships, or simply pools of investment funds.
6
 
The reason the Investment Company Act takes this approach is straightforward 
when one considers the state of the industry in 1940.  At the end of 1940, mutual fund 
industry assets totaled $2.1 billion.
7 
 Of that amount, only $450 million were in open-end 
mutual funds (which were then commonly organized as trusts).
8
  The remaining $1.65 
billion were in closed-end investment companies.
9
  Closed-end investment companies 
were (and are) organized in traditional corporate form.  Given the dominance of 
investment companies organized on a corporate basis, it is understandable that, in 1940, 
Congress and the SEC would apply to investment companies the corporate mechanisms 
 
Vanguard, and T. Rowe Price. 
 6. Notably, the corporate paraphernalia that is required of mutual funds is not required of other 
collective investment arrangements, such as bank common trust funds, commodity pools, separately 
managed accounts, and hedge funds. 
 7. Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act—A Reevaluation of the 
Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903, 905 (1982). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Investors buy and sell shares of closed-end funds in the public markets, in the same manner they 
buy and sell shares of public companies. Investors invest in open-end funds by going directly to the fund to 
buy or redeem shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a) (2000). It is estimated that closed-end funds were formed in 
greater number before 1940 because more money was made distributing their shares than managing their 
portfolios. PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A BETTER WAY TO ORGANIZE 
MUTUAL FUNDS 25 (2007). 
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of boards of directors and shareholder voting.  And it is equally understandable why the 
industry accepted this form.  In short, the Investment Company Act was crafted to 
regulate an industry that was dominated by closed-end funds organized along corporate 
lines.
10
  Moreover, given that shares of closed-end mutual funds trade in secondary 
markets which, in 1940, were thin and not very liquid, investors were deemed vulnerable 
to expropriation by fund managers and in need of safeguards that boards of directors and 
voting rights were to provide.
11
  Today, however, the investment company industry is 
dominated by open-end funds, not closed-end ones.  In 2004, open-end funds managed 
$8.1 trillion, or 95% of total investment company assets.
12
  In contrast, closed-end funds 
held only $254 billion.
13
  Furthermore, closed-end mutual fund shares today are highly 
liquid.  Notwithstanding the shift from closed-end funds to open-end funds, and the 
increased liquidity of the markets, the corporate paradigm continues. 
 
B. Pros and Cons of the Corporate Model 
This subsection examines the arguments for and against the corporate paradigm, 
namely, the requirements that mutual funds have boards of directors and that mutual 
funds grant shareholder voting rights to investors. 
 
1. Mutual Fund Boards: Watchdogs or Sleeping Dogs 
 Mutual funds must have a board of directors, according to advocates, to police 
potential conflicts of interest inherent in mutual fund creation and operation.  A typical 
mutual fund is organized by its investment adviser, which provides the fund with its 
management services.  Because the adviser is a legally distinct entity from the fund and 
must seek higher profits for its owners, it has objectives that differ from those of mutual 
fund investors, who seek the highest possible return on their investment, after fees and 
expenses.  The investment adviser thus serves two masters.
14
 The investment adviser‟s 
 
 10. Phillips, supra note 7, at 905. 
 11. Id. 
 12. INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 ICI FACT 
BOOK], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2005_factbook.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. One exception is the mutual form of ownership adopted by the Vanguard Group, where investors in 
Vanguard funds are also shareholders of the investment adviser. 
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interest “in maximizing its own profits for the benefit of its owners may conflict with its 
paramount duty to act solely in the best interests of the fund and its shareholders.”
15
  
While fund investors have the legal authority to remove the investment adviser, it is not 
realistic to expect fund investors to sever that special relationship between the fund and 
its adviser.  Consequently, a conflict arises.  In response, the Investment Company Act 
requires that a board of directors oversee fund operations.  The board of directors is 
intended to be a monitor, protecting the interests of mutual fund investors in situations 
where the investment adviser could exploit them.  Under the Investment Company Act, 
the board is responsible for selecting the fund‟s investment adviser and other service 
providers, evaluating fees for services provided to the fund, policing operational 
conflicts, permitting certain transactions in the absence of SEC review, and establishing 
the fund‟s investment objective and policy.
16
  Moreover, the Investment Company Act 
requires that a percentage of the fund‟s directors be independent of the fund‟s investment 
adviser.
17
  The independent directors, in particular, are expected to look after the interests 
of investors, and the Investment Company Act assigns additional responsibilities to these 
independent directors.
18
  Because of the independence requirement and the mandated 
responsibilities, some claim that independent directors are “watchdogs” of shareholder 
interests.
19
  The SEC has sought (and continues to seek) to enhance the bargaining power 
of mutual fund boards by strengthening the influence of the independent directors.
20
 
 The corporate paradigm has its critics. Critics observe that a board of directors 
imposes costs on mutual funds. Direct costs include compensation of directors, 
 
 15. Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 24,083, 70 SEC Docket 2017 (Oct. 14, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271). 
 16. The duties imposed on directors by the Investment Company Act are in addition to those imposed 
by state law. 
 17. The SEC has stated that mutual funds are unique in that they are “organized and operated by people 
whose primary loyalty and pecuniary interest lie outside the enterprise.” 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 251. 
 18. For instance, independent directors vote separately from the board on certain matters, review and 
approve the fund‟s contracts with the investment adviser and principal underwriter, select the fund‟s 
independent public accountants, oversee certain securities transactions involving affiliates, and review and 
approve fidelity bonds. 
 19. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (quoting District Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan in 
Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977)); Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: 
Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust 
Study, SEC). 
 20. See supra notes 1–3. 
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reimbursement of travel expenses for board meetings, costs of counsel for the 
independent directors, and expenses of keeping directors informed.
21 
 There are indirect 
costs as well. Fund management must reallocate considerable time and resources away 
from portfolio management to preparing for board meetings and tending to director 
requests.  
 Critics also argue that boards do not fulfill their intended function. These critics 
argue that, despite their “watchdog” role, mutual fund boards are ineffective in policing 
conflicts between the adviser and investors.
22
  Directors do not have much more 
information than investors, critics point out.  Directors are typically generalists with only 
limited resources.  Boards lack a full-time professional staff, and directors are dependent 
upon the investment adviser to keep them informed.  Moreover, boards meet only 
quarterly or bimonthly, not daily.  Further, fund directors typically lack the subject-matter 
expertise in portfolio management that the adviser possesses.  While corporate boards 
outside the mutual fund context perform two functions, monitoring of management and 
providing strategic expertise, mutual fund boards typically perform only the monitoring 
function.  If directors do not possess full information or expertise, critics argue that it is 
not realistic to expect them to strike the best deal for investors.  This lack of information 
and expertise is compounded by the compensation scheme for directors.  Directors are 
typically paid an annual retainer fee and a separate fee for each meeting attended.  
Payment is not tied to fund performance.  The compensation scheme thus does not align 
director interests with shareholder interests. 
 Other critics argue that the independent director requirement that underpins mutual 
fund corporate governance rests on a faulty definition of independence.
23
 The Investment 
Company Act views independence in a relational context. Under the Act, a director is 
deemed independent if he or she does not have a close relational nexus with the 
 
 21. For a quantification of direct costs, see Letter from Lipper Analytical Services, Inc., to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Sec‟y, SEC (Oct. 9, 1990), cited in 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 274 n.85, 286; Letter from  
Leslie L. Ogg, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, IDS Mutual Fund Group, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec‟y, SEC 
(Sept. 26, 1990) (on file with author); Letter from Non-Interested Trustees of Scudder Funds, to Jonathan 
G. Katz, Sec‟y, SEC (Oct. 9, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cost Letters]. 
 22. See, e.g., WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 9. 
 23. Jeffrey J. Haas & Steven R. Howard, The Heartland Funds’ Receivership and Its Implications for 
Independent Mutual Fund Directors, 51 EMORY L.J. 153, 183–191 (2002). 
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investment adviser, underwriter, or administrator.
24
  The Investment Company Act 
assumes that every director who meets the relational distance test from the fund adviser 
will look out for the best interests of fund shareholders.  However, critics argue that this 
assumption is flawed for three reasons.
25
  The first reason is that, over time, the distance 
between the independent directors and the fund adviser narrows considerably.  
Independent directors may become “house directors,” serving on the boards of many 
funds within a fund family, and receive considerable compensation as a result of 
maintaining friendly relations with a particular investment adviser.  Yet, under the 
Investment Company Act, this compensation is irrelevant, due to the relational 
standard.
26 
 The second reason is directorial incompetence.  Directors may stand the 
requisite distance away from the fund adviser to qualify as independent, but if they lack 
the necessary knowledge and skill, then they cannot be an effective watchdog.  Third, 
funds are typically formed by an investment adviser, who is the fund‟s initial shareholder.  
Given this special relationship between an adviser and its fund, it is unrealistic to expect 
an independent director to sever that relationship, particularly since most directors are 
initially selected by the adviser.  And, indeed, instances of a board choosing to replace 




 24. The Investment Company Act disqualifies “persons who are investment advisers of, affiliated 
persons of an investment adviser of, or officers or employees of” a registered investment company. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 789, 806 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-10 (2000)). Congress expanded the scope of the relational nexus in 1970 to include the term “interested 
persons,” the effect of which was to widen the relational nexus and permit fewer individuals to qualify as 
independent. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1416 
(1970). Simply put, interested persons are defined to include a long list of persons who have some business 
or professional relationship with the investment company or are affiliated with the adviser, underwriter, or 
broker for the investment company. 
 25. See, e.g., Haas & Howard, supra note 23, at 186–190. 
 26. One Maryland case, Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 
may be read “as implying that the court [involved in that case] would be sympathetic to the argument that 
clustered boards whose members receive „substantial remuneration‟ [would] violate section 10(a) of the 
Investment Company Act.” David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J. L. & 
INV. MGMT. 6, 33 (2001). Section 10(a) mandates that a certain percentage of a fund‟s board be 
independent. However, in no subsequent case has a court taken this approach, and both Maryland and 
Massachusetts have since adopted statutes effectively overruling the holding. See id at 34. 
 27. In 2007, the board of the Korea Fund replaced its adviser, Deutsche Asset Management, with RCM 
Capital Management. Press Release, The Korea Fund, Inc., The Korea Fund Under New Management 
(April 2, 2007) [hereinafter Korea Fund Press Release], available at 
http://www.thekoreafund.com/documentLibrary/ 
koreaFund/supportingLiterature/newsPressReleases/kf_press_release_04_02_07.pdf. In 2005, the board of 
the Clipper Fund voted to replace its adviser, Pacific Financial Research, with Davis Selected Advisors. 
Douglas Appell, What Are the Odds? Twice in 10 Years, and Davis is There, PENSIONS & INV. (New York, 
N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2006, at 8. In 2002, the Japan Fund chose to replace its adviser, Deutsche Asset Management, 
with Fidelity. Chuck Jaffe, Japan Fund Shift Shows Who’s Boss, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 27, 
112 
 
 Besides the fact that the statutory regime does not capture a meaningful notion of 
independence, critics find other shortcomings with the reliance upon independent 
directors.  Critics often cite the process by which mutual funds select independent 
directors as creating an inherent conflict of interest.  Often independent directors are 
selected as a reward for being a friend or colleague of the person or entity that started the 
mutual fund.  This results in boards composed of independent directors who are anything 
but independent.  Other critics point out that the statutory regime does not allow 
shareholders to pursue private enforcement of a break-down in the arm‟s length 
relationship between directors and advisers.
28 
 Finally, critics have observed that, until 
recently, errors and omissions insurance did not cover litigation between independent 
directors and fund advisers.  A director would have had to know to ask for it, and would 
have had to be willing to ask the fund to pay the cost.
29
 
 The system of mutual fund directors has faced mounting criticisms over the years, 
leading to claims that they are not “watchdogs” but rather “sleeping dogs.”  As tangible 
evidence, critics typically point to directors‟ failure to keep management fees low, to 
terminate management contracts with poorly performing investment advisers, and to 
effectively challenge practices of investment advisers.  For instance, consider board 
performance in terms of fees and expenses.  Critics who argue that boards have not been 
 
2003, Bus., at 66. In 1993, the board of the Selected Funds chose to replace Kemper with Venture Advisers 
L.P. Appell, supra. 
The unusual situation surrounding the Japan Fund illustrates the kind of circumstances that prompt a board 
to act. To begin, the Japan Fund‟s long-time adviser, Zurich Scudder, was acquired by Deutsche Bank only 
months earlier. Shortly thereafter, the fund‟s portfolio manager resigned. Because the directors of the Japan 
Fund were not sitting on the boards of other funds in the Zurich Scudder/Deutsche Bank family they opted 
to change advisers. Jaffe, supra. 
 28. Shareholders do have an express cause of action with respect to compensation, pursuant to section 
36(b) of the Investment Company Act, which imposes a fiduciary duty on the adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(b) (2000). However, section 36(b)  is limited to fee-related conflicts of interest only. Id. Further 
limitations include the following: (1) plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial, (2) only shareholders or the 
SEC have standing (not the fund, as with a derivative suit), (3) the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, (4) 
damages are not recoverable for any period prior to one year before the start of the suit, (5) damages are 
limited to actual damages resulting from breach of fiduciary duty and may not exceed the amount of 
payments received from the investment company or its shareholders, and (6) federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction. Id. Section 36(b) was interpreted by the Second Circuit in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), which held that for a management fee to violate section 36(b) it 
must be so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered, and 
could not have been the product of arms-length bargaining. Id. at 928. Moreover, the court rejected 
comparisons with the fees and expenses of advisers to other funds. Id. at 929. No plaintiff has met the 
standards set forth in Gartenberg. Note that one case, Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., may have 
opened the door to derivative litigation whereby shareholders on behalf of the fund could challenge the 
independence of putatively independent directors. Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp 
783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Carter, supra note 26, at 33. 
 29. See Haas & Howard, supra note 23, at 189. 
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effective in negotiating fees and expenses cite escalating fund expense ratios.  The SEC 
estimates that mutual fund expense ratios have risen from an average of 1.14% in 1979 to 
1.36% in 1999.
30
  One study calculates that average expense ratios for U.S. funds 
increased from 0.96% in 1971 to 1.44% in 1990.
31
  Another study claims that expense 
ratios have, on average, doubled over four decades.
32
  Critics note that this escalation in 
expense ratios has occurred simultaneously with the growth of the fund industry, which 
should permit large economies of scale and hence declining expense ratios for 
investors.
33  
Critics thus argue that these increasing fees and expenses reveal that boards 
have not been effective in negotiating on behalf of investors.  In fact, boards rarely re-
negotiate management fees over time and advisers are rarely fired; one study shows that, 
on average over the 1993-2002 period, only about 10% of all U.S. mutual funds 
renegotiated their management fees or changed their subadvisers.
34
  Certain critics go 
further, arguing that escalating funds fees are not just a reflection of ineffective boards.  
Rather, these critics assert that escalating fees are caused by the corporate paradigm that 
requires mutual funds to have boards and empowers them to review and approve fund 
fees.  For instance, Wallison and Litan analogize the way adviser fees and expenses are 
approved by fund boards to the way rates are established by public utility commissions.
35
  
Observing that mutual fund boards often set fund fees on the basis of reported costs plus 
a reasonable profit, they believe the corporate paradigm eliminates the incentive of 
investment advisers to cut costs and compete on the basis of price.  Wallison and Litan 
state the following: 
[I]n the mutual fund world where virtually all advisers must receive 
 
 30. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES (2000), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm [hereinafter THE FEE REPORT].  
 31. Erik Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1593 (1998). 
 32. Roger Klein, Who Will Manage the Managers?: The Investment Company Act’s Antipyramiding 
Provision and Its Effect on the Mutual Fund Industry, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 507, 611 n.20 (1998). 
 33. Economies of scale result from the fact that the expenses associated with mutual fund management 
increase more slowly than the size of assets under management, and the fact that most funds are offered as 
part of a larger fund family (as the net asset values of families grow larger, they can spread fixed costs, 
such as research costs, or expenses for bank lines of credit, over a larger base). Sources of economies of 
scale also include savings from larger securities trades and from more efficient utilization of investment 
analysis; computers; shareholder servicing, accounting, record-keeping and reporting systems; and legal 
services. 
 34. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund 
Industry 3 (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705. The 
author focuses on subadvisers because primary advisers are rarely replaced by boards. 
 35. WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 9, at 77–78. 
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approval of their fees and expenses from a board of directors, there is, as 
noted, no incentive for them to discover all the innovations and 
efficiencies that would reduce their costs.  If they did, the board, adding a 
„reasonable‟ profit to the lower cost figures presented to them, would 




Recently, a number of counter arguments have arisen in response to the critics.  
One counter argument notes that mutual fund shares, which are redeemable upon demand 
in open-end funds, put competitive checks on advisers.  That is, while boards may not 
often fire advisers, investors can effectively fire an investment adviser on their own by 
redeeming their shares and investing elsewhere.
37
  If advisers charge excessive fees, in 
the long run they will lose out as investors shift to lower fee funds.  A related counter 
argument points to the number of funds competing in the market, and the lack of 
substantial barriers to entry and expansion in the mutual fund market.
38
  Such factors 
make it hard to argue that the mutual fund market suffers from lack of price competition.  
Since investors can move in and out of funds with little cost or frictions, and funds can 
enter, exit and expand with few obstacles, competition in the market place should be an 
effective regulator.  Hence, boards are not needed. 
Some recent studies find that mutual fund expenses have been declining over 
time, contradicting studies cited by critics.
39
  Studies of trends in mutual fund expenses 
produce contradictory results depending upon the time period analyzed, how expense 
ratios are computed,
40
 and the sample of funds analyzed.
41
  A further complicating factor 
 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. There can be, however, disincentives to redemption, including loads, redemption fees, and adverse 
tax consequences. 
 38. See John C. Coates & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition and Shareholder Fees in the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 167–70 (2007).  
 39. Studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office find that average expense ratios were 0.74% in 
1990, 0.65% in 1998, and 0.70% in 2001. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUNDS: INFORMATION 
ON TRENDS IN FEES AND THEIR RELATED DISCLOSURE 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03551t.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: 
ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION (2000), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00126.pdf. The Investment Company Institute estimates that average 
equity mutual fund fees and expenses in 2005 were at their lowest level in 25 years. See 2005 ICI FACT 
BOOK, supra note 12. 
 40. Although it found that the average expense ratio had risen from 1979 to 1999, the SEC Division of 
Investment Management cautioned that the overall cost of owning fund shares may not have risen if 
changes in sales loads are taken into consideration. THE FEE REPORT, supra note 30. (Sales loads are not 
taken into consideration when calculating expense ratios and have generally decreased during the period. 
Id.) According to the Division,  
the increase in mutual fund expense ratios since the 1970s can be attributed primarily to changes 
in the manner that distribution and marketing charges are paid by mutual funds and their 
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is that, while funds may not often change their stated fees, they do frequently offer to 
waive some of those fees.  One study finds that almost half of money market fund 
expenses were being waived, and that 37% of equity funds were offering fee waivers.
42
  
Moreover, the study found that these fee waivers changed frequently throughout the 
year.
43
  Thus, it might be that price competition gets reflected in fee waivers instead of in 
fees themselves. 
 With compelling arguments made by proponents and critics of fund boards, the 
question remains:  Do the advantages of boards of directors in mutual funds outweigh 
their disadvantages?  Before answering that question, however, we must first examine the 
other element of the corporate paradigm: shareholder voting. 
 
2. Shareholder Voting 
 In the United States, a mutual fund, as a corporation organized under state law, 




Moreover, the Investment Company Act reinforces and extends these shareholder voting 
rights.  Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act requires, with a few exceptions, 
that every share of stock issued by an investment company “shall be a voting stock and 
have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock.”
45
  Further, the 
Investment Company Act grants additional voting rights to shareholders, beyond those 
 
shareholders. Many funds have decreased or replaced front-end loads, which are not included in 
a fund‟s expense ratio, with ongoing Rule 12b-1 fees, which are included in a fund's expense 
ratio. This change complicates the comparison of current expense ratios with expense ratios from 
earlier periods.  
Id. Studies have addressed this complication by analyzing “total fees” instead of expense ratios. Total fees 
attempt to incorporate loads into a fund‟s expense ratio by amortizing any load over an assumed holding 
period for a hypothetical investor, and adding that amount to the annual expense ratio. Such studies tend to 
find that total fees are declining notwithstanding increasing expense ratios. See Erik R. Sirri & Peter 
Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589 (1998); Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, 
Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240596; THE FEE REPORT, supra note 30; The Cost of Buying and 
Owning Mutual Funds, FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v13n1.pdf. 
 41. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 38, at 175–77 (discussing varying study results across several 
samples of funds). 
 42. Susan E.K. Christoffersen, Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive Their Fees?, 56 J. 
FIN. 1117, 1138-39 (2001). 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Investment Company Act also mandates these rights for funds of non-corporate form, such as 
trusts. 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (2000). There is an exception for investment companies organized as series, 
where each series represents interests in a single portfolio of securities. Id. § 80a-18(f)(2). 
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given by state corporate law. Such shareholder voting rights include the right to elect 
directors,
46
 to approve changes to fundamental policies with respect to key investment 
activities,
47
 to approve Rule 12b-1 plans,
48
 and to approve the initial management 
contract, subsequent changes to the management contract, assignments of the 
management contract, and any new management contract.
49
  Over the years, these 
shareholder voting rights have been emphasized and expanded by the SEC.  For instance, 
in administrative proceedings, the SEC staff has often taken broad positions on 
classifying investment policies as fundamental investment policies that cannot be 
changed without shareholder approval.
50 
 Also, the SEC staff has interpreted the notion of 
“assignment” of management contracts broadly to require shareholder approval following 
minor changes in ownership or control of the investment adviser.
51
  Advocates argue that 
shareholder voting is necessary to ensure the accountability of fund management to 
investors.  Shareholder voting is also necessary to elect directors to the fund‟s boards, and 
to preserve the independence of the independent directors.  Advocates also cite the 
informational advantages that accompany the proxy process. 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, critics argue that voting rights have been of limited 
value in governing the relationship between the fund and its investment advisers, 
underwriters, and others.  These critics argue that, in the more than six decade history of 
the Investment Company Act, there have been few instances where shareholders appear 
to have had a significant impact on the management of the fund.  There have been almost 
no reported instances of successful shareholder opposition to any management proposal 
for advisory contracts, change in investment policies, or selection of accountants, which 
are issues that expressly require shareholder approval.  There have been three instances in 
recent years where shareholders have been involved in a proxy fight between the 
investment adviser and independent directors.  The three instances involve the Navalier 
 
 46. Id. § 80a-16(a). 
 47. Id. § 80a-13(a). Activities that must be governed by fundamental investment policies are capital 
structure, permissible investments and investment strategies that significantly affect the investment 
characteristics, and risk-reward profile of the shares issued by the mutual fund. See 1992 SEC REPORT, 
supra note 3. 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(1) (2007). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a); id. § 80a-15(f). Either the shareholders or the board must approve multi-year 
contracts. Id. § 80a-15(a)(2). 
 50. Phillips, supra note 7, at 907 (describing how the Commission has expanded voting requirements). 
 51.  Id. 
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funds in 1997, the Yacktman funds in 1998, and the Japan Fund in 2002.  In those cases, 
the independent directors refused to approve management contracts and the issue 
subsequently fell to shareholders.  In the first two cases, the shareholders actually 
defeated the independent directors and voted to retain the investment adviser.  Only in the 
last case did the shareholders support the independent directors.  Nevertheless, in cases 
such as these, most shareholders choose to sell their shares rather than vote.
52
  
Consequently, critics conclude that shareholder voting is generally not a viable 
mechanism for ensuring accountability or even for meaningful expression of opposition 
to management. 
 Critics also argue that shareholder voting is ineffective in preserving the 
independence of directors.  Independent directors are initially selected by the fund 
sponsor or adviser, in most cases.  Thereafter, vacancies are typically filled by 
nominating committees composed of the independent directors.  While shareholders in 
theory have the power to reject candidates nominated by the nominating committee, it is 
rarely exercised.  Shareholders overwhelmingly approve the proposed slate of directors.
53
  
Critics conclude that shareholder voting tends to be a “ritualistic ratification” of nominees 
already selected pursuant to this process.
54
  In the history of the Investment Company 
Act, critics observe that there have been virtually no shareholder attempts to elect 
nominees to the board in opposition to management nominees, or to ouster an incumbent 
director through a proxy fight.  Furthermore, critics argue that proxy materials do not 
serve a useful communication function for shareholders.  Fund investors already receive, 
in addition to the proxy materials, annual statutory prospectuses and periodic shareholder 
reports.  Proxy materials are likely the least read and least understood of all 
communications investors receive. 
 Critics offer several reasons for the ineffectiveness of shareholder voting.  First, 
mutual fund shares are typically dispersed widely.  There are no large blocks of shares in 
the hands of individual investors or management and, hence, collective action problems 
 
 52. See David A. Sturms, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Directors: Is the System Broken, 
Creaking or Working?, 1 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 103, 111 (1999) (“Approximately 69% of the mutual 
funds shares had „voted with their feet‟ by redeeming their investments in the fund.”). 
 53. See Carter, supra note 26, at 25 (stating that shareholders typically approve the proposed slate 
without objection). 
 54. Phillips, supra note 7, at 909-10. 
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prevail.  Second is the nature of an investment in a mutual fund.  The instant 
diversification provided by a mutual fund obviates the incentive to follow fund 
management decisions closely or to expend the energy necessary to participate in the 
voting process.  Mutual fund investors “hire” the fund‟s investment adviser precisely 
because they wish to avoid such involvement.  Third, the liquidity offered by mutual 
funds means investors can redeem their shares (“vote with their feet”) rather than bother 
to vote.
55  
As a result, mutual fund shareholders participate in the voting process even less 
often than shareholders of traditional corporations.
56
 
 Nevertheless, providing for shareholder voting is costly for mutual funds.  Critics 
note that voting has direct costs.  These costs include the expenses of proxy solicitations, 
including legal and accounting fees in connection with the preparation and distribution of 
proxy materials, as well as the costs of holding annual or special meetings of 
shareholders.  Attendance of investors at shareholder meetings and the number of proxies 
actually returned is sparse, making it difficult to achieve a quorum.
57  
Two and three 
adjournments of shareholder meetings for lack of response to proxy solicitations are not 
uncommon, causing delay and increased costs for re-solicitations.  The expenses 
associated with shareholder voting are typically paid by the fund (and thus the investors), 
and not by the investment adviser.
58
  Although there are no published figures that isolate 
these costs from other funds expenses, they likely are not negligible.
59
  There are more 
indirect costs as well.  In order to comply with shareholder voting requirements, fund 
management must reallocate considerable time and resources away from portfolio 
management to shareholder solicitations.  Moreover, collective decision making by 
shareholders can result in decisions that are different from those that would have been 
reached if shareholders each contracted individually.  In other words, the collective 
decision making of shareholder voting may be inefficient in that it does not maximize 
 
 55. There are nevertheless disincentives to redemption, including loads, redemption fees, and adverse 
tax consequences. 
 56. See Carter, supra note 26, at 26 (comparing mutual fund shareholders to shareholders of traditional 
corporations), WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. 87-2274, at 
68 (1962) [hereinafter WHARTON REPORT]. 
 57. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 56. 
 58. Phillips, supra note 7, at 908 (discussing responses to proxy solicitation). 





 Consequently, critics have often called for the SEC to permit 




 We are left with the question:  Do the advantages of shareholder voting in mutual 
funds outweigh the disadvantages?  Similarly, do the advantages of boards outweigh their 
disadvantages?  More generally, do corporate mutual funds represent an optimal market 
solution to the agency problems that characterize mutual funds?  If so, the corporate 
model should, in total, benefit funds and their investors.  But if mutual funds in the 
United States are organized along corporate lines solely to satisfy legal requirements, 
those requirements represent a deadweight cost to mutual funds and their investors.  The 
next Part of this chapter explores the primary alternative to the corporate model, namely, 
the trust model.   
 
III. Mutual Funds Outside the United States (The Trust Model) 
 
 With respect to fund structure and governance, two dominant types of mutual 
funds have arisen in the world: the “corporate fund” (the U.S. model) and the “trust or 
contractual fund” (the German, Japanese, and traditional British models).  In the United 
States, mutual funds have been required to take the corporate form.  However, in much of 
Europe, in Japan, and in many other countries, funds have arisen under contract or trust 
law, as opposed to corporate law.  Investors in these funds contribute money to a pool of 
funds, in which contribution is governed by a contract between the investors and the 
manager of the pool and by a trust deed between the manager and a custodian/trustee 
(which incorporates the terms of the contract by reference).  The manager then manages 
the portfolio.  Unlike funds organized pursuant to the corporate model, funds organized 
pursuant to this trust/contractual model do not empower a monitor (such as a board of 
directors) with discretion to oversee the fund and provide little, if any, shareholder 
voting.  The fact that mutual funds have arisen in many countries pursuant to a 
trust/contractual model raises the possibility that the corporate model is not a market 
 
 60. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39-44 (1996). 
 61. See Phillips, supra note 7, at 910 (stating one critic‟s view on nonvoting securities). 
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solution to the organizational design problem. 
 
A. Differences Between the Corporate Model and the Trust Model 
 The two models differ in how they allocate decision-making power and control 
among the three primary actors (the investment adviser, the monitor, and the investors). 
 
1. Fund Versus Adviser as the Focal Point 
 The corporate model places the mutual fund at the center of the model.  In the 
corporate model, the fund is an independent legal entity with the capacity, for instance, to 
enter into contracts and to sue and be sued.  The laws and regulations governing mutual 
funds focus on the operation and structure of the fund.  The fund offers shares in itself to 
the investors.  It is the proceeds from the issuance of its shares that form the investment 
pool of the fund.  The investment pool may not be commingled with the assets of the 
investment adviser or any other entity, or paid out to any other entity except pursuant to 
contracts approved by the fund‟s board.  The fund has a board of directors, with ultimate 
responsibility for coordinating and managing the fund.  With board approval, the fund 
contracts with legally independent third party service providers, such as the investment 
adviser, the distributor, and the administrator. 
 In contrast, the trust model places the investment adviser (or its equivalent, the 
“investment manager”) at the center, instead of the fund.  The fund in the trust model is a 
contractual entity which is not independent of its investment manager or sponsor.  Rather, 
the design and operation of the fund, and its success or failure, are the responsibility of 
the manager.  In this sense, the contractual fund is “more like a proprietary financial 
product.”
62  
For instance, the Financial Services Regulation of the United Kingdom states 
the following: 
It is the duty of the manager to manage the property of the [fund], and it is 
his right and duty to make decisions as to the constituents of that property 
from time to time in accordance with . . . the trust deed, [laws and 




 62. Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of Structure 
and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 957 (1994). 
 63. Financial Services (Authorised Unit Trust Schemes) Regulation, 1988, S.I. 1988/284, § 4.01 (U.K.), 
reprinted in JOHN W. VAUGHAN, THE REGULATION OF UNIT TRUSTS 34 (1990). The regulation is also 




 Consequently, in the trust model, the investment manager is not subject to the 
control of a board or any other organizational superior.  The investment manager is 
responsible for all services necessary for the operation of the fund (except for custodial 
services)
64
 and all costs involved in operating the fund and distributing its shares (though 
the manager may recoup all or some of such costs through pre-set fees). 
 
2. Rules Versus Discretion 
 In the corporate model, the fund‟s board of directors is granted considerable 
discretionary authority and is responsible for making business judgments.  For instance, 
the board must approve the contracts with the fund‟s adviser, distributor, and 
administrator, and review them annually.  The board is provided with no guidance or 
decision rules; rather, these are decisions for the board in its sole discretion.
65
 
 In contrast, funds following the trust model rely more on rules than discretion.  In 
the trust model, the typical fund contract is composed of “standard terms or rules, with 
allowances for variations (i.e., discretion) in only exceptional cases.”
66
  To ensure that 
contract terms are fulfilled, a passive monitor (typically, a custodian or trustee) is 
employed to “ensure that the [fund] is administered by the managers in accordance with 
the [management contract, regulations and prospectus].”
67 
 Thus, instead of imposing a 
board of directors, the trust model relies on a passive monitor to oversee the manager‟s 
compliance with pre-established rules and, in carrying out the function, the monitor is 
 
 64. Because fund assets are mostly held in liquid form, the potential for insider misconduct is high. It is 
therefore important that fund assets are held by custodians. The custodian typically safeguards fund assets, 
makes payments for purchases of securities in a fund‟s portfolio, and receives payments from sales of 
portfolio securities. In the United Kingdom, the manager must be independent from the custodian (whose 
function is performed by the trustee). The trustee (1) carries out the instructions of the manager (subject to 
laws and regulations), (2) takes reasonable care to ensure that the manager accurately calculates issue and 
redemption prices, and (3) takes custody of assets and holds them in trust for investors. The trustee may 
delegate its custodial function to a separate custodian. If it does so, the trustee must make reasonable 
inquiry to ensure that the custodian is fit and proper and that arrangements have been made to protect the 
trustee‟s priority over other creditors of the custodian. Financial Services (Authorised Unit Trust Schemes) 
Regulation, 1988, S.I. 1988/284, § 4.05 (U.K.), reprinted in VAUGHAN, supra note 63, at 38. 
 65. For instance, Congress amended the Investment Company Act in 1970 to impose, in section 36(b), a 
fiduciary duty with respect to payments from the fund to the investment adviser. Investment Company 
Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
80a-35 (2000)). Yet no guidance was provided as to what the term “fiduciary duty” would allow. 
 66. Wang, supra note 62, at 959. 
 67. Financial Services (Authorised Unit Trust Schemes) Regulation, 1988, S.I. 1988/284, § 4.01 (U.K.), 
reprinted in VAUGHAN, supra note 63, at 34. 
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given little discretion.  In the United Kingdom, for example, if a trustee of a unit trust 
desires to remove a fund manager, the trustee can only do so in one of six events that are 
specified in the regulations.  Such events include the liquidation of the manager or the 
appointment of a receiver for any part of the manager‟s activities.  In another example, 
instead of requiring the trustee to be a watchdog over potential conflicts, as boards are 
required in corporate funds, the laws and regulations of trust fund jurisdictions explicitly 
set forth which transactions are permitted and prohibited for managers. 
 
3. Shareholder Voting 
 Voting occurs when decisions are not already decided by contract.  Thus, not 
surprisingly, corporate funds typically provide for greater shareholder voting than trust-
type funds.  In the United States, a mutual fund, as a corporation organized under state 
law, must grant voting rights to its shareholders in accordance with state corporate law.
68 
Moreover, the Investment Company Act grants additional voting rights to shareholders, 
beyond those given by state corporate law.  Such shareholder voting rights include 
election of directors, changes to fundamental policies with respect to key investment 
activities, approval of the initial management contract, subsequent changes to the 




 In contrast, trust-type funds provide few voting rights to investors.  In the United 
Kingdom, for example, unit trust investors may vote on only four issues: (1) amendment 
of the trust deed, if the trustee and manager consent, (2) approval of a manager to depart 
from a policy set forth in the prospectus, (3) removal of the manager, and (4) merger of 
the fund with another fund or other body.
70
  In many other countries following the trust 





 68. The Investment Company Act also mandates these rights for funds of non-corporate form, such as 
trusts. 
 69. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 70. See VAUGHAN, supra note 63, at 76 (discussing voting rights in the United Kingdom). 
 71. See Managing Money: A Legal Guide to the World’s Investment Fund Markets, INT‟L. FIN. L. REV. 
(Mar. 1990), at 101-02; The Inv. Trust Ass‟n of Japan, Investment Trusts in Japan 6 (1990), cited in Wang, 
supra note 62, at 962. 
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B. Purported Advantages of the Trust Model 
 As noted above, the trust model places the investment adviser (or its equivalent, 
the investment manager) at the center.  That is, the investment manager provides and 
coordinates all fund operations.  It is not solely one of several outside service providers.  
While the corporate model assigns legally separate roles to the sponsor, the investment 
adviser, the distributor, and the administrator, in the trust model, these functions are all 
performed by the investment manager. 
 Advocates of the trust model cite efficiency as a justification for combining these 
functions.  Running a mutual fund involves coordinated execution of multiple tasks.  
Since the functions are complimentary activities, advocates argue that they can be 
performed more efficiently by a single entity. 
 It is not only more efficient, but also easier to assess performance if those tasks are 
accomplished by a single entity.  Combining functions makes it easier to evaluate 
performance and provide incentives.  In a trust-type fund, the investment manager can set 
a single, fixed fee in exchange for all services necessary for a fund‟s operation.  All fund 
expenses are paid out of that single fee or from the investment manager‟s own resources.  
This unitary, or bundled, fee structure greatly simplifies the investors‟ ability to evaluate 
bottom-line fund expenses as well as net mutual fund performance.  In contrast, corporate 
funds have much more complex fee structures.  Corporate funds, acting through their 
boards of directors, enter into multiple service contracts with separate service providers, 
each with its own fee and expense provisions.  But this approach produces, in the 
aggregate, a complex fee structure. The problem is compounded by the fact that, in 
corporate funds, the allocation of costs among service providers is somewhat arbitrary.
72
 
 Combining functions may benefit investors in other ways, according to advocates.  
As the provider of all services, the investment manager becomes fully responsible for the 
design and operation, and success and failure, of the fund.  The fund is not independent 
of the investment manager, but rather part of it, just as any financial product the 
investment manager offers.  A trust mutual fund is, in a sense, a proprietary product 
whose success or failure directly impacts the reputation of the investment manager. 
 Another advantage of the trust model is that it likely reflects investor perceptions 
 
 72. See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 9, at 82-83 (discussing problems in allocating costs ). 
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of their relationship to their fund, even in the United States.  Typical investors in U.S. 
mutual funds do not think of themselves as owners of the fund, though legally they are.  
More likely they view themselves as customers of the investment adviser.  For instance, 
investors in the Fidelity Magellan Fund most likely view it as Fidelity‟s fund, not a fund 
that they own as shareholders, and they likely view themselves as contracting with 




C. SEC Consideration of Trust Proposals 
 The SEC‟s Division of Investment Management considered permitting mutual 
funds to organize pursuant to an alternative governance structure in the early 1990s, and 
rejected the idea.
74
 Two alternatives to a corporate model were considered: the Unitary 
Investment Fund and the Unified Fee Investment Company. 
 In concept, the Unitary Investment Fund (UIF) follows the trust model closely.  
Specifically, the UIF would be a mutual fund organized in trust form and would be 
operated under the management of a sponsor, without the provision for a board of 
trustees elected by shareholders.
75
  Instead, the sponsor/manager would act as the fund‟s 
trustee.  A trust indenture would spell out fundamental investment policies and the 
management fee.  Investors would hold non-voting interests in the trust.  In return for the 
elimination of shareholder voting and fund boards, the UIF would be required to operate 
in accordance with its trust indenture, and the UIF‟s manager would limit itself to a single 
management fee to cover all operating expenses (except extraordinary expenses and 
shareholder account services).  The fee would be set forth in the trust indenture and be 
subject to a statutory maximum, which the SEC could adjust.  The trust indenture could 
not be amended for a certain period (perhaps five years) without an SEC exemptive 
order.  Thereafter, it could be amended upon adequate prior notice to investors, who 
could respond by redeeming. 
 The advantage of the UIF is its simplified governance structure, with neither voting 
 
 73. Paula A. Tkac, Mutual Funds: Temporary Problem or Permanent Morass?, ECON. REV. (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.), Fourth Quarter 2004, at 1, 2, available at 
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 74. See 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 253 (deciding that the current model should be retained). 
The SEC first floated the idea in a concept paper in 1982. Advance Notice and Request for Comment, 
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 75. 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 282-88. 
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shareholders nor a board of directors, and a simple fee arrangement.  However, the UIF 
was criticized by the Division along several lines.
76
  The Division first pointed out that 
boards in the corporate model do more than police fees.  They also police potential 
transactions that would transfer value from investors to the adviser or its affiliates.  The 
Division, consequently, called for an independent monitor to accompany the UIF 
proposal, which role might be performed by either an independent trustee or the SEC 
through oversight and examination.  However, in the end, the Division felt that the added 
cost of an independent monitor would undermine the initial rationale for the 
trust/contractual model.
77
  Second, the Division took the position that shareholder voting 
rights “serve an important communicative and deterrent function, particularly in 
circumstances where there are impediments to redemption.”
78
  Thus, although the 
Division acknowledged that “the current voting structure is a „ritualistic anachronism,‟” it 
chose to retain the traditional corporate model and eliminate certain shareholder voting 




Consequently, the Division “concluded that a contractual or UIF structure is 
fundamentally incompatible with the regulatory philosophy of the Act, which relies on 
boards of directors to monitor investment company operations and resolve conflicts of 
interest.”
80
  The Division stated that “implementation of the UIF concept would require a 




 Having rejected the UIF proposal, the Division considered a compromise: the 
Unified Fee Investment Company (UFIC), which retained the board of directors feature 
of the corporate model, retained some shareholder voting rights and eliminated others, 
and added the single fee aspect of the trust model.
82
  Under the UFIC proposal, two-thirds 
of the board would be independent.  The board, including the independent directors 
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 77. See id. at 285 (explaining that without demonstrable savings there is no reason to replace the current 
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voting separately, would review and approve all material contracts, including the 
management contract, and would have the right to terminate any contract at any time.  
However, the board would have no role with respect to fund fees.  Instead, the UFIC 
would have a single, unified fee which would cover all operating expenses (except 
extraordinary expenses and shareholder account services).  The fee would be displayed 
prominently in the prospectus, sales materials, and advertisements, and would be set by 
competitive pressures in the marketplace.  Shareholders would no longer have the right to 
vote with respect to the fund‟s advisory contract.  Instead, they would receive 90 days 
notice of any management or advisory fee changes, and would be expected to redeem 
their shares if they disagreed with the changes (there would be no sales charges or 
redemption fees).  Shareholders would retain all other voting rights that they had.
83
 
 However, the Division downplayed the importance of the UFIC proposal, placing a 
discussion of it in Chapter 8 of its report (“The Sale of Open-End Investment Company 
Shares”) instead of in Chapter 7 (“Investment Company Governance”), with a discussion 
of the UIF.  The Division appeared to consider the UFIC to be merely a modified version 
of the corporate model, rather than an alternative to it.
84
 
 An important factor in the Division‟s rejection of these proposals was an estimate 
of the cost of corporate governance structures.  The Division rejected the idea that the 
corporate governance structure is more costly than a trust structure.  The Division 
determined that the elimination of the corporate structure “would result in only minimal 
cost savings.”
85
  However, in reaching this conclusion, the Division did not make a fully 
informed decision.  First, it did not conduct its own study or rely upon an independent 
study.  Instead, it based its decision on estimates provided by three mutual fund 
complexes.
86
  The authors of these submissions would have had a vested interest in 
continuing the current system.
87
  Moreover, one can question whether three estimates are 
sufficient.  Further, the three estimates had very narrow scopes, looking at direct costs 
only, such as fees and expenses of independent directors, the cost of proxy solicitations, 
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the cost of counsel for the independent directors, and the cost to prepare materials and 
reports to directors.  These estimates did not address the potentially greater costs of a 
corporate governance structure that diverts resources away from fund management in 
order to comply with corporate governance requirements and that empowers boards of 
directors whose interests are not aligned with shareholders.  In contrast to these direct 
cost, industry-sponsored studies considered by the SEC, this dissertation takes a more 
comprehensive approach, using regression analysis, to empirically assess the impact of 




 This chapter has described the efforts by U.S. lawmakers and regulators to mitigate 
the principal-agent conflict inherent in mutual fund creation and operation.  The U.S. 
approach, requiring that all mutual funds have boards of directors and grant shareholder 
voting rights to their investors, is characterized as a corporate model.  Both Congress and 
the SEC, however, implicitly believe that the corporate model has not been sufficiently 
effective.  Since the inception of the Investment Company Act, the SEC has sought to 
enhance the independence and effectiveness of mutual fund boards of directors.  Most 
recently, in 2001, the SEC adopted rules that required independent directors to comprise 
at least a majority of each mutual fund‟s board (the previous requirement had been 40%), 
and that required independent directors to be selected and nominated only by other 
independent directors.
88
  Since 2004, the SEC has pursued numerous additional changes 
pertaining to fund governance, including requirements that independent directors 
comprise at least 75% of each mutual fund‟s board, and that an independent director chair 
each fund‟s board.
89
  The SEC has been reviewing, revising, and adopting rules and 
regulations pertaining to fund governance throughout the more than six decade existence 
of the Investment Company Act.
90
     
 If the corporate model has not been sufficiently effective at mitigating principal-
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 See supra note 3.  Over the years, shareholder voting rights have also been emphasized and expanded by 
the SEC.  See discussion accompanying supra notes 50 and 51. 
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agent conflict in mutual funds, perhaps Congress and the SEC should look to the United 
Kingdom.  British authorities have historically relied upon the strict fiduciary duties of 
trust law to mitigate principal-agent conflict within mutual funds.  However, since 1997, 
British regulators have allowed investors to choose whether to invest in funds organized 
as trusts or as corporations.  The British experiment with organizational competition has 
produced a useful set of data, analyzed in chapters II and III, regarding the effects of 
organizational form.  The empirical evidence from chapter II and III reveals that 
differences in fiduciary rules across organizational forms have non-trivial implications 
for investors.  This dissertation finds that fiduciary rules have implications for investors 
in terms of expenses, risk taking, and performance.  One caveat, however, is that this 
dissertation has not analyzed other potential differences between trusts and corporations, 
such as different reliance on rules versus discretion.  Nevertheless, the fiduciary 
obligation is the heart of organizational law.  And the empirical evidence indicates that 
the difference in underlying fiduciary obligations exerts significant effects, all else being 
equal.      
 The evidence from the British fund industry suggests that regulatory change in the 
U.S. could benefit American investors.  Permitting a trust alternative to the U.S. 
corporate governance model may benefit American investors by offering them greater 
choice.  Organizational competition in the U.S. fund industry would enable American 
investors to choose to invest in funds that subject themselves to the stricter fiduciary rules 
of trust law, or to opt for funds that subject themselves to the looser fiduciary rules of 
corporate law backed by boards and voting rights.  Different organizational structures 
would appeal to different investor clienteles.  Some clienteles would prefer the trust-type 
funds, with their relatively cheap and low risk-return profile, while other clienteles would 
prefer the corporate-type funds, with their relatively more expensive and more aggressive 
profile.  With organizational competition, American investors could decide the tradeoff 
themselves, a decision now made for them by regulators under the current one-size-fits-
all governance model.  Moreover, chapter III shows that a loosening of restrictions on 
organizational form fosters competition within the fund industry, resulting in an 
improvement in risk-adjusted performance (at the cost, however, of greater risk-taking 





 Overall, the evidence analyzed in this dissertation suggests that a business‟s legal 
form of organization has a non-trivial impact on managerial behavior, risk taking, and 
performance.   The results have implications for corporate governance design, suggesting 
that enhancing investor protection through heightened fiduciary duties can reduce agency 
costs and managerial risk-taking behavior, but at the expense of lower risk-adjusted 
performance.  The results, therefore, suggest that fiduciary liability can be a policy tool to 
lower the direct costs of financial services and risk–seeking behavior within the industry.  
These benefits, however, must be exchanged for diminished risk-adjusted performance. 
 
